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Canada is a country often painted as a unifying power and an honest broker in world 
affairs. She has a respected history within the United Nations and a tradition of 
championing international norms, especially to curtail dangerous actions amongst the 
community of nations. From NAFTA to peacekeeping missions, she has carved a 
respected niche in global politics, perhaps fairer than her domestic situation warrants. 
Recent economic and environmental problems challenge this legacy of international 
cooperation and the rule of law with poor implementation of key international treaties. 
Environmental problems, in particular, have not translated into robust environmental 
policies even though Canadian identity is intrinsically woven with the concepts of nature 
and stewardship. The issue of climate change is a case in point: Canada was one of the 
earliest and most vocal supporters of the international climate change regime, and 
simultaneously, one of the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitters per capita. The 
government signed the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) with a commitment to lower emissions by 6% of 1990 levels; yet 
emissions rose by 19% by the end of the commitment period. The country appears to 
suffer from a Jekyll and Hyde syndrome: defending international norms and the rule of 
law whilst at the same time ignoring the very treaties she fought to create. This thesis 
explores how the federal Canadian government shifted from being an international leader 
to a laggard in the Kyoto Protocol; and in doing so it will explain the socio-economic and 
political forces that shaped Canada’s Kyoto strategy. A grounded theory research design 
was used, combining key informant interviews, policy document analysis, and participant 
observation. The case study raises important questions for a country such as Canada with 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
In the history of climate change politics, the Kyoto Protocol has been a lightning-rod 
issue in foreign affairs. Although the Protocol was only intended as a modest first step to 
combat climate change, by setting legally binding targets to reduce global greenhouse gas 
emissions internationally by -5% of 1990 levels, it was dogged by controversy from its 
inception. Climate scientists and green groups labelled it weak and ineffective; industry 
groups and political leaders described it a ‘socialist plot’ to funnel money to developing 
countries. As the international community struggles to negotiate a more ambitious 
successor to the Kyoto Protocol, important questions arise about why this Protocol 
succeeded in some countries and misfired in others.  
Canada was one of the original flag-bearers for international action on climate 
change, and for the Kyoto Protocol in particular, but also one of its biggest failures. The 
country was a forerunner in the Protocol negotiations, with multilateral environmental 
agreements traditionally enjoying strong support from the population. Yet Canada came 
nowhere close to actually meeting her Kyoto target. In 1997, the Government of Canada 
agreed to lower greenhouse gas emissions by -6% of 1990 levels; but by 2011 emissions 
had increased by 19% relative to the baseline (See Figure below for the country’s 
trajectory in GHG emissions). This thesis seeks to explain why this happened and how it 
was that Canada failed so spectacularly to meet her international obligations. 
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Figure 1 Growth in Canadian GHG Emissions (Mt CO2e)  
(Source: Environment Canada) 
 
There is now an extensive literature on the polarisation of climate change 
(Boykoff, 2011; Hulme, 2009; Cox, 2010; Demeritt, 2006; Crow and Boykoff, 2014). In 
particular, the UNFCCC negotiations have most often been studied within the context of 
the United States and Europe (Giddens, 2011; Compston and Bailey, 2008; Schröder, 
2001; Patterson, 1996; Mintzer and Leonard, 1994; O’Riordan and Jäger, 1996); 
however, Canada’s participation is significant because it appears to represent a paradox. 
The country suffers from a Jekyll and Hyde syndrome of being one of the most vocal 
supporters of the UNFCCC; and simultaneously, one of the world’s largest greenhouse 
gas emitters per capita. The Conservative government came into power in 2006 and is 
blamed for Canada’s tarnished international image, exacerbated by its decision to 
withdraw from Kyoto in 2011. Indeed, the party largely dismantled the country’s federal 
climate change programme. However, emissions rose unabated for nearly ten years 
previously under the Liberal Party between 1993 to 2006 – a party that dedicated 
significant political effort and roughly $3.7 billion CAD to meet its Kyoto targets. There 
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are many untested explanations as to why Canada failed, but relatively little academic 
study on the factors that influenced Canada’s Kyoto strategy. The country raises many 
unanswered questions, and the lessons learned have significance for climate politics both 
within Canada and in other federalist countries.  
 
1.1 Aim of this Thesis 
This thesis explores how the federal Canadian government shifted from being an 
international leader to a laggard in the Kyoto Protocol; and in doing so it will explain the 
socio-economic and political forces that shaped Canada’s Kyoto strategy. The aim is not 
to grade the effectiveness of federal policies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
There have been many notable studies on different types of climate change policies both 
within Canada and elsewhere (See Bernstein et al., 2008; Helm and Hepburn, 2009; 
Bakvis and Skogstad, 2008; NRTEE, 2012). Instead, the objective of this thesis is to test 
some of the major assumptions surrounding the Government of Canada’s participation in 
the Protocol and to explain why the federal government pursued the course of action it 
did. In particular, the thesis seeks to answer the following research questions:  
1. How and why did international norms and strategic interests align and motivate 
the Government of Canada’s early support for the Kyoto Protocol? 
2. What were the limits on unilateral action by the federal government and how did 
provincial demands and federal-provincial coordination processes shape climate 
change policies in Canada?  
3. How, why, and with what wider effects did pressure from organised interest 
groups shape Canada’s response to the Kyoto Protocol? 
4. What lessons can we learn about Canada’s participation in the Kyoto Protocol, for 
both the country and other federalist countries? 
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There are many reasons why Canada’s behaviour in the Kyoto Protocol appears to be a 
paradox. As eloquently observed by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, ‘[w]hen we are 
puzzled by the happening in foreign affairs’, which raises questions as to why and how 
the government acts the way it does, ‘one typically puts himself or herself in the place of 
the nation, or national government, confronting a problem of foreign affairs, and tries to 
figure out why one might have chosen the action in question’ (1999, p. 2-3). Treating a 
national government ‘as a centrally coordinated, purposive individual’ (Allison and 
Zelikow, 1999, p. 3) can be an appropriate frame of analysis when decisions reside with 
one or a few key individuals. There are certainly critical moments where the decision to 
pursue or abandon Kyoto came down to one decision-maker in Canada: the Prime 
Minister. However, this raises further questions about the knowledge base and beliefs of 
such individuals (what Herbert Simon (1985) referred to as ‘bounded rationality’). For 
example, was the Prime Minister guided by strategic material interests or international 
norms of environmental stewardship and multilateralism? Moreover, one must not 
minimise the importance of the structure of the political system, the heterogeneous nature 
of government as an organisation, and especially the different levels of government in a 
federalist system. Different departments can often exhibit unique bureaucratic cultures 
and pursue competing agendas. Federalist countries add further difficulty in the analysis 
because of the domestic division of powers between the federal and provincial/state 
governments, both de jure and de facto. In many ways, Canada’s participation in Kyoto 
can be viewed as a two-level game of negotiation: the international level between 
countries and the domestic level between the federal and provincial governments who 
must share control over environmental and energy policy. Globalisation also increases the 
influence of non-state actors and questions the singular importance of “the state” in world 
politics. Pluralism and constructivism within human geography abandon the traditional 
state-centric approach in international relations and political science. They focus on the 
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bargaining that occurs within government and the competing interests and ideas from 
different departments and non-state actors; as well as the role of the media reacting to and 
shaping public opinion. Furthermore, critical theorists and historical sociologists argue 
there is a false dichotomy between the state and society which needs to be dismantled. As 
E. Fuat Keyman proposes, 
‘the interrelationship between the two constructs of the state and society 
must be understood in both theoretical and empirical terms. In other words, 
it is not “either the state or society” but “both the state and society” […] The 
either/or logic [replaced by] “the both/and” logic’ (1994, p. 154). 
We cannot completely escape a state-centric approach when examining Kyoto since 
international law assigns national governments with the power to negotiate on behalf of a 
country and a population, and thus become the gatekeepers for international agreements 
such as the UNFCCC.1 However, it is vital not to treat “the state” as a monolithic entity; 
or even a rational actor, simply because it is the national government that has the final 
constitutional power to sign and ratify such an agreement.  
The second reason Canada’s behaviour in the Kyoto Protocol raises so many 
questions is because there are various widespread but untested explanations about state 
action and climate change politics (as well as a large amount of misinformation and 
hyperbole that surrounds this polarised issue), especially pertaining to countries, such as 
Canada, that receive less critical, academic analysis. For example, did Canada join Kyoto 
but fail to act simply because the government was motivated more by appearing “green” 
than championing action on climate change? Or was it a simple case of buyer’s remorse? 
Or did the federal government lack the power and political muscle to act without the 
provinces also on side? Or was the federal government in the pocket of powerful interest 
groups, namely the growing fossil fuel sector?  
                                                
1 Moreover, state-centric approaches in academia and multilateral international negotiations can 
be harmful by excluding or marginalising indigenous peoples (Smith and Parks, 2010). 
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Figure 2 Chrétien and Canada Not Complying with the Kyoto Protocol 
 (Source: Dolighan, n.d.) 
 
Interestingly, our interpretation of state action reveals ‘regular and predictable 
characteristics that reflect unrecognised assumptions about the character of puzzles, the 
categories in which problems should be considered, the types of evidence that are 
relevant, and the determinants of occurrences’ (Allison and Zelikow, 1999, p. 4). Our 
untested assumptions echo competing worldviews and theoretical propositions of “the 
state” and politics. They can also become an initial starting-point to identify common 
theoretical explanations which can be tested by evidence and against one another.  
This thesis is inspired by the work of Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence 
of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (1971), and Robert Putnam’s 
“Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games” (1988); using a 
critical realist, human geography methodology. These scholars examined challenging 
foreign policy topics using multiple theoretical perspectives and levels of analysis to 
compare the ability of each to explain the motivation behind decision-making and the 
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course of events. This approach is instructive by allowing the researcher not only to test 
the explanatory power of multiple theoretical propositions simultaneously but also to 
capture and represent a wider range of perspectives in the data. In this thesis, as I discuss 
in greater detail in Chapter 2, the research was both exploratory and explanatory. I used a 
grounded theory research design, combining key informant interviews, policy document 
analysis, and participant observation, with multiple theoretical approaches to understand 
and weigh different factors in the analysis: to view Canada’s strategy to Kyoto under 
different “lenses” so-to-speak. Critical events were identified and unpacked to examine 
the most significant factors that influenced the federal government’s Kyoto strategy, as 
well as the barriers and limitations on federal powers to act unilaterally. In fact, the 
failures and missed opportunities to implement Kyoto were more illuminating than the 
successes for investigating the complex set of political, economic, and social variables 
that shape policymaking and the lessons we can derive.2 
 
1.2 Setting the Stage 
Our understanding of past and future climate change has become highly sophisticated 
ever since the French scientist, Jean-Baptiste Fourier, first predicted global warming and 
the greenhouse effect in 1827. Advances in climate science continued, and in the 1950s, 
scientists such as Roger Revelle, Hans Suess, and Harmon Craig drew the connection 
between fossil fuels and rising concentrations of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide 
(CO2). However, at the time, it was believed that fossil fuel production would level off at 
a moderate level and that the Earth’s oceans could absorb extra GHG emissions. It was 
not until 1959 and the work of Bert Bolin and Erik Eriksson that the ocean’s “buffering” 
mechanism was called into question and atmospheric CO2 was calculated to rise 
                                                




exponentially by 25% by the end of the century. For obvious reasons, this raised the 
alarm within the global scientific community and, in 1979, the first World Climate 
Conference was held by the World Meteorological Organization calling on governments 
‘to foresee and prevent potential man-made changes in climate’. Prominent Canadians 
such as Maurice Strong,3 Kenneth Hare,4 James Bruce,5 Howard Ferguson,6 and Arthur 
Collins,7 were politically active throughout this first response, which became a source of 
pride for the Government of Canada and helped foster a sense of Canadian ownership of 
the climate change problem.  
In addition, in 1988 the Toronto Conference on Changing Atmosphere was held in 
Canada, which was the first time that government formally addressed the problem of 
climate change. It helped that 1987 was the hottest year in recorded history and that the 
Conference produced both the International Panel on Climate Change and set out the 
optimistic goal to reduce GHG emissions by 20% of 1988 levels by 1995 (the same 
expressed by the Canadian government at the time). Of course, the objective was never 
realised; however, the IPCC would prove to be a major impetus for international political 
action. It was established jointly by the WMO and UNEP to ‘assess on a comprehensive, 
objective, open, and transparent basis the scientific, technical, and socio-economic 
information relevant to understanding the scientific basis of risk of human-induced 
climate change’. The IPCC Response Strategies Working Group in 1990 also appointed 
Canada, Malta, and the United Kingdom to develop the initial framework convention on 
climate change in advance of negotiations. That year the Government of Canada released 
The Green Plan, which allocated $175 million CAD to GHG emission reduction policies 
                                                
3 First Director of the United Nations Environment Programme. 
4 One of the organisers of the First World Climate Conference, 1979. Later appointed first Chair of the 
Canadian Climate Program Board. 
5 Chaired the 1985 Villach Conference, “Assessment of the Role of Carbon Dioxide and of Other 
Greenhouse Gases in Climate Variations and Associated Impacts”. 
6 Organised the Second World Climate Conference, 1990. 
7 Assistant Deputy Minister, Atmospheric Environment Service who later formed the Canadian Climate 
Centre and the Canadian Climate Program Board. 
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using “soft” policies such as research, public education, energy efficiency, and support 
for renewable energy.
 
The momentum of the Toronto Conference carried through to 1992 during the 
World Conference on Environment and Development. The now famous Rio Declaration 
established the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The goal was 
to seek ‘stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’ (Article 2). 
The UNFCCC was based largely on the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer and the US–Soviet nuclear-arms agreement (Schiermeier, 2012).8 The 
Montreal Protocol was a natural model since it is arguably the most successful 
international environmental agreement to date leading to the emission reductions of 
compounds that threaten the stratospheric ozone layer. The Montreal Protocol was 
established in 1987 with significant amendments in 1990 and 1992. The rationale behind 
multilateral action and rule by consensus were translated from the Montreal Protocol to 
the UNFCCC process including the principle of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibility’ and calculating emissions reductions as a percentage against a “business-
as-normal” baseline. The 1990 baseline which was eventually agreed under Kyoto would 
become a major issue for domestic opposition within Canada as it was seen to give 
European countries, who were transitioning away from “dirtier” forms of energy, with an 
unfair advantage.  
 The first Conference of the Parties (COP1) under the UNFCCC was held in 1995 
in Berlin. Even at this first Conference it was evident that existing commitments were 
inadequate for meeting the UNFCCC goals and the ‘Berlin Mandate’ was established to 
strengthen the commitments through a protocol or other legal instrument using quantified 
                                                
8 As explained by Gwyn Prins, who studies environmental politics at the London School of Economics and 
acted as an advisor for the British negotiating team in 1992, ‘[t]ake out nuclear warheads, put in CO2 — the 
basic idea was as easy as that’ (Quoted in Schiermeier, 2012, online). 
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emission targets. The inclusion of a “legally binding” measure was a surprising 
development on the part of developed countries, especially from the United States.  
Although the United States linked its support for such commitments and timetables to 
“flexible mechanisms” it, nonetheless, represented a significant step in the negotiations 
and brought renewed optimism going forward (Schröder, 2001, p. 62). In 1995, the 
Canadian government launched the National Action Program on Climate Change, which 
created the Voluntary Challenge and Registry for companies to submit voluntary 
greenhouse gas emission policies and reports, retrofits for federal buildings, and once 
again public education.  
Throughout this period, environmental nongovernment organisations pushed for 
stronger commitments and action from states, and helped to find common ground over 
contentious issues. For example, the compromise over “joint implementation” (whereby 
parties to the Convention can implement climate change policies jointly with other parties 
or assist other countries in reaching their own domestic commitments [Article 4.2(a)]) 
was originally conceived by ENGOs. As Matthew Patterson explained, ‘[t]he origin of 
“joint implementation”, as it became known, can be traced to a workshop organised by 
the Center for International Climate and Energy Research, an NGO based in Oslo, in July 
1991’ (Hanisch cited in Patterson, 1996, p. 110). The Canadian ENGO, the International 
Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), was also officially in charge of reporting on 
the UNFCCC negotiations: producing daily summaries (“Earth News Bulletins”) which 
reported the daily events, issues under negotiation, and important proposals and 
submissions.  
Following from COP1 in 1995, the “Ad Hoc Group” was formed to begin 
negotiations on the legally binding commitments with the self-imposed deadline of 
COP3. The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change was created at the Conference in 1997; and so made the starting point for this 
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thesis. It was a surprising development in international consensus as OECD countries 
under Annex I signed up to legally binding emissions targets, something usually reserved 
only for security or economic agreements. While many environmentalists argue that the 
Kyoto targets should have been more stringent, in terms of international law, Kyoto was 
remarkable since it holds developed countries to mandatory commitments. In fact ‘[t]he 
speed with which scientific knowledge of climate change has been translated into an 
international diplomatic consensus is remarkable, if not unprecedented’ (Demeritt, 2001, 
p. 307). This was even more so because many countries in North America and Europe 
signed the Kyoto Protocol with little understanding of implementation and the costs and 
benefits to their national economies.  
 
1.3 Three Perspectives 
Historically there has been little academic study of Canada within the field of climate 
change policy and politics, although this has improved in recent years especially in 
comparative research with other countries (Steinberg and VanDeveer, 2012; Harrison and 
Sundstrom, 2010; Compston and Bailey, 2008).  The most notable scholars contributing 
research on Canada and the politics of climate change are Steven Bernstein, Douglas 
Macdonald, and Kathryn Harrison. These scholars address similar domestic and 
international political, economic and institutional factors hindering Canadian climate 
change policy; although approaching the topic from different disciplines. For example, 
Bernstein (2002) examines Canada’s response to Kyoto from an international relations 
perspective and the process in which international pressures can influence domestic 
policies. The work is particularly informative by positioning the analysis within a solid 
theoretical constructivist framework. Macdonald (2001; 2007) examines the business 
lobby in the domestic climate change debate, and Macdonald (2008; 2013) offers insight 
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into the domestic power struggles between the federal and provincial levels of 
government, exacerbated by historic, regional divisions. Harrison and Sundstrom (2010; 
2007) and Harrison (2010; 2007) provide a comparative analysis of Kyoto’s 
implementation in various countries including Canada. In particular, Harrison and 
Sundstrom (2010) tackles the central question about whether Canada, and specifically 
Chrétien’s government, was sincere in its desire to implement Kyoto. Harrison (2010) 
sees Ottawa’s intentions as genuine, but explains how Canada’s decentralised federalist 
system, trade-dependent economy, and shallow public knowledge of climate change 
hindered climate policy.  In particular, electoral disincentives are cited as a major obstacle 
to robust climate policy. 
This thesis is original not only in the depth of research but also in the overall 
conceptual approach. Too often within the social sciences, case-studies are examined 
using one, or sometimes two, theoretical models with various factors tested against the 
model. Sometimes the research is not even explicit about its analytical framework and 
simply investigates a series of factors without situating them under a conceptual umbrella 
for how such factors will be weighed against one another. This thesis starts from the 
understanding that different theoretical models will prioritise different sets of factors, and 
thus lead to a unique reading of events. It is insufficient to study Canadian politics by 
exploring factors such as the economy, political ideology, parliamentary democracy, 
regionalism, public opinion, and interest groups without first explicit reference to how the 
state and the actions of government are defined, especially since different disciplines and 
models will gravitate towards different scales of analysis (for example international over 
subnational factors, or group over individual action). This thesis is guided by three, 
unique theoretical perspectives of politics; as such, the research is able to not only capture 
a wide range of socio-economic and political factors in the case-study, but offers an 
opportunity to test the explanatory power of each perspective. 
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In addition to these different sets of literature, the research did not focus 
exclusively on the international level analysis as is often the case. The domestic context 
within Canada and the internal political battles and negotiations were often more 
important than Canada’s behaviour at the UNFCCC negotiations themselves. This is 
important since environmental issues, such as climate change, ‘cut across the dividing 
line between domestic politics and international politics in ways not taken sufficiently 
into account by the traditional approaches’ (Jackson and Sørensen, 2003, p. 273). Within 
international relations, several strands ‘have been developed on the basis of there being a 
radical distinction between local, national, and international processes’ which 
environmental issues can undermine (Baylis and Smith, 2001, p. 394). In fact, such 
approaches ‘often require significant revision to take proper account of the particular 
characteristics of environmental issues’ (Baylis and Smith, 1995, p. 393). Finding the 
balance between the international and domestic scales of analysis was a challenging but 
necessary part of this research. 
This thesis is unique in that it was guided in a systematic way by three research 
questions, each of which speak to different over-arching explanatory perspectives. They 
are divided by chapter and encompass sets of theoretical propositions for why Canada 
moved from a leader to a laggard. In doing so, they also offer unique explanations by 
employing subtle yet distinct definitions of the state and examining different sets of 
factors in the political equation. This research does not attempt to merge theories; 
however, side-by-side they offer a more comprehensive analysis of politics resulting from 
their specific strengths and weaknesses. In doing so, the case study becomes explanatory, 
not just descriptive with lessons that can then be generalised and applied to a variety of 
complex government actions (Yin, 2009). The secondary literature defining each 
perspective was folded into the analysis chapters in order to weave the basic framework 
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for each more closely with the discussion to hand; however, below is a brief overview of 
each perspective and approach, broadly framed by the three research questions.  
 
Research Question 1: How and why did international norms and strategic interests 
align and motivate the Government of Canada’s early support for the Kyoto 
Protocol? 
The field of international relations offers an intuitive starting point to examine Canada’s 
foreign policy decision to join the Kyoto Protocol. At its core, IR focuses on the 
conditions for conflict and cooperation between states and much of the literature on 
international institutions and regime formation can be applied to the UNFCCC and Kyoto 
Protocol. Although international relations theory has traditionally been developed for 
economic or security issues; environmental agreements introduce new issues and players 
that offer us the opportunity to refine our understanding of foreign affairs and 
international diplomacy (See Burchill et al., 2001). Climate change even transforms the 
traditional view of security in an environmental context. For example, there have been 
several US Quadrennial Defense Reviews (2006, 2010, 2014) that link climate change to 
national security in the 21st century. Scholars such as Patterson (1996), Porter and Brown 
(1996), and Homer-Dixon (1999) have developed the IR perspective for environmental 
issues, although few focus on the Canadian experience. 
Broadly speaking, international relations adheres to a state-centric approach which 
treats national governments as unified, rational actors, typically personified by the actions 
of key decision-makers (i.e. The Trudeau Doctrine or Bush Doctrine). The question then 
becomes how one defines and weighs their choices, usually framed as “comprehensive” 
or “bounded rationality” (Simon, 1985). The central question posed by the field is 
whether states as rational actors are motivated by strategic, material interests, as the so-
27 
 
called neorealist tradition of IR would have it (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 1994); or 
whether states are also influenced by norms and ideas which frame their decision-making 
process, as an alternative ‘constructivist’ perspective would have it (Wendt, 1992, 1995; 
Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998).9 Put another way, ‘the question of debate is […] whether 
rational choice, deductive-type approaches, or interpretive approaches are most 
appropriate for the study of international cooperation’ (Haas, 1992, p. 3). Unsurprisingly, 
neorealism also holds a higher degree of cynicism for international cooperation while 
social constructivists see opportunity for extended periods of cooperation galvanised 
around issues, such as environmentalism or human rights. Most foreign policy is 
examined as a cost-benefit analysis in which a government’s objectives are measured 
against various options and consequences; however, constructivism (and to a lesser extent 
international institutionalism) also includes the role of norms in decision-making 
processes. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, this conceptualisation of the 
state and of the role of interests versus ideas is an important but contentious area of study 
within the field. Two theories capture this debate: neorealism and social constructivism 
(not to be confused with “constructivism” in human geography), which offer competing 
views about whether material interests or norms shape foreign policy and, crucially, the 
perception of national interest amongst key decision-makers. Chapter 3 explores the 
degree to which norms of environmental stewardship and multilateralism aligned with 
Canada’s national interest in the early Kyoto Protocol negotiations.  
Neorealism and constructivism provide an instructive framework for examining 
the international level dynamics between states, the macro-patterns in state-level 
decision-making processes exemplified by different notions of interest, norms and 
rational behaviour. However, Canada is a highly decentralised federalist country, and 
                                                
9 Constructivism within IR views state interests as ‘constructed’ through values rather than being self-
evident as neorealists. This is different from the way that constructivism has been used by geographers in an 
anti-essentialist mode to refer to the construction of things or knowledge or both (Demeritt, 2002). 
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examining the rationale behind federal policy is only one side of the coin. There remain 
many unanswered questions including whether the federal government even had the 
power to implement Kyoto without the provinces (research question two); as well as the 
power of organised interest groups and the heterogeneous nature of the federal 
government itself which challenges the notion of the state as a unified actor (research 
question three).  
 
Research Question 2: What were the limits on unilateral action by the federal 
government and how did provincial demands and federal-provincial coordination 
processes shape climate change policies in Canada?  
Expanding the rational actor model, the second research question focuses on the structure 
of the state, institutional architecture and division of powers between the federal and 
provincial governments which put the brakes on Canada’s Kyoto ambitions. Although the 
federal government is still treated as a unified entity in this analysis; it is not assumed to 
be the most powerful. Whereas foreign policy and treaty-making are powers held by the 
federal government; in Canada, power over environmental and energy policy 
predominately resides with the provinces (although the federal government does retain 
some important levers over taxation, the criminal code, and under the ‘peace, order, and 
good government’ clause of the constitution). As Chapter 4 will examine, a majority 
federal government in Canada can ratify international treaties without the provinces, but 
then has limited powers to act unilaterally to implement them. This reality of the 
federalist system has posed significant barriers for many issues such as energy policy, 
health care, and constitutional amendments (i.e. the Meech Lake Accord), and provides a 
powerful argument for why Canada struggled to implement her emission reductions to 
which she had pledged herself when signing the Kyoto Protocol.  
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Drawing on literature from political science and political geography, Chapter 4 
examines the distribution of power within the Canadian state, the need for strong 
executive-to-executive coordination between federal and provincial governments, and the 
multiple veto points within the federalist system. Special attention is dedicated to why 
there was a five-year gap between signing and ratifying the Protocol, especially 
considering the Liberal Party enjoyed a comfortable majority in the House of Commons. 
Robert Putnam’s metaphor of two-level diplomacy (1988) suggests that in matters of 
foreign policy, domestic level negotiations are equally important to the analysis as the 
international level negotiations. This is amplified in a highly decentralised and regionally 
divided country such as Canada. Thus, the power dynamics between Ottawa and the 
provinces takes centre stage in the analysis.  
 
Research Question 3: How, why, and with what wider effects did pressure from 
organised interest groups shape Canada’s response to the Kyoto Protocol? 
Although the division of powers in a federalist country is crucial, an exclusive focus on 
structure and institutions ignores the potential role and influence of external actors in 
framing the issue, setting the agenda, and exerting both direct and indirect pressure on the 
actions of the state. The final research question thus widens the aperture to examine the 
degree to which interest groups shaped the climate change agenda and exerted influence 
over the government’s Kyoto mandate. The rational actor model of the first two 
approaches is put to one side and instead the federal government is treated as one actor 
amongst many in Canada.  
Within international relations, homogenising the state works well for examining 
inter-state and intrastate bargaining (the analogy of players on a chessboard is often 
employed). However, by generalising the state as a unified, rational actor, one loses sight 
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of the heterogeneous nature of the state, which may, in fact, hide the explanations behind 
the course of events. As summarised by Allison and Zelikow, ‘differences matter’: 
‘[t]he apparatus of each national government constitutes a complex arena for the 
international game. Political leaders at the top of the apparatus are joined by 
officials who occupy positions on top of major organisations to form a circle of 
central players. […] Beyond the central arena, successive, concentric circles 
encompass lower level officials in the executive branch, the press, NGOs, and 
the public. Ongoing struggles in outer circles help shape decision situations 
among players who can affect the government’s choice and action in the case in 
question’ (Allison and Zelikow, 1999, p. 255-6). 
Here external actors are given prominence and the actions of government are treated as 
the outcome of a series of micro-political games between state and non-state players. 
Literature on organisational behaviour (North, 1990; Allison and Zelikow, 1999), 
epistemic communities and social learning (Haas, 1992, 2000; Demeritt, 2001), and 
especially pluralism and business dominance theory (Macdonald, 2001) are used to 
explore the channels of influence for both internal and external lobbying, group choice, 
and bureaucratic culture. These different sets of literature may not appear similar at first 
glance, but they focus on the fabric of government and the politics within, rather than 
treating the state as a monolithic entity with a singular objective. It is less about the state 
as a rational actor, or even the structure of the system; but rather about the channels of 
influence for non-state actors – looking beyond the state to powerful vested interests that 
can shape government policy. Influential stakeholders such as environmental 
nongovernment organisations, labour unions, major trade associations and others which 








Table 1 Breakdown by Research Question 
 Level of Analysis  Primary Actor(s) Critical Factors 
RQ 1 International States International Norms & 
Strategic Interests 
RQ 2 Domestic Federal & Provincial 
Government 
Structure of the State 
RQ 3 Domestic Interest Groups & the 
State  
Internal & External 
Lobbying 
 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
Each lens of analysis offers a different piece of the puzzle to study the paradox around 
Canada’s evolution from forerunner to straggler in the Kyoto Protocol. Collectively, they 
highlight complementary scales of analysis from the international to subnational; and 
epistemological interpretations. Although the literature draws upon varying academic 
fields, at their core, they wrestle with the same fundamental questions about “the state” 
and the relative importance of ideas, institutional structures, and external interests in 
determining policy outcomes. There will be few easy answers but Canada’s failure to 
implement Kyoto offers the opportunity to assess multiple factors simultaneously and to 
refine our understanding of how policy is formed within a federalist system. In doing so, 
failed agreements like Kyoto allow us to unravel international and domestic politics and 
improve our theoretical understanding.  
 To that end, the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the research 
approach and methodology. Due to the sensitive nature of the political topic and the 
multiple theoretical approaches that will be woven together, a carefully designed, 
grounded theory approach was chosen. Chapter 2 explains how the research moved from 
exploratory to explanatory analysis, how the different theories were built upon one 
another like scaffolding of a building, and how the data was collected. Special attention is 
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given to how in-depth interviews were structured, as well as methods of data triangulation 
and cross validation. 
 This is followed by three analytical chapters encompassing the three perspectives 
or lenses of analysis as outlined above (Section 1.3). They loosely follow the chronology 
of events so that, by the end, the reader has a thorough understanding of the course of 
events. Chapter 3 provides the first approach rooted in international relations theory 
which asks: how did international norms and strategic interests align and motivate the 
Government of Canada’s early support for the Kyoto Protocol? The early exploratory data 
collection revealed that the Government of Canada was motivated principally by strategic 
issues related to reputation, their relative position with the United States, and deep-seated 
support for multilateralism and environmental stewardship amongst the Canadian public 
and decision-makers of the time. Chapter 3 dissects each of these threads to understand to 
what degree norms influence Canadian foreign policy. The chapter also explores concerns 
over international reputation and the relationship to the United States; which not only 
speaks to the neorealist view within IR but a feature of Canadian politics and academia 
around the country’s position in the world. Given the nature of the inquiry, the research 
draws heavily from in-depth interviews with political insiders (members of the Canadian 
UNFCCC delegations, Ministers of Environment, government officials, as well as 
esteemed observers who have worked closely with the federal government). The findings 
were analysed through both a neorealist and social constructivist view of the state and 
foreign policy. Neorealism treats the actions of the Canadian government in strategic 
terms; whereas social constructivism explores the formation of state interest instead of 
treating them as a given. As explained above, by using both approaches, there is a more 




 Chapter 3 provides a starting line in the overall analysis but the story cannot focus 
exclusively on the international level. While international relations theory offers a 
satisfactory explanation for why the federal government of Canada under Chrétien joined 
the Kyoto Protocol, the government’s overall strategy and action over the next nine years 
cannot be extrapolated from this vantage point alone. Thus, Chapter 4 considers 
implementation and explores the extent to which Canada’s actions after 1997 were 
ultimately driven by the structure of the federalist state and division of powers within the 
country. Drawing on work from political science and political geography, the chapter 
focuses on the domestic level politics between Ottawa and the provinces between 1997 
and 2010, with particular attention to a) the powers of the federal government to act 
unilaterally and the political costs associated with different policy options, b) the 
diminished capacity of the federal and provincial governments in policy formation, c) the 
domestic-federal consultation process and its ability to establish consensus, and d) the 
multiple veto points in the Canadian federalist system which hindered Ottawa’s Kyoto 
ambitions. The analysis also branches out to the wider history of two-level politics 
between the federal and provincial governments, including the legacy of the National 
Energy Program (NEP). The data focuses on primary sources including government 
reports, minutes from Parliamentary debates, official government communiqués and press 
releases, and media sources. However, in-depth interviews with government insiders were 
vital to contextualise the government sources, especially the conflict between Ottawa and 
the provinces and the political tactics of the latter. This period in Canada’s climate change 
policy becomes even more fascinating as the provinces have since moved ahead without 
the federal government. This gives weight to the hypothesis that the structure of the 
federalist system, and the disproportionate powers of the provinces, dictates the actions of 
Canada as a whole, or in the case of the Kyoto Protocol, the lack thereof. 
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 Chapter 5 expands the domestic level analysis further to examine perhaps the most 
complicated area under investigation: the role of organised interest groups within Canada 
in shaping the country’s Kyoto strategy. It was also one of the most challenging areas of 
research due to the number of actors under investigation, the scope of the data, and the 
sensitive political nature of the topic. Simply put, no government department wants to be 
seen as in the pocket of business and certain channels of influence proved to be murky 
areas of investigation. The typography of vested interest groups is identified and 
examined through four main channels of influence: campaign finance, agenda-setting, 
investment and capital strike, and subtle, internal influence fostered by a close 
professional relationship with different departments of government, informing their 
policy design. After assessing the relative importance of each in shaping Canada’s 
climate policy, the chapter concludes by reflecting on the significance of its particular 
findings for this wider tradition of explaining policy outcomes as the result of pluralist 
political influence. 
In the final conclusion, Chapter 6, the main empirical findings are summarised 
followed by a critical reflection about the three broad analytical approaches and the 
relative explanatory power of each. The conclusion ends with wider implications for both 
the politics of climate change and politics in Canada along with lessons learned.   
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Chapter 2   Research Approach & Methodology 
The aim of this thesis was to explain climate change policymaking in Canada which 
raised important issues about how one conceptualises power, policymaking, and even the 
very definition of explanation and causation within the social sciences. Without getting 
too embroiled in debates about ontology and epistemology, this chapter will provide a 
synopsis on how I approached this area of inquiry before leading into a detailed 
explanation of the methodology, highlighting some of the important issues and obstacles 
for this type of research.  
 
2.1 Investigating Government Politics and the Policy Process 
The policymaking process can be viewed as a dynamic and open system, so rather than 
attempting to isolate effects in the Canadian system one by one, this thesis examined 
‘multiple generating mechanisms’ operating simultaneously and at various levels (Kurki, 
2002, p. 11). As such this thesis rejected positivism and the idea that it is possible to 
identify universal processes from which to make predictions that would apply to all times 
and places. Instead, it drew on the traditions of interpretative social science to understand 
the development, operation, and transformation of social systems (Flyvbjerg, 2001; 
Winch, 2008). It examined the structure of the political social system and division of 
power as defined by its structure and material interests; and also power expressed through 
ideas, motivations, and intentions. As explained by Ted Palys,  
‘any effort to understand human behaviour must take into account humans are 
cognitive beings who actively perceive and make sense of the world around 
them, have the capacity to abstract from their experiences, ascribe meaning to 
their behaviour and the world around them, and are affected by those meanings. 
[Thus] in many situations the influence of “reality” (if indeed such a thing exists 
independently of our experience of it) pales in comparison to the influence of 
our perceptions of this situation – indeed, those perceptions define our “reality”’ 
(1997, p. 16-7).  
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At home or down at the pub, most people accept there is an “external” or independent 
reality (Putnam, 1975). Even our language locks us into this way of thinking; for 
example, how we refer to “the true nature of things” or “market forces”. Thus, critical 
realism regards society ‘as an ensemble of structures, practices, and conventions which 
individuals reproduce and transform, but which would not exist unless they did so’ 
(Bhaskar, 1989, p. 36). To investigate and explain climate change politics and 
policymaking in Canada, this research adopted the motto of the Thomas theorem: ‘[i]f 
men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences’ (Thomas and Thomas, 
1928, p. 572). This critical realist interpretation also predicts that such ‘generating 
mechanisms’ change over time (Palys, 1997; Kurki, 2002). If perception matters then 
context is also important. One cannot explain federal climate change policymaking in 
Canada without understanding the institutional context and shifting processes that led 
state and non-state actors to interpret and respond as they did within the political system 
over time.  
I embraced the notion that state and non-state actors hold different interpretations 
of policymaking and that these patterns of interpretation can define and confine the 
policymaking process, as much as constitutional law or the size of the deficit. Moreover, 
the three broad theoretical perspectives, or “lenses”, used in the analysis implicitly 
adopted different interpretations of the state and the actions of government. The most 
significant distinction resides between the rational actor model employed in Chapter 3 
and Chapter 4, where the federal and provincial government are defined as self-contained 
and purposeful actors in the system. In Chapter 5, the pluralist model treats the 
government as one actor amongst many in society and blurs the distinction between 
government and society. Most importantly, this latter approach does not treat the federal 
Government of Canada as a single entity but focuses on the heterogeneous nature of 
government. As a result, these models differ in how they value the power of the state, 
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conceptualise the actions of government, and the influence of interest groups and ideas on 
policy objectives.  
The theories were organised with an interpretive research design rooted in the 
assumption that knowledge is filtered and ultimately understood through constructed 
realities. As Thomas Kuhn demonstrated in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
(1962), whether wittingly or unwittingly, scientists are guided by community paradigms, 
and ‘work from models acquired through education and through subsequent exposure to 
the literature’ (3rd Edition, p. 46). The natural sciences have undergone an analytical 
transformation whereby logical positivism has been challenged by critical realism, 
feminist critique, and postmodernism. This is true for the natural sciences, and is doubly 
true for the social sciences where the relationship between observer and subject is 
inseparable. 
 
2.2 Research Design and Empirical Targets 
The heated debate surrounding climate change politics brings about strong opinions; and 
a careful research design and methodology was required to ensure the findings did not 
simply amount to political gossip. I chose to develop an inductive, qualitative research 
design using a longitudinal case study analysis of Canada and her response to the Kyoto 
Protocol. Such a design is well-suited for unravelling political processes and 
understanding “why” and “how” things happened as they did (Bryman, 2004, p. 278-9; 
Yin, 2009, p. 2). Moreover, exploratory case studies are practical when conducting causal 
studies, especially for complex studies into organisational behaviour (Berg, 2003) and 
conceptualising the findings (Bryman, 2004).  
Canada’s participation in the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent implementation 
policies were examined between the years 1997 and 2010, although the period between 
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1997 and 2006 is discussed in greater detail as the research pointed to critical events 
within those nine years. The starting point, 1997, was chosen since it was the year the 
Kyoto Protocol was created and indeed signed by the Canadian government. By 2006, the 
Liberal Party was replaced by the Conservatives as the ruling party in a minority federal 
government, and the federal climate change programme was largely dismantled or 
allowed to fall into abeyance. Preceding the 2006 election, it had been the stated aim of 
the federal government to meet its Kyoto commitments (even if viewed with cynicism, a 
large amount of financial and political capital was spent to meet the country’s Kyoto 
commitments). After 2006, there is far less evidence to show that the federal government 
under the Conservatives actively pursued an implementation strategy, and the country 
announced its withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in December, 2011. Historical context 
before 1997 is introduced when relevant (principally with reference to Canada’s national 
identity, history in the international climate change regime, traditional regional divisions, 
and the National Energy Program). Provincial policy after 2006 is also of note in order to 
contextualise the domestic policy trajectory. Focusing the analysis on policymaking under 
the Liberals also allowed greater control comparing different actors under the same 
political party; yet a long enough time frame to track the evolution of Canadian climate 
change policy over many years. 
The federal government is the central protagonist in this study; in particular, the 
decision-makers directly involved in the Kyoto mandate from the Head of State (Prime 
Minister), Cabinet Ministers, negotiators, and government officials. Particular attention 
was paid to the federal Ministries of the Environment, Natural Resources Canada, and 
Foreign Affairs Canada who shared the climate change file. Followed by the Climate 
Change Secretariat, Privy Council Office, the Canadian Council of Ministers of the 
Environment (CCME), and National Roundtable for the Environment and the Economy 
(NRTEE) who were also active in domestic consultation and policy formation. Even 
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when the federal government appeared to be acting as a unified body, the analysis sought 
to draw out the prominent decision-makers within the government who were driving the 
policymaking process at that time. This is especially important in the Canadian context 
where both federal and provincial governments enjoy a strong executive under majority 
governments (as explained in Chapter 4 Section 4.2). Non-state actors also played a 
prominent role in the analysis, especially in agenda-setting and internal/external lobbying 
efforts to influence government policy. Indeed, the line between state and non-state actors 
is often blurred; for example, Canada’s UNFCCC delegations include scientists, 
nongovernment organisations, corporations, trade associations, and labour unions.  In 
addition, non-state actors enjoy a close relationship with all levels of the Canadian 
government, shaping ideas and offering professional expertise as analysts and advisors (as 
seen with many of the respondents in this thesis) who move in and out of the government 
over their careers.   
The qualitative research design employed a grounded theory approach which 
started with exploratory research and progressively became more explanatory, using the 
three broad theoretical perspectives. There was an initial, cursory literature review; 
however, early data collection was not guided by one set of theoretical propositions from 
the start. The data was allowed to speak for itself and collection came before theoretical 
propositions and analysis. As explained by Walsham, ‘[a]lthough theory can provide a 
valuable initial guide […] there is a danger of the researcher only seeing what the theory 
suggests, and thus using the theory in a rigid way which stifles potential new issues and 
avenues of exploration’ (1995, p. 76). Since the aim was to use multiple, contrasting 
theoretical propositions, it made no sense to frame data collection around one theoretical 
approach. Instead, data collection and analysis became an iterative process, whereby data 
was collected and multiple theories were tested and revised; then more data was collected, 
and the process repeated. To illustrate, during the initial data collection, the data pointed 
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towards international level processes, especially when Canada first signed the Kyoto 
Protocol. Theoretical propositions from international relations offered robust explanatory 
power. However, the data then shifted and pointed increasingly to domestic level factors 
influencing Canada’s implementation for which IR was less equipped to examine. Thus 
new theoretical approaches took over. Theory was not the starting point but part of the 
analysis itself. ‘A simple metaphor […] is the use of scaffolding in putting up a building, 
where the scaffolding is removed once it has served its purpose’ (Walsham, 1995, p. 76). 
Grounded theory works well when the researcher has a strong ‘theoretical 
sensitivity’ to the subject or field (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). This thesis benefited from 
my previous knowledge and experience of climate change science and policy, which in 
turn, allowed for a flexible research methodology as new issues emerged and 
circumstances changed. My academic background in climate change policy and 
professional work with the Canadian Institute for Environment Law and Policy (CIELP) 
and the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), amongst others, 
gave me a head start on the subject matter. It was especially valuable for attending the 
Kyoto negotiations (COPs/MOPs), building credibility with respondents, and crafting 
interview questions (as Section 2.2.2 will explain). It also allowed me to juggle multiple 
data sources and contrasting literatures during the analysis, which offered diverging 
perspectives but also a fair degree of overlap, even blurriness, between the analytical 
boundaries. Such data would have been more challenging to manage without a firm 
understanding of climate change politics and international negotiations from the start. 
 Data collection took place in two phases. As mentioned in the 
Acknowledgements, this thesis has undergone two incarnations. Originally it was 
designed as a multi-country case study: comparing and contrasting three countries and 
their strategy to the Kyoto Protocol. Unfortunate personal circumstances led to disruption 
and interruption in the research, so the project was reframed with a focus on just the 
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Canadian case, and the interplay between the national and international dimensions 
shaping Canada’s approach to the Kyoto Protocol. This was done because the data 
increasingly stressed domestic as opposed to international forces. The initial, primary data 
collection and the majority of the direct observation and exploratory interviews took place 
between 2003 – 2006 while the Liberal Party held power or shortly thereafter. The 
interview questions were exploratory and not guided yet by identified theoretical 
propositions. They were designed to capture the perception and views of respondents; as 
well as flag critical events for later examination. The second phase of data collection was 
collected between 2010 – 2013 in which previous interview data was put through 
different “lenses” of analysis. The data was re-examined using new types of research 
questions, which were explanatory as opposed to exploratory. Particular attention was 
placed on the critical events flagged in the first set of interviews although new primary 
data revealed other important events. A few follow-up and additional interviews were 
conducted with high-ranking government officials and new primary data collection 
focused on the domestic context.  
Overall, there was a fair degree of continuity between the first set of data in 
Chapter 3 which focused on the international forces on domestic policymaking. Whereas, 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 represent new analytical questions and analysis applied to earlier 
data, extended with data collected after 2010. Although the delay is unusual, it did allow 
for greater time for reflection of the findings, and good research protocol ensured 
transcripts and notes were coded and saved.  Below is an outline for each data source. 
 
2.2.1 Primary Literature 
Primary documents were collected to first build a picture of past UNFCCC negotiations, 
beginning with the first Conference of the Parties in 1995 (i.e. Berlin Mandate), and 
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tracking the subsequent evolution of climate change policy and policymaking within 
Canada. In addition to developing a timeline of events, primary sources revealed changes 
in the Government of Canada’s participation in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, mandate, 
and evolving policy position. Primary sources provided valuable information regarding 
the position of the provinces and territories, quotes from key public figures, the position 
and external lobbying efforts of non-state interest groups, and public opinion. These 
sources included:  
• UNFCCC conference documents  
• Earth News Bulletins10  
• Assessment reports from the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
including unreleased drafts11  
• Minutes from Parliamentary debates 
• Federal government reports and inventories including those of Natural Resources 
Canada, Environment Canada, Climate Change Secretariat, Prime Minister’s 
Office, and Justice Canada 
• Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) 
• Provincial government reports and joint statements including those from the 
Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME) 
• Government Press Releases and Communiqués 
• Reports from the National Roundtable for the Environment and the Economy 
(NRTEE) 
• Press releases from stakeholders 
• Media sources including quotes from public figures 
• Canadian public opinion polls 
Data between 1997 and 2010 identified who the key players were throughout this period. 
Most importantly the documentary analysis revealed the policy trajectory, emerging 
issues, and changes in position from both state and non-state actors. Moreover, primary 
                                                
10 Published by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), the ENB are daily 
summaries of the UNFCCC proceedings released each day of the COPs/MOPs. They do not editorialise and 
are a good resource to see the important events and submissions. 




documents not only described the chronology of events; they also offered insight into the 
federal government’s rationale linking to theoretical propositions (Yin, 2009, p. 148). For 
example, the government’s official climate change plans and consultation reports 
collectively trace the evolution of the federal government’s approach to Kyoto, moving 
from research and development to voluntary measures to a cap-and-trade system with the 
Large Final Emitters Program.  
Figure 3 Timeline of Federal Climate Change Plans Relative to National GHG 
Emissions (Mt CO2e)  
(Source: Environment Canada) 
 
Of course, official government reports do not reveal the policy formation process (or the 
pros and cons of different policy instruments). However the language was illuminating 
for this analysis, especially when patterns emerged or when words or meanings moved 
from non-state actors to official government reports (for example, “Made in Canada” was 
adopted by trade associations and then used in government reports). Even small changes 
in language sometimes represented large policy shifts pointing to a critical event, most 
notably the switch from absolute to intensity targets. 
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Table 2 Timeline of Federal Climate Change Policies  
(Source: Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development) 
1997 Canada announces its intention to sign the Kyoto Protocol (formalised in 
1998) 
1998 First report published, The Kyoto Conference on Climate Change: Let's Get 
The Ball Rolling 
1999 Six greenhouse gases were to be added to the list of toxic substances in 
Schedule 1 to the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA). Tabled in 
2005 but later withdrawn 
2000 The Government of Canada Action Plan 2000 committed to reducing GHG 
emissions by 65 million tonnes per year from 2008 to 2012. 
2001 Canada Foundation for Sustainable Development Technology Act: Not-for-
profit foundation established to fund green technology 
2002 Canada formally ratified the Kyoto Protocol. The federal government 
released Climate Change—Achieving Our Commitments Together, 
committed to cut 240 million tonnes of GHG emissions from Canada’s 
projected 2010 level 
2003 Additional $1 billion CAD pledged for climate change programme 
2004 One Tonne Challenge announced 
 
2005 The Kyoto Protocol entered into force. The federal government released 
Project Green—Moving Forward on Climate Change: A Plan for Honouring 
Our Kyoto Commitment, which committed to reducing GHG emissions by 
270 million tonnes per year from 2008 to 2012. 
 Notice of Intent to Regulate Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Large Final 
Emitters 
 Greenhouse Gas Technology Fund Act 
 Canada Emission Reduction Incentives Agency Act 
2006 Clean Air Act. Under the newly elected Conservative government the Large 
Final Emitters programme was abandoned. Their new Clean Air Act (and 
budget) made no mention of Kyoto Protocol; only introduced a tax credit for 




2007 Environment Canada released the first climate change plan, as required by 
the Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act, which indicated that Canada’s target 
was to reduce GHG emissions to an average of 6% below its 1990 emission 
level over the 2008–2012 period. The plan reiterated the government’s 
commitment as indicated in “Turning the Corner” and added a commitment 
to reduce Canada’s total GHG emissions by 60 − 70% by 2050. These 
targets were repeated in the 2008 and 2009 climate change plans. 
The Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act is assented to in June, 2007. 
The plan, Turning the Corner was announced. The government announced 
Canada was not on track to meet Kyoto and announced a new target to 
reduce GHG emissions by 20% below Canada’s 2006 level by 2020. 
2010 Canada committed to reducing GHG emissions by 17% below its 2005 level 
by 2020 under the new Federal Sustainable Development Strategy. 
2010 Canada pledged $400 million in new and additional climate change financing 
for 2010-2011 
2011 Canada announced its intention to formally withdraw from the Kyoto 
Protocol. Canada committed to 17% cuts from 2005 levels by 2020 − lower 
threshold to meet than cutting below 1990 emissions levels 
 
 Primary data collection was relatively straightforward as the federal government 
maintains an open and accessible public record. However, not all government reports 
were easy to locate as many programmes under the Liberal Party were cancelled when the 
Conservative government took office in 2006. This provided barriers to track the policy 
formation process, even with Freedom of Information requests. The greatest challenge 
occurred when investigating the influence of non-state actors on the policy formation 
process. Where gaps existed, interviews with government officials provided additional 
information and context; however, it did mean that triangulation was more difficult to 
achieve. In such incidences where triangulation was difficult to establish, the data 





As opposed to primary sources, interview data provided context and insider information 
about the policymaking processes. In fact, research like this could not take place without 
interviews, which are often the only means to learn about internal decision-making, 
internal lobbying, and the unreported political battles within and between governments. 
For instance, although the UNFCCC negotiations are relatively open to observers, crucial 
events often occurred behind closed doors or as private conversations between decision-
makers and negotiators; such moments can only be identified by interviewing those 
present, for example members of the Canadian delegation team. Interviews also provided 
the researcher with the opportunity to study policymaking from within, especially semi-
structured interviews which allow customisation for each respondent and a means to 
discuss motivations, rationales, and interpretations in an interpretative format. As 
explained by Keith Hoggart et al., in-depth interviews are ‘appropriate for exploring 
rationalities, implications and meanings’ (2002, p. 204). Although the researcher leads the 
discussion, there must be adequate ‘freedom for the respondents (...) to bring in all sorts 
of tangential matters which, for them, have a bearing on the main subject matter’ (Hakim, 
1987, p.  27). Questionnaires or structured interviews may provide larger sample sizes in 
some instances and additional points of direct comparison between respondents; however, 
the purpose of the interviews was not to survey the widest range of state and non-state 
actors, but to identify and prioritise the views of principal decision-makers within the 
federal government, those working most closely with these individuals, as well as 
intellectual entrepreneurs outside government. Semi-structured, in-depth interviews 
allowed me to gather insider information and learn about the personal views of those 
most closely connected to Canada’s Kyoto mandate, including close attention to their 
language and how they framed key issues (conversational analysis).  
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I leveraged my professional background and network within the climate change 
community to gain greater access than typically enjoyed by a postgraduate student. Both 
my primary source data collection and first-hand experience at the UNFCCC negotiations 
allowed me to identify the key state and non-state actors. This was further helped by the 
fact that Canadian Ministers and bureaucrats embrace a culture of openness to both 
journalists and researchers alike. Their contact details were also readily available, either 
printed in booklets by the UNFCCC or available on government websites. Overall, my 
response rate for the interviews was over 85% and no respondent refused to discuss a 
topic or answer a specific question. On a few occasions sample questions were requested 
in advance but most respondents were happy with a general summary of the research 
project. Instead, the obstacles were those experienced by all interviewers: those of 
confidentiality, candour and an openness to discuss policymaking in an iterative, 
exploratory manner. 
Interviews were held in-person or over the telephone, with the exception of one 
interview via email (80% were held in-person). In total, there were 46 semi-structured 
interviews as listed in the table below. This list does not include anonymous interviews or 
informal discussions at the UNFCCC negotiations, side-events, and workshops. 
Respondents were recruited using purposive, intensity sampling where state and non-state 
actors with the most experience were targeted: including major stakeholders, Canadian 
negotiators, officials from the International Panel on Climate Change, World Trade 
Organization, and World Meteorological Organization; and of course, government 
officials and decision-makers (including three former Ministers of Environment from 
both sides of the aisle). Some of the climate scientists and observers were also official 
members of past Canadian COP delegations and provided valuable insider information. 
Stratification was achieved with individuals working at different levels of government; as 
well as snowballing where new respondents were identified from earlier interviews. 
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Overall a wide-range of state and non-state actors were interviewed; as well as noted 
Canadian academics and observers who were identified as particularly knowledgeable in 
the Canadian climate change policy process or former members of Canadian delegation 
teams. 
Table 3 Interview List 
Intergovernmental Organisations 
Dr. Rajendra Pachauri. Chairman, International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In-
person. November 11, 2006 (COP12/MOP2). In-person 
Dr. John Stone. Vice-Chair, Working Group II, International Panel on Climate Change 
& Professor, Carleton University. February 22, 2006. In-person. 
Dr. Buruhani Nyenzi. Director, UN World Climate Programme (WCP) at the World 
Meteorological Organization. February 1, 2006. In-person. 
Ms. Marie Isabelle Pellan. Legal Affairs Officer, Trade and Environment Division, 
World Trade Organization. February 2, 2006. In-person. 
Mr. John Harding. Programme Officer, United Nations Office for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (UNISDR). February 2, 2006. In-person. 
Mrs. Silvia Llosa. Programme Officer, UN International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction. February 1, 2006. In-person. 
High-Ranking Government Officials 
Hon. Peter Kent. Minister of Environment, Conservative MP. January 5, 2012. In-
person. 
Hon. Stéphane Dion. Minister of Environment, Former Leader of Liberal Party, Former 






Hon. David Anderson. Minister of Environment. July 15, 2003 (with follow-up 
correspondence). Telephone. 
Canadian government official, anonymous. August 20, 2012. In-person. 
US government official, anonymous. On-going communication throughout 2010-11. 
In-person. 
Foreign Affairs Canada 
Mr. Richard Ballhorn. Director General, Foreign Affairs Canada. February 22, 2006. 
In-person. 
Mr. Doug Forsythe. Deputy Director, Climate Change Division, Foreign Affairs 
Canada. February 28, 2006. In-person. 
Ms. Jeanne-Marie Huddlestone. Economic and Policy Analyst, Foreign Affairs 
Canada. February 24, 2006. In-person. 
National Roundtable for the Environment and the Economy 
Mr. Glen Murray. Chair, National Roundtable for Environment and the Economy 
(NRTEE). March 3, 2006. In-person. 
Climate Change Secretariat 
Mr. David Oulton. Head, Federal Climate Change Secretariat. July 31, 2003. 
Telephone. 
Environment Canada 
Dr. John Stone. Science Advisor, Environment Canada. July 14, 2003 (with follow-up 
correspondence). Telephone. 
Mr. Henry Hengeveld. Science Advisor and Senior Advisor on Climate Change, 
Environment Canada. 2006. Email. 
Ms. Norine Smith. Assistant Deputy Minister, Global Climate Affairs, Environment 




Natural Resources Canada 
Mr. Alrick Huebener. Director, Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation Directorate, 
NRCan. February 28, 2006. In-person. 
Ms. Margaret Martin. Senior Director, Energy Policy Branch, NRCan. February 28, 
2006. In-person. 
Ms. Kristi Varangu. Senior Advisor, NRCan & International Energy Agency. February 
2006. In-person. 
Dr. Don Lemmen. Research Manager, NRCan. March 28, 2006. In-person. 
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada 
Dr. Marie Boehm. Research Scientist, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada. February 24, 
2006. In-person. 
Dr. Wayne Lindwall. Director General, Environmental Health, Agriculture and Agri-
Food Canada. February 24, 2006. In-person. 
Nongovernment Organisations 
Ms. Mary Jane Middelkoop. Senior Policy Analyst, Environment Policy, Federation of 
Canadian Municipalities (FCM). February 21, 2006. In-person. 
Dr. John Bennett. Executive Director, Climate Change Action Network & Director, 
Sierra Club Canada. July 10, 2003 (with follow-up correspondence). Telephone. 
Mr. John Drexage. Director, Climate Change and Energy, International Institute for 
Sustainable Development. December, 2004 (multiple discussions). In-person. 
Mr. Ken Ogilvie. Executive Director, Pollution Probe. July 17, 2003. Telephone. 
Dr. Matthew Bramley. Director, Pembina Institute. July 15, 2003. Telephone. 
Climate Scientists and Observers 
Dr. Gordon McBean. Research Chair, Institute for Catastrophic Loss Reduction, 




Dr. Barry Smit. Professor, University of Guelph. July 20, 2003 (with follow-up 
correspondence). In-person. 
Dr. Rodney White. Director, Institute of Environmental Studies. July 4, 2003. In-
person. 
Dr. Steven Bernstein. Professor, Department of Political Science, University of 
Toronto. July 26, 2003. In-person. 
Dr. Ian Burton. Professor, The Munich Climate Insurance Initiative, University of 
Toronto. July 23, 2003. In-person. 
Dr. Robert Munn. Professor, University of Toronto. July 24, 2003. In-person. 
Former government official, now academic. Anonymous. February 24, 2012. In person. 
Trade Unions and Industry 
Mr. Michael Murphy. Senior Vice President − Policy, Canadian Chamber of 
Commerce. February 23, 2012. In-person. 
Mr. Brian Kohler. National Representative, Health Safety & Environment, 
Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada (CEP). February 22, 
2006. In-person. 
Mr. Vince Catalli. Director, Cement Association of Canada. February 22, 2006. In-
person. 
Mr. Michael Cloghesy. President, Centre patronal de l’environnement du Québec 
(cpeq). February 3, 2006. Telephone. 
Mr. Tom Rosser. Director, Forest Products Association of Canada (FPAC). December 
5, 2005. In-person. 
Mr. John Dillon. Vice President − Regulatory Affairs, Canadian Chamber of 
Commerce. February 24, 2006. In-person. 
Mr. Claude Andre Lachance. Vice President − Public Affairs, Dow Chemical Canada 




Mr. Christian L. Van Houtte. President, Association de l'Aluminium du Canada. 
February 21, 2006. Telephone. 
 
Most interviews were recorded on a small tape recorder with additional notes made 
during the interview. I should also add that the tape recorder was quickly withdrawn if the 
respondent showed any unease or objection. However, the vast majority of respondents 
were used to recorded interviews and appeared to forget it was there within a few 
minutes. Most importantly, informed consent was maintained during the interview 
process. Respondents were supplied with a general summary of the research project in the 
interview request, which could take place either on or off-the-record. Confidentiality was 
also discussed before each interview and whether respondents wanted to be cited by 
name, quoted anonymously, or not at all. This was important for mid-level bureaucrats for 
fear of reprisal but proved less of a concern for senior officials and Ministers. 
Respondents were also free to switch between on and off-record during the interview 
which they sometimes took advantage of to make personal or colourful comments. 
Overall, the respondents were senior level individuals well-versed in the interview 
process, so informed consent and confidentiality was relatively straightforward. The vital 
issue was maintaining confidentiality for those who did not wish to be cited. Although it 
makes the researcher’s task more difficult, research of this kind could not take place 
unless respect and confidentiality are strictly maintained. 
The interviews were semi-structured, and on average, one hour in length. Each 
interview required detailed preparation to customise questions to the experience and 
background of each respondent. For example, by reviewing respondents’ publicly stated 
positions and speeches. It was also vital that “leading questions” were avoided including 




Why do you think the Kyoto Protocol proved divisive? 
versus 
Why do you think the Kyoto Protocol proved challenging? 
 
As explained by Ted Palys (1997), two apparently similar questions will solicit different 
responses based on word choice and their imbedded assumptions. It was important that 
the interviews followed a grounded theory approach, with open-ended questions that 
avoided prejudiced words as much as possible. I had a firm understanding of the jargon 
and controversial topics going into the interviews, and thus could craft content-
appropriate questions tailored to the expertise and background of the respondent; while 
also minimising biased lines of questioning.  
In the end, the ordering of the questions was sometimes more challenging than the 
questions themselves. Interviews with government respondents tended to follow the 
policy cycle (agenda-setting, policy formation, decision-making, implementation, and 
evaluation) and non-state actors according to their personal experience with the climate 
change file. As the interviews progressed, they followed the issues raised by the 
respondents with key topics and events introduced at appropriate junctions. After roughly 
45 minutes, when a pictured developed of the respondent’s views and opinions, I 
sometimes posed more contentious questions to see how respondents either rejected or 
assimilated alternate interpretations. Special attention was also paid to the words and 
expressions used by the respondents in addition to their opinions and how they perceived 
events as a whole. It was particularly interesting to see the pattern of language employed 
by different types of respondents (those in different government departments or organised 
stakeholder groups), which supports social learning and the notion of epistemic 
communities. I should also mention that there was a fair degree of candour, and even 
humour, during the interviews. I personally never felt intimidated by senior-level 
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respondents owing to my professional experience and was able to demonstrate a fair 
amount of insider knowledge of climate change policymaking leading to fluid and 
iterative conversations.  
Afterwards, all recorded interviews were transcribed. For those that were not 
recorded, I taped my own thoughts within an hour of the interview and also typed up my 
personal notes. Occasionally there were follow-up interviews and questions via email; 
transcripts and notes were than coded for later analysis. 
 
2.2.3 Direct Observation 
Another source of valuable data came from attending the UNFCCC negotiation 
proceedings themselves (See list below). I was able to attend as an observer with the 
International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED). I listened to the open 
sessions and watched the presentations, remarks, and interventions made by countries. I 
also had full access to attend the closed nongovernment sessions of the Climate Action 
Network representing environment and development not-for-profit organisations. 
Table 4 List of Attended UNFCCC Negotiations 
UNFCCC 9th Conference of the Parties in Milan, Italy. December 1 to 12, 2003. 
UNFCCC 10th Conference of the Parties in Buenos Aires, Argentina. December 6 to 
17, 2004. 
UNFCCC 11th Conference of the Parties and 1st Meeting of the Parties in Montreal, 
Canada. November 28 to December 9, 2005. 
UNFCCC 12th Conference of the Parties and 2nd Meeting of the Parties in Nairobi, 




In addition, there were useful side-events and workshops. For example, I worked 
as a reporter with the Earth News Bulletin (sponsored by the UNFCCC and the Canadian 
non-profit organisation, the International Institute for Sustainable Development). I 
reported and wrote summaries of key side-events, which also allowed me to discuss the 
proceedings with more experienced reporters. Furthermore, I helped organise the IIED’s 
Development and Adaptation Days prior to the UNFCCC negotiations which trained 
junior negotiators from least developed countries. Although not designed for Canadian 
negotiators, this exposure gave me a greater understanding of the UNFCCC process and 
the expectations placed on delegation teams. I also assisted with trust and capacity-
building workshops between negotiations blocks, which revealed the strong personal 
relationships between negotiators, the importance of pre-COP meetings to “float” ideas, 
and the shifting alliances between countries. Overall, the attendance at these various 
events provided background data to “peek behind the curtain”. Such observation also 
highlighted gaps in the primary sources, especially government reports where only a 
highly sanitised version of policymaking is presented; as well as the significant amount of 
time and effort placed on the definitions of words, which was important when viewed in 
conjunction with the language employed in government reports and communiqués.  
Strict confidentiality was maintained for all direct observation and informal 
discussions. I wore name badges stating my affiliation to King’s College London and 
prefaced my conversations stating I was doing research as a PhD student; as well as 
attending on behalf of a nongovernment organisation. Ethical concerns for privacy and 
informed consent meant no names were mentioned and no one was quoted anonymously 
or otherwise unless with a follow-up “formal” interview where the proper protocol could 
be ensured. On the whole, direct observation was a valuable source of data collection in 
the early stages including data on the UNFCCC proceedings, negotiation mandates, the 
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interaction between state and non-state actors including the spread of ideas, and an 
opportunity to identify key individuals to approach for formal or informal interviews.  
 
2.2.4 Analysis of Data 
As explained earlier, data collection was informed by a version of grounded theory (also 
known as the method of constant comparison). Grounded theory can be described as 
‘complex, methodical and creative, rigorous and laissez-faire process in which the 
researcher engages to generate theory from the data [and then] inspects the data for 
properties of categories, uses memos to track the analysis, and develops theoretical ideas’ 
(Walker and Florence Myrick, 2006, p. 548). In keeping with the flexible approach 
advocated by Strauss and Corbin (1990), the variation of grounded theory I employed was 
that the data was then subjected to different theoretical propositions framed through three 
over-arching “lenses” of analysis (See Chapter 1 Section 1.3). Coding refers to the 
‘analytic process through which concepts are identified and their properties and 
dimensions [then] discovered in the data’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p. 101). Memos 
were also important to signpost changes and refinements in the analysis, especially as 
new issues emerged. The data analysis included an examination of the words and 
language (and the meanings these imply) in all sources as well as identifying critical 
events in the policymaking process (See Miles and Huberman, 1994). These critical 
events roughly followed the policy cycle of the federal government and were 
characterised by issue-framing, changes in policy, periods when the federal government’s 
authority was challenged, or even critical moments between individuals. Overall, a more 
iterative and flexible grounded theory approach was used; one that examined both micro-
data in language and small events, but also balanced with macro patterns and structures 
(See Layder, 1993).  
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A critical realist approach guided the process of analysis and interpretation. 
Critical realism can offer a ‘dialectical’ model for integrating different research 
paradigms. As Joseph Maxwell advised, the ‘realist understanding of causality […] 
values the multiple insights that different paradigms and “mental models” bring to the 
discussion and the generative potential of an engagement with these different viewpoints’ 
(2008, p. 167). It does not stop at studying events, exemplified by the positivist research 
approach (Hume, 1896; Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948), but examines the social 
structures and the construction of meaning. In this thesis, I used theories from different 
positivist and realist research paradigms. These theories also prioritise different sets of 
data, with theory and data paired in an iterative process of collection and analysis. 
Triangulation was also sought by comparing different data sources and explanations, 
especially comparing interview data between different sets of respondents and identifying 
patterns or points of conjecture. When possible, critical events identified in the interviews 
were also validated through media sources or secondary literature. This was particularly 
important for more contentious issues in the theory and case study. Finally, the analysis 
and write up involved going through the data multiple times, building a deep familiarity 
with the subject. Unfortunately, there was a delay between some data collection and 
analysis; however, this consequently allowed for greater time for reflection, benefitting 
the final product. Overall, a ‘gradual building of an explanation’ was established which 
supported or undermined theoretical explanations (Yin, 2009, p. 143-4). In doing so, the 
analysis followed both abductive and retroductive interpretations of the data which pairs 
well with grounded theory.  
One of the biggest obstacles studying political processes is objectivity and 
validation (Arksey and Knight, 1999, p. 23). Climate change remains a highly 
controversial topic; as such, the objectivity and openness of the data (whether they be 
secondary literature, government reports, media sources, or interviews) was always under 
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scrutiny. In fact, instead of being an obstacle, the bias embedded within government 
reports, media, and interviews was instructive in the analysis as it underscored the policy 
motivations of various actors. That said, validation was still required to prevent the 
analysis from moving off-track. Source and methodological triangulation was sought to 
provide greater confidence in the results.  
Finally, the issue of researcher bias also requires discussion. This is true for those 
with or without prior knowledge and experience with the subject matter (“theoretical 
sensitivity”). As discussed above, we are all products of our cultural and historic context, 
and lean towards certain theoretical propositions. Even quantitative research 
methodologies cannot safeguard against researcher bias; however, it can become 
especially pronounced with highly interpretive, qualitative research such as this. For this 
thesis I was always mindful of my personal and academic background, especially when 
approaching the interview data collection. I identified those theoretical propositions 
which I was predisposed towards and attempted to disprove, rather than confirm. I was 
also often surprised by the data findings, which reaffirmed that I was allowing the data to 
speak for themselves. However, overall, when it comes to research bias, one can only 




Chapter 3  The Role of International Norms & Multilateralism 
3.1 Introduction 
In December of 1997, the Kyoto International Conference Hall played host to the third 
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC. One thousand five hundred delegates from 
161 countries and many thousand more supporting staff, media, and non-government 
groups descended on the centre. The Canadian delegation was 63 strong. It included the 
Deputy Prime Minister Hon. Herb Gray; ‘a strong signal’12 of the importance Canada 
placed on the outcome. Amongst the meetings, speeches, and press junkets, one delegate 
recounted an important encounter at the negotiations (anonymous Personal Interview). It 
is well-known that most decisions at these negotiations are made not in the plenary or 
official meetings, but in the cafés outside. In one such café, a Canadian and an American 
delegate found themselves sneaking a cigarette and chatting. The Kyoto negotiations were 
quickly coming to a close and both countries needed to declare their commitments before 
the final bell. Up until that point, Canada sought stabilisation of greenhouse gas emissions 
to 1990 levels, abruptly changing their target to -3% when other countries announced 
larger commitments. Prime Minister Chrétien had given a strict mandate to keep in line 
with the Americans; specifically to be within 1% (Bramley Personal Interview; Supported 
by Simpson et al., 2001, p. 33). Most importantly, the Chrétien government wished for 
Canada to be viewed internationally as fully engaged and fully cooperative in the climate 
change negotiations. As this chapter will explore, ‘it was the right thing to do’ 
(anonymous UNFCCC delegate Personal Interview; Minister of Environment, Hon. 
David Anderson Personal Interview). The Canadian delegate asked the American what 
their commitment would be; and he replied that they were waiting for Japan to reveal 
their hand. At that moment, the Japanese negotiator approached and was asked his 
                                                
12 Minister of Environment, Hon.. Christine Stewart, recalled how Chrétien ‘wanted regular briefings. I was 
so pleasantly surprised that our Prime Minister was willing to up the ante each time we talked to him’ 
(quoted in Harrison, 2007, p. 11).  
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commitment target. The Japanese delegate said -6% of 1990 levels. So the American said 
they would pursue -7%; and the Canadian said -6%. They shook hands and continued to 
enjoy their cigarettes.  
Of course, this is just one anecdote; however, the story reveals how Canada’s 
decision to sign Kyoto with a -6% commitment was based more on international norms 
and reputation than science or economics. All those interviewed, including members of 
the original COP3 delegation, government officials, and observers cited norms and 
reputation as guiding Canada’s participation in the Kyoto Protocol. In fact, it is rare that 
all data would converge to a single point but international norms and reputation were 
consistently cited as the main motivating factor for the federal government and framed 
their strategy going forward. Those members of Canada’s COP3 delegation team recount 
that it was not a question of whether Canada signed the Protocol but with what 
commitment target.  
This chapter will investigate who the key decision-makers were when Canada 
signed and then ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and how and why norms of environmental 
stewardship and multilateralism aligned with Canada’s existing national interests and 
concerns over reputation. Indeed, the emerging climate change regime did not appear to 
be a hard sell for the Canadian public or the federal government; and it allows us to 
explore international relations theory to unpack whether foreign policy at the time was 
dictated by strategic, material interests or norms and beliefs. The framework of the 
analysis adopts an IR approach and treats the state as a unified actor, personified as 
Chrétien’s government. As Raymond Aron described, ‘[t]he theory of international 
relations starts from the plurality of autonomous centers[sic] of decision’ (1966, p. 16) 
with international reputation viewed as a means to an end to achieve greater power 
amongst states. This rational actor model predicts the state to be value-maximising, 
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although there exists much debate within the field about whether material interests 
supplant beliefs and norms in influencing state decision-making.  
 
3.2 International Norms 
Norms are an intrinsic part of international relations and have evolved alongside 
diplomacy, governing the expectations of actors from kingdoms, states, and empires. Our 
modern understanding of norms began at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, in which 
liberal and democratic norms, epitomised by Wilsonian Principles, were championed as 
the cornerstone of international relations. These norms of human rights, sovereignty, and 
indeed sustainable development appear to be set in stone. Nonetheless, they implicitly 
mirror the principles and beliefs of the treaty-makers, and so like state leaders themselves, 
they have changed over time. Moreover, norms also inform international law, as with the 
Geneva Convention or the Law of the Sea. In the case of the UNFCCC, the negotiations 
began with a discussion of the principles or norms that all parties were to adhere to before 
the technical text and obligations were written down. Unlike domestic law, there is no 
governing body or enforcement agency for international law, although the United Nations 
has attempted to provide both. The principles enshrined in the UNFCCC attempt to define 
the terms of understanding to govern future negotiations. As Malanczuk wrote, ‘the 
capability of international law in governing the relations between states must not be 
exaggerated…[i]n fact [it] has always been limited, but it is rarely insignificant’ (1997, p. 
6). The practical needs of self-interest give weight to a consensus of principles and a 
necessity to ensure reciprocity in global politics (Malanczuk, 1997, p. 6).  
Norms are, of course, a vague and contentious aspect of international relations. 
Hans Morganthau criticised the utopian principles of Woodrow Wilson and framed norms 
along utilitarian lines. For realists such as George Kennan and Hans Morganthau, norms 
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reflect the material and strategic interests of a state, not their ideals. ‘Government is an 
agent, not a principal’ (Kennan, 1985). Even neorealist scholars such as Kenneth Waltz 
disregard ideas and political ideology and focus exclusively on discovering structural 
realities in the global system that encourage or constrain state behaviour. As Bismark 
famously quoted, ‘politics is the art of the possible’. Moreover, these scholars 
conceptualise the state as ‘predatory rather than status quo’ (Allison and Zelikow, 1999, 
p. 32) leading to pessimism about the prospect of international cooperation unless the 
balance of power necessitates it.13 However, modern branches of neorealism do tackle the 
notion of ideas in global politics; and many self-described neorealists do not exclude the 
possibility that ideas, as well as structural interests, shape norms and state behaviour.  
Noted scholars such as Hedley Bull and Robert Keohane blur the distinction and develop 
theoretical approaches that integrate structural and strategic factors with social and 
political ideas.  Robert Jervis goes even further to advocate ‘the irreducible importance of 
perceptions and misperceptions in international politics’ (Allison and Zelikow, 1999, p. 
33). Scholars from different streams of international relations attempt to adjust the notion 
of ideas to a structuralist theory. These include Hedley Bull and Martin Wright of the 
English School; Robert Keohane and his theory of Interdependence; Robert Cox and his 
work on Critical Theory; and Alexander Wendt’s Social Constructivism. This last theory, 
social constructivism will inform this stage of the analysis; it will also borrow in part 
from normative theory.14 For constructivists, international relations and state behaviour 
are not dictated by structural realities in the system, but rather, the perception of that 
reality by those participating. Wendt’s social constructivism also positions itself as a 
‘middle way’ between neorealists (rationalists) and postmodernists (reflectivists) (Kurki, 
                                                
13 International institutionalism adds a further layer to neorealism and, while incomplete (Allison and 
Zelikow, 1999, p. 34), proposes that international institutions offer greater opportunity for sustained 
cooperation through the ‘mutuality of interests’, extending the ‘shadow of the future’ for states, and 
providing a structure for numerous states to negotiate (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985).  
14 Constructivism within IR views state interests as ‘constructed’ through values rather than being self-
evident as neorealists. This is different from the way that constructivism has been used by geographers in an 
anti-essentialist mode to refer to the construction of things or knowledge or both (Demeritt, 2002). 
63 
 
2002, p. 11). Crucially for our analysis, ‘they still take the state as the basic unit [and] 
emphasise the expression of these constructed identities in state behaviour’ (Allison and 
Zelikow, 1999, p. 74), which is different than critical theory and epistemic communities. 
As we shall see, the beliefs and perceptions of Canadian decision-makers, specifically 
their ideas surrounding sustainable development and multilateralism, were paramount in 
moulding Canada’s normative approach in the climate change negotiations.  
 
3.3 Canadian National Identity 
This perception of the system, rather than the system itself, is characteristic of the 
academic and political debate within Canada and offers a long history of the country’s 
changing image of itself. It is often said that Canada has a deep-seated identity problem 
(Hawes, 1994). At best, the country wrestles with normative questions of its foreign 
policy doctrine and national identity, especially how to differentiate itself from the United 
States, and prior to that, the United Kingdom. The very fact that Canada’s political elite 
speak in terms of “distinguishing” the country from other states betrays an uncertainty. At 
worst, however, the debate is rooted in an insecure nation that does not know itself. As 
Margaret Atwood put it, ‘Canadians are forever taking the national pulse like doctors at a 
sickbed: the aim is not to see whether the patient will live well but simply whether he will 
live at all’ (Lipset, 1990, p. 7-8). A less damning observation by the noted Canadian 
historian, Arthur Lower, wrote ‘in every generation, Canadians have to rework the 
miracle of their political existence’ (Lower, 1946, p. 561).  
The debate over norms has underscored Canada’s own questions regarding its 
foreign policy doctrine and national identity, both amongst academics and politicians 
alike. Are norms formed from Canada’s material position within the constellation of 
nations, as a major player, middle power, or satellite state (essentially, geopolitics)? Or 
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are norms formed through the ideology of the political elite and the national identity of its 
people? Upon entering office, former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau commissioned the 
seminal Foreign Policy for Canadians, often referred to as the Trudeau Doctrine, which 
set out to:  
‘sensibly reject the popular fallacy that national interests are objective and 
immutable. Instead the Trudeau doctrine claimed for the government of the day 
the responsibility to spell out: “foreign policy is the product of the government’s 
progressive definition … of national aims and interests”; and is “shaped mainly 
by the value judgements of the government at any given time”’ (Lyon, 1970, p. 
8-9). 
Pierre Trudeau, and similarly, Jean Chrétien, executed foreign policy decisions in the 
belief that Canada’s national interests are born from norms unique to its people, history, 
and culture, and not simply the country’s strategic interests. However, many Canadian 
academics disagreed reflecting the wider divide within international relations theory. This 
debate forms a cornerstone of academic and political discussion within the country and 
why neorealism and social constructivism are instructive in this analysis since they 
capture this debate so succinctly. In particular, the literature concentrates on role-playing 
at international meetings, though little work has focused on the climate change 
negotiations or other environmental issues outside the Law of the Sea. Role-playing is 
featured in Canadian rhetoric (Lyon, 1963) whether it be as a mediator, honest broker, 
bridge, or puppet. More than rhetoric, however, the language gestures at the underlying 
perception and normative beliefs of the political elite – beliefs their language rarely 
reflect.  
 
3.3.1 Multilateral Rule of Law 
Canada’s role in international relations is open to interpretation; however what can be 
agreed is that the country is always eager to play a role, whatever that may be. As the 
distinguished scholar Peyton Lyon wrote, ‘as a nation with an acute identity problem, 
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Canadians appear eager to be seen playing a distinctive role on the international stage’ 
(1963, p. 11). This differs dramatically from more isolationist states and introduces the 
first of two important norms: the multilateral rule of law. It is often said that since climate 
change is a fundamentally global problem, it necessitates a multilateral political solution. 
This is certainly the sound bite that Canada, the European Union and others have adopted 
− but the global community is far from unanimous. Many countries have instead 
advocated individual state action, sector agreements within distinct industries, or simply 
more confined regional agreements such as the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean 
Development and Climate.15 The UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol represent a multilateral 
model which spoke at the time to Canada’s political elite and explains to a large extent 
the country’s early support of the UNFCCC.  
It is widely acknowledged that multilateralism, both the participation and respect 
for multilateral agreements and institutions, is a feature of Canada’s national identity. 
Lyon continues, ‘[p]erhaps the most persuasive element in Canada’s image as an 
international actor is its reputation for constructive support for international 
organisations’ (1963, p. 163). In the last quarter of the 20th century, Canada emerged as a 
global citizen, promoted through a lineage of Canadian Prime Ministers including Lester 
Pearson, Pierre Trudeau, Brain Mulroney, and Jean Chrétien.16 Of course each generation 
has sought to develop multilateralism in new ways, from peace and security, economic 
stability, human rights, to the environment; but the support has remained constant. The 
names on her dance-card may change but Canada will always join the dance.  
Under the United Nations, Canada has made ‘sustained contributions that spanned 
the entire spectrum of the UN's agenda and mandate [and] dealt energetically and 
                                                
15 Interestingly, APP is viewed as a recent rival of the UNFCCC. Keen to participate in regional 
agreements, Canada is a member of APP as well. 
16 Canada also gives a higher percentage of gross national income as overseas development aid (ODA) than 
the average for G7 and OECD countries (although the country’s position in the rankings fluctuates with 
administrations and economic circumstances). 
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creatively with social, economic, educational, and technical issues’ (Melakopides, 1998, 
p. 41). However, Canada’s trust in the multilateral rule of law is by no means limited 
within the scope of the United Nations. Former Prime Minister Lester Pearson increased 
Canada’s involvement in multilateral organisations such as the Food and Agriculture 
Organization, World Health Organization, and International Monetary Fund; with this list 
expanding following each succeeding Prime Minister. It has led many to describe the 
country as the world’s first ‘international nation’ (Ward, 1970): a title that has 
‘strengthened its sense of purpose, national identity, and resolve to resist total absorption 
in the American system’ (Lyon, 1970, p. 1). This last point was certainly characteristic of 
Trudeau’s brand of nationalism which was ‘in its essence a form of internationalism […] 
that he conceived of Canada as a mentor state, taking initiatives on behalf of the world’s 
community’ (Hawes, 1984, p. 7). For example, Canada takes great pride in its 
peacekeeping force − started by Pearson under the United Nations Emergency Force who 
would later win the Nobel peace prize for this effort (Tucker quoted in Buchan, 1975, p. 
17). Multilateralism has also been applied to the economic system such as Canada’s 
active involvement in the World Bank, G8, G20, and similar bodies. Perhaps the most 
important has been NAFTA for which Canada insisted on Mexico’s inclusion. However, 
the best examples of Canadian support for multilateralism resides with the environment, 
where multilateral agreements and organisations have proved to be the model of choice 
for the government. Every year significant funds are given to intergovernmental 
organisations (IGOs) such as the Commonwealth and La Francophonie to fund 
environmental initiatives along with economic and social programmes. And as we shall 
see later, the US-Canada Acid Rain Agreement and the International Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer laid the groundwork when the new threat of 




3.3.2 The Environment 
Most Canadian children growing up encounter fabled tales of the Arctic explorations that 
fuel the imagination. These stories embed the vernacular of expeditions, travel writing, 
poems, and songs about the great Canadian wilderness that build a history for a young 
nation. The mountains, rivers, and northern lights replace the cathedrals and monuments 
of the Old World; and come to symbolise the country’s fledging identity. ‘In the quest for 
a cohesive identity, Canadian nationalism often gravitates to geography and climate, 
factors that are brought together in notions of the northern character of Canada as a chief 
attribute of nationality’ (Carl Berger quoted in Abel and Coates, 2001, p. 9-10). As the 
academic Paul Samson put it, there is ‘a national sense of belonging to the land’ (2001, p. 
199). Indeed with a history created from such diverse groups, ethnicities, and cultures, the 
land itself was often the unifying feature to all. The great literary theorist, Northrop Frye, 
once described Sir John Franklin’s doomed search of the Northwest Passage as a ‘great 
Canadian theme’ (Quoted by Cavell, 2007). And Shelagh Grant writes, ‘our northern 
heritage endures as an amorphous, obscure, yet recurrent theme in Canadian nationalism’ 
(Shelagh Grant quoted in Hulan, 2002. p. 1).17 The Canadian landscape, and specifically 
the North, has become a piece of national furniture, set into the country’s national 
identity.  
Canada is distinctive relative to countries in Europe and Asia in that the natural 
environment is seen to provide a history longer and more permanent than the young 
nation itself. The natural landscape grants a narrative for Canada from the early pioneers 
and frontier histories, to the Hudson Bay Company, to the leisure and tourism culture of 
modern day. Interestingly, Prime Minister Chrétien as a young politician was responsible 
for initiating the extensive Natural Park System in Canada: an initiative which has proved 
to be a popular and uniting force for an otherwise highly regional and culturally diverse 
                                                
17 Supported by Rudy Weibe who writes the North as ‘the true nature of our world and also our graspable 
identity’ (1989, p. 111). 
68 
 
nation (Saul, 1997; Powell, 2005), just as the cross-country rail had been a century before. 
Canadian currency carries iconography of the great wilderness (Gilbert, 1997) and even 
the national anthem evokes images of the natural landscape: ‘the true north strong and 
free’. When the Canadian Broadcast Corporation (CBC) conducted a poll (2007) to 
determine the seven wonders of Canada, five out of seven were either natural landscapes 
or vehicles and homes used to explore the wild (the canoe, the igloo, Niagara Falls, The 
Rockies, The Prairie Skies followed by Pier 21 in Halifax and Old Québec City). Contrast 
this with a country such as the United Kingdom in which popular polls cite exclusively 
man-made creations (BBC poll, 2002) or even the United States (NBC poll). Nature as an 
idea holds greater resonance in Canada as it is fundamentally linked to the country’s 
national identity; and this in turn, holds a normative value for the public and decision-
makers. Nature has become part of Canada’s national identity; and as such, is inherently 
good and worth maintaining. The Montreal Protocol and the Acid Rain Treaty between 
Canada and the United States are but two examples from a long list of Canada’s support 
for environmental protection, even before the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. 
Within international relations, environmentalism as a norm has received less 
attention, most likely because few nations define themselves so directly to their natural 
environment. The normative value placed upon environmental stewardship and 
sustainable development generally focuses on the UN system, such as the Millennium 
Development Goals enshrining sustainable development as a right, but not with specific 
reference to Canada nor specific debates about forests, fisheries, or climate change. This 
is because “Nature” only features in Canada’s story along with a small number of other 
states. To understand its role, one must explore Canadian literature and history in which 
scholars have long written of the environment forming a central element of the country’s 
national identity. Nowhere is this witnessed more than in Canadian art and poetry, from 
Leonard Cohen and Margaret Atwood to the paintings of the ‘Group of Seven’ (Keohane, 
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1997, p. 111). As Atwood elegantly observed, throughout French and English Canadian 
literature the central theme is that of Nature and Survival, or la Survivance; both 
intractable to the Canadian experience with the environment helping to define the 
country’s national identity (1972).  
 
3.4 Forerunner in the UNFCCC Negotiations 
As early as the Toronto Conference in 1988, it was evident from press statements and 
secondary literature that the Canadian government was convinced by the science and fully 
engaged in the emerging climate change regime. The Conference was hosted by Canada 
with many of its prominent scientists helping to raise early awareness of global warming. 
Later in 1992 at the Rio Earth Summit, Canada was praised for its participation. Indeed, 
the Summit was chaired by Canadian Maurice Strong, the first Director of the United 
Nations Environment Programme, who stated in his closing address: ‘the world will never 
be the same again’. The Earth Summit saw the creation of the UNFCCC; and whether one 
views Canada’s early rhetoric with sincerity or scepticism, the active participation and 
language demonstrates that, at the very least, it was deemed important to engage the 
debate and appear motivated in climate change policy. As James Sebenius observed, 
Canada is ‘a country in the rhetorical vanguard of greenhouse concern’ (in Mintzer and 
Leonard, 1994, p. 292); whose intentions however may or may not be as strong.  
 One of the domestic outcomes of the Earth Summit was The National Round 
Tables on the Environment and the Economy (NRTEE), initiated by the Conservative 
government and Prime Minister Mulroney in 1993. NRTEE became the main forum for 
consultation on climate change within the country (this will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 4). The process was influenced by the Brundtland report, which framed ideas of 
sustainable development for the Canadian government (Bernstein, 2002, p. 214). In the 
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same year, the Liberal Party, who would later succeed the Progressive Conservatives, 
advocated strong emission reductions in their Red Book with a 20% decrease of 1988 
levels by 2005 (the same goal expressed at the Toronto Conference in 1988). Indeed, as 
leader of the opposition party, Jean Chrétien followed the Earth Summit and was well-
versed in the issues surrounding climate change. As former Minister of Environment 
under Chrétien, Hon. David Anderson, said, he had a ‘fair knowledge’ of the subject 
(Personal Interview) and even pushed Prime Minister Mulroney towards stronger action 
on some of the key treaties (Toronto Star, 1992, p. A21). 
 
3.4.1 The Good Boy Scout 
Internationally, one of the loudest calls for action came from Canada, specifically Prime 
Minister Mulroney who wished for Canada to be a forerunner in the fledgling UNFCCC 
process. In 1989, as the United States was deliberating whether to negotiate a Convention, 
22 countries including Canada called for multilateral negotiations (Bodansky, 1994, p. 
54). As explained by Thomas Biersteker, ‘[t]he Conservative government of Brain 
Mulroney […] was largely receptive. Just as these norms [of sustainable development] fit 
with broader acceptance of economic liberalism and market forces as the main engine of 
economic growth at the end of the Cold War’ (quoted in Bernstein, 2002, p. 213). More 
importantly, environmental stewardship carries great weight in Canada; whose national 
identity is often defined by the natural landscape. And so, when the first assessment 
report from the IPCC was published in 1990 multilateral opinion was galvanised and the 
IPCC Response Strategies Working Group appointed Canada, Malta, and the United 
Kingdom as coordinators to schedule a multi-disciplinary workshop to ‘agree on the 
inadequacy of existing legal instruments and on the need for a framework convention on 
climate change, modelled on the Vienna Convention’ (Bodansky, 1994, p. 54). As one 
prominent Canadian scientist observed who was instrumental to the early UNFCCC 
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negotiations, Canada wished to be a ‘good environmental boy scout’ (Personal 
Interview). And many interviewees used this phrase or variations of it to describe how, ‘it 
was the right thing to do’. This sentiment continued under Prime Minister Chrétien and 
the Kyoto Protocol negotiations. 
The expression of a ‘good environmental boy scout’ is a revealing one and 
reintroduces both key norms, though in a less complimentary manner. The phrase invokes 
a sense of environmental stewardship; as well as a naïve enthusiasm, which is 
characteristic of Canada’s approach to climate change and other environmental problems. 
The boy scout analogy also carries moral implications alongside the rule of law and being 
a good global citizen. As Chapter 5 will touch upon, Canada’s reputation evaporated in 
subsequent UNFCCC negotiations as the country sought large emission credits for 
exporting clean energy and failed to introduce robust policy at home to reduce GHG 
emissions. 
 
3.4.2 A Multilateral Approach 
The UNFCCC process was a natural fit with Canada’s long-standing support for 
multilateralism. The Canadian government often referenced the success of the Montreal 
Protocol in speeches, and sought a similar multilateral agreement with a “targets and 
timetable” approach (Personal interview with Montreal Protocol negotiator). Canada also 
sponsored research and policy work in line with the Montreal model. For example, 
NRTEE completed a series of technical papers on emissions trading systems, and released 
Canada’s Options for a Domestic Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Program (1999). 
‘The logic of economic efficiency and win-win solutions typical of liberal environmental 
thinking continues to prevail in NRTEE’s work’ (Bernstein, 2002, p. 214). The NRTEE 
process also reinforced parallel international policy from the OECD (1998; Bernstein, 
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2002, p. 214) and analytical work on emissions trading by the Annex 1 Expert Group of 
the FCCC. In addition, the former Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) 
carried the UNFCCC mandate forward and championed adaptation within its project 
portfolio until it was folded into the Department of Foreign Affairs in 2013. 
An interesting side-note is that leading up to the climate change Convention, 
Canada sought an even more ambitious model: a general framework agreement based on 
the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention entitled the Law of the Atmosphere. ‘The 
rationale for this approach was that it recognised the interdependence of global 
atmospheric problems’ (Bodansky, 1994, p. 53). In February of 1989, Canada sponsored 
a meeting in Ottawa of legal and policy experts on the Law of the Atmosphere, to initiate 
discussions on a comprehensive atmospheric convention. However, at this same meeting 
Mostafa Tolba, the Executive Director of the UNEP, criticised the model as politically 
unrealistic, arguing instead for negotiation of a more narrowly focused convention on 
climate change. As Daniel Bodansky explained that the recommendations and approach 
of Mostafa Tolba carried more weight,  
‘due to his recent success in the Montreal Protocol negotiations, and the 
Canadian proposal never gained momentum. Although the Ottawa meeting went 
through the motions of discussing the elements of a framework convention on 
the atmosphere, attention began to focus on the alternative approach’ (1994, p. 
53).  
In the end, the UNFCCC maintained many aspects favourable to the federal government; 
but it is worth reinforcing that Canada was committed to multilateral action with a strong 
basis in international law. 
 
3.5 The Canadian Public 
Before continuing it is important to address public opinion in Canada. Public support was 
an essential pre-requisite for action and shaped this ‘boy scout’ can-do attitude amongst 
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both the Progressive Conservative and Liberal parties. Canadian public support on 
climate change and the Kyoto Protocol was not based on in-depth knowledge of the issue 
(indeed, in the early days, global warming was often confused with other environmental 
issues), but rather a more general concern owing to the strong national identity woven 
with the environment; as well as a general support for the UN approach which translated 
into automatic support for Kyoto.  
Much academic study into risk analysis attempts to unpack the public’s 
understanding and concern for climate change. Within Canada and many other countries, 
there is a paradox where public opinion polls demonstrate strong support for climate 
change mitigation (and specifically the UNFCCC) without a deep knowledge of the 
problem or sense of personal responsibility. In 1997, 70% of Canadians believed climate 
change was real and a problem (Anderson Personal Interview). That number had risen to 
roughly 73-80% support at the time of ratification in 2002 (Anderson Personal Interview; 
Angus Reid National Poll, 8 November, 2002); while at the same time, only 13% of 
respondents reported that they understood global warming ‘very well’ and 47% ‘fairly 
well’ (Bord, et al., 1998).18 In fact, ‘[t]here was confusion between climate change, ozone 
depletion, and poor air quality, often added to by poorly informed journalists (Hengeveld 
Personal Interview; supported by Bell, 1994). This lack of understanding was seized upon 
by anti-Kyoto opposition (See Chapter 5), who organised media campaigns to debunk 
climate science. However, public views on climate change and mitigation are more 
complex than a simple correlation between information and concern (Pidgeon and 
Fischhoff, 2011). While research has shown that low public support for climate policy 
may arise from misconceptions of the climate system, there are also instances where 
higher levels of information can lead to less public concern (Kahan et al., 2012). The 
                                                
18 To put this into perspective, a study into public knowledge of global warming in the United States, 
Canada, Mexico, Russia, Portugal, and Brazil, showed that Canadians the highest public knowledge of the 
issue at the time.  
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scholar, Kari Marie Norgaard, expands on the ‘information deficit’ approach (2011) in an 
ethnographic study of changing Norwegian views on climate change. Although outside 
the scope of this research, she shows how climate scepticism may not be the main barrier 
in countries, but rather the complex relationship between trust in science, information, 
and anxiety towards the future (Norgaard, 2011). For now, the crucial fact was that the 
public supported action while demonstrating only a superficial understanding of the risks 
of climate change.  
Moreover, multilateral agreements have traditionally held strong support amongst 
Canadians. One negotiator at the first COP spoke of ‘joining for the sake of joining’, and 
this was echoed in the media at the time. As explained by P.H. Chapman, former Director 
of the Political and Strategic Analysis Division in Canada’s Department of Foreign 
Affairs, Canada is a society ‘in which the vast majority express an interest in international 
events […] and expect their government to be actively engaged in finding solutions to 
international problems’ (quoted in Melakopides, 1998, p. 137). By 2002, the large 
majority of Canadians believed climate change was already occurring (Anderson Personal 
Interview), and this broad, though shallow, public support was expressed for the 
UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. According to one poll organised by Ipsos-Reid, CTV, and 
The Globe and Mail, 74% of Canadians supported the Kyoto Protocol (Angus Reid 
National Poll, 2002). Only 19% of Canadians were opposed (Angus Reid National Poll, 
2002). Interestingly, almost as many people, 71%, said that ‘even if there are some 
problems with the Kyoto Protocol, it should be implemented because it is a good first 
step’ (Angus Reid National Poll, 2002). Minister of Environment, Hon. David Anderson, 
remembered the Alberta government and industry ‘paid a lot of money for advertising 
and managed to drop the figures from 73% support for ratification down to about 43%’. 
However, these figures did not remain permanently low (See Chapter 5). In another 
Ipsos-Reid poll released in June of 2002, 72% of Albertans said they supported ratifying 
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the Kyoto Protocol (Angus Reid National Poll, 2002). Furthermore, 95% of Albertan 
households said they would be willing to pay something to implement Kyoto (Angus 
Reid National Poll, 2002). Without this domestic support, it would have required much 
more political courage from the national government to proceed in the negotiations. As 
Matthew Bramley, Director of the Pembina Institute and long-standing observer to the 
UNFCCC negotiations, explained, ‘the federal Liberals’ success lay in their ability to sit 
right in the middle of the political spectrum: [the reason] why they managed to stay in 
power for so long. When you want to sit in the middle you have to be very attentive to 
public opinion’ (Bramley Personal Interview; Supported by Anderson Personal 
Interview).  
 
3.6 The Mandate 
Canada’s early participation in the negotiations of the UNFCCC garnered praise both 
internationally and domestically; however, this was not to last. As the scholar Steven 
Bernstein explained from his own research into the attitudes of the time, ‘[s]tarting in 
1995, the NGO community had really gone after Canada because it had been at the 
forefront until Rio and then disappeared’ (Personal Interview). By the first Conference of 
the Parties (COP1), Canada suffered a high degree of embarrassment amongst the media 
and environmental nongovernmental organisations (ENGOs). Indeed, it is suggested in an 
anonymous interview that one of the reasons Canada fought to have the new UNFCCC 
secretariat housed in Toronto was in an attempt to rectify the negative image both at 
home and abroad (Personal Interview). In the end, the Secretariat was given to Germany. 
This negative image haunted the Canadian delegation and brought added pressure when 
the Kyoto negotiations commenced two years later. 
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 The outcome of COP1 was the Berlin Mandate, which set the task of 
strengthening the commitments of OECD countries by 1997. Since the 1992 Convention, 
it had become clear that voluntary initiatives were insufficient and that stronger measures 
were required; and so COP3 was set as the self-imposed deadline for governments to 
reach an agreement on what those would be (Baylis and Smith, 2001, p. 305). As Richard 
Ballhorn, former Head of Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs Environment Division, 
explained, Canada ratified the UNFCCC soon thereafter, ‘but it became clear quite 
quickly that the Framework Convention was not going to do a whole lot […] we knew we 
had to get something more intense’ (Personal Interview). Environment Canada and 
Foreign Affairs Canada worked on the country’s international position for COP3. At the 
G8 Summit in June of that year, it became clear to Prime Minister Chrétien that ‘other 
governments wanted to sign: [there was] a lot of pressure’ (Bernstein Personal Interview). 
A year before, the US Senator Tim Wirth, gave a speech indicating the need for legally 
binding commitments and targets linked to market mechanisms; in essence, drawing an 
outline of the American position. It was also reported that both Canada’s Ambassador to 
the United States and Chrétien himself received phone calls from President Clinton 
‘urging Canada to “push the envelope” in order to help bridge the gap and thus facilitate 
agreement between the polarised US and EU positions’ (Harrison, 2006, p. 10). This 
filtered into the G8 Summit, at which countries like Germany and the United States put 
pressure on legally binding commitments and targets. In Canada, ‘the bureaucrats were 
taken by surprise’ (Bernstein Personal Interview). Based on the research of Steven 
Bernstein and personal communications with former members of Canada’s delegation, 
‘the provinces were not on board but the federal government said they were going to 
anyway because of international pressure and reputation’ (Personal Interview). As we will 
see in Chapter 4, the conflict between the federal and provincial governments would later 
erupt when the Canadian position changed to a -3% cut and then again to the -6% 
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reduction agreed in the dying hours of the Kyoto summit. The negotiations from then on 
became about relative gains and political optics − how Canada appeared in relation to 
other country commitments − more than domestic scientific and economic analysis.   
 
3.6.1 The Target 
In December 1997, the ambitious Kyoto negotiations commenced. The pressure delegates 
were under at the Conference to produce a meaningful and legally binding agreement 
cannot be overemphasised. Media attention at the Conference was enormous and 
delegates were well aware they had just 11 days to broker an international agreement. As 
Starkey et al., wrote, ‘[a]lthough the rhetoric ran high at times, the overall tone of these 
negotiations was collaborative as befits a public-good dilemma such as that posed by 
global warming’ (1999, p. 7). Since ‘the Conservative government of Mulroney’, 
international norms embodied in the Convention had permeated the federal bureaucracy 
(Bernstein Personal Interview), and there was strong support within the Ministries for a 
successful COP3 negotiation (although the depth of this commitment varied as Chapter 5 
Section 5.6 will examine). Following media sources home and abroad, COP3 brought 
renewed attention from Prime Minister Chrétien with the findings demonstrating his 
direct involvement in the negotiations. Hon. David Anderson described how the Prime 
Minister wished Canada to ‘play a positive role’ in the negotiations (Anderson Personal 
Interview; Supported by Harrison, 2010). This is confirmed by the scholar, Andrew 
Cooper, with Chrétien exemplified by his desire to rebuild Canada’s reputation as the 
‘quintessential international citizen’ (1997, p. 74). This foreign policy approach builds 
upon the ‘fundamental tenets of Pearsonism’ (Cooper, 1997, p. 74), a man Chrétien 
studied under during his formative years as a rising figure in the Liberal Party. Canada 
has had a long-term commitment to the UN and multilateralism (Bennett Personal 
Interview). The EU and United States offered greater reductions, and Chrétien wanted to 
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demonstrate Canada’s equal commitment. In the lead up to COP3, the Prime Minister 
announced that Ottawa wished to take a position better than that of the Americans 
(Geddes, 1997, p. 6) – to be ‘greener than the Americans’ (McBean Personal Interview). 
However, press reports from the time also recall that US President Clinton phoned 
Chrétien and urged Canada ‘to help bridge the gap’ between the US and EU positions 
(Harrison, 2010, p. 178). In the end, the United States agreed to a target 1% more than 
Canada, reinforcing the interpretation that Chrétien wished to stay in line with the US 
position but not necessarily out-do them. As Matthew Bramley explained, ‘-3% would 
have just looked too bad […] it is all about optics […] arguably -6% was not better than 
the Americans but it was perhaps close enough to save face’ (Personal Interview).19  
Ultimately, the Kyoto Protocol was similar in objective to earlier climate change 
agreements but with a mechanism radically different in that it proposed legally binding 
targets for emission reductions. This is because international environmental agreements 
are usually voluntary with no mechanism for enforcement; and yet countries under Annex 
I agreed to compulsory reductions and can be penalised for inaction. It may well be that 
‘the multilateral negotiation process, emerging global environmental norms, and linkages 
to broader foreign policy goals and pressures pushed Canada to commit to action well 
beyond what domestic constraints dictate’ (Bernstein, 2002, p. 205). Indeed, the built-in 
ratchet effect in the Convention meant that the pressure for tighter emissions targets 
would only increase. During Kyoto, ‘[s]ome delegations even seemed unsure what their 
numbers stood for at times’ (Starkey et al., 1999, p. 15). This is confirmed by anonymous 
members of Canada’s delegation team who said that Canada had not done the math 
(Supported by Ballhorn Personal Interview and Bramley Personal Interview), unlike the 
Australians and even the Americans who were better prepared in their analysis. As 
                                                
19 The US 7% commitment amounted to a 26% reduction from business-as-usual projections for 2010. The 
EU and central European countries agreed to 8% cut and Japan 7%, or about 15% and 12% respectively 
from business-as-usual projections. At the time, Canada’s -6% target amounted to a 27% reduction in 
business-as-usual by 2010, although this has  now risen to 37-40%.  
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Gordon McBean, a member of the Canadian delegation at COP3, said, ‘the number was 
sort of picked out of the sky’ (Personal Interview). It appeared Canada only knew she 
wanted to be part of the process; there was little study of specific interests and 
implementation. At this early stage, Canada’s national interests would prove malleable. 
 
3.6.2 Sleeping with Elephants 
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau famously compared Canada’s relationship with America to 
sleeping with an elephant: no matter how friendly and evenly tempered the beast; one is 
affected by every twitch and grunt. During good times and bad, the Canadian government 
has paid close attention to her large neighbour to the south. For climate change policy, the 
marriage of the two economies brings practical concerns for coordinating environmental 
regulation between both, as has been seen with ozone depletion and acid rain. Each is the 
other’s most important trading partner, though the size of their respective economies also 
means that Canadian exports to the United States are much more important to Canada 
than the other way around. To support this relationship there are multiple points of 
contact between the two governments, as well as widespread cross border travel between 
Canadian and American citizens.20 About 31 American federal agencies and 21 Canadian 
counterparts deal directly with one another, as do many more states and provinces 
(Keohane and Nye, 2011, p. 147). However, this partnership does not guarantee 
agreement on all aspects of foreign policy. The relationship and ideology of the Prime 
Minister and President can be a deciding factor. 
Brain Mulroney came into power as leader of the Progressive Conservative Party 
in 1983, holding office for 10 years. Despite economic recession, Canada introduced new 
                                                
20 Each year some 38 million Americans travel to Canada and some 34 million Canadians visit the United 
States. In the 1970s there were between 20,000 to 30,000 permanent immigrants in each direction, and this 
has steadily risen with each decade. 
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environmental policies along with the United States. Prime Minister Mulroney was noted 
for his close relationship with President Reagan, which allowed both leaders to manage a 
common North American position on issues of trade, security, and the environment. This 
continued under Chrétien and Clinton whose similar liberal outlooks and centre-left 
policies facilitated a common position between the two countries. They also shared 
common perspectives of the Kyoto Protocol including the “target and timetable” 
approach and credit trading systems. This is contrasted with when President Bush entered 
the White House. Prime Minister Chrétien was observed to have an uncomfortable 
relationship with the new President. Consequently, Canada appeared to realign itself with 
the European Union on positions such as security and the environment. This would prove 
a salient point during ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
3.7 Ink to Paper 
Canada ratified the Kyoto Protocol on December 17, 2002 after an unexpected 
announcement by Prime Minister Chrétien at the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development. At the time, the decision played out more like a soap opera with no one 
expecting the announcement from the Prime Minister (Personal Interview with Minister 
of Environment). There were strong reservations within the Cabinet and a number of 
Ministries, most notably Natural Resources Canada, and not all were working on the 
assumption that ratification was inevitable (See Chapter 5 Section 5.6). Many within the 
government voiced concerns about implementation once the United States withdrew in 
2001. ‘Its “firm” commitment to implement the Kyoto Protocol even after the US 
withdrawal is particularly puzzling from a rationalist perspective, since the Canadian 
government and powerful domestic economic interests had previously stated that 
international competitive concerns should prevent Canada from moving forward on 
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Kyoto without the United States’ (Bernstein, 2002, p. 205). However, in terms of 
reputation, the US withdrawal from Kyoto gave Canada a chance to distinguish herself 
from America by forging ahead without them. Canada was also negotiating for ambitious 
credits for the country’s forests (carbon sinks), which could have reduced her Kyoto 
commitment by one-third (Macdonald, 2001). As one commentator said, ‘it would have 
looked really bad if Canada had won these [concessions] and then said ‘thank you but we 
are not going to ratify’’ (Bernstein Personal Interview). 
As mentioned earlier, Chrétien followed ‘the Trudeau tradition who always 
wanted to have more independent foreign policy’ (Bernstein Personal Interview; 
Supported by other Personal Interviews). This dates back to the late 1960s, where ‘the 
doctrine of quiet diplomacy had come under considerable criticism from nationalistic 
elements of the Canadian public [followed by an] increasingly nationalistic and assertive 
Canadian bargaining approach’ (Keohane and Nye, 2011, p. 150). Chrétien already 
demonstrated a desire to strengthen the country’s international reputation and the need to 
distinguish Canada from the United States. Indeed, ‘the uncompromising tone of the Bush 
administration [which] was noted to a large extent in the personal antipathy to 
environmental concerns’ (Harris, 1998, p. 44-45; Paterson and Grubb, 1992, p. 305-6; 
Schröder, 2001, p. 35) only added to disapproval over Bush’s withdrawal and positioned 
Canada in a more favourable light, especially as Chrétien’s announcement came just three 
months after.   
This decision from the top was guaranteed in the House of Commons. At the time, 
the Prime Minister enjoyed a majority government and, even more so than in the United 





Figure 4 After Ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, PM Chrétien Receives Standing 
Ovation in the House of Commons 
(Source: AFP/Getty Images) 
 
As will be discussed in Chapter 4, the Prime Minister has greater latitude for autonomous 
action when leading a majority government. Chrétien, in particular, did not bow to his 
Cabinet and increased his power over his 13 years in office. For example, at the first 
Cabinet meeting in 1993, Chrétien warned ‘[t]he first person who makes a mistake will be 
out, [and reminded] there was plenty of talent available on the backbench’ (Quoted by 
Savoie, 1999, p. 97). This was indicative of Chrétien’s leadership style, and the Cabinet is 
portrayed at times as nothing more than a focus group for the Prime Minister. This is 
extended to the executive assistants to each Cabinet member. ‘If a minister is 
experiencing continuing political difficulties then The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) 
will simply select the executive assistant, and for all practical purposes the minister must 
accept PMO’s candidate for the job’ (Savioe, 1999, p. 250).  
After Canada, it was left to only a handful of countries to ratify, namely Russia 
who carried the deciding vote. One of the curious aspects of the Protocol was that the 
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agreement would only come into force 90 days after 55 countries representing 55% of 
global GHG emissions signed and ratified. This high threshold for entry was to ensure the 
participation of the most important emitters to the Protocol (Schröder, 2001, p. 63) but 
had the undesirable consequence of giving some OECD countries like Canada and Russia 
a powerful hand in the negotiations.21 After the United States pulled out in March of 
2001, countries like Russia and Canada were placed in an advantageous position to 
receive more credits and exemptions in order to ensure their support, although Canada did 
not receive all the key concessions it pushed for (namely credit for exporting clean energy 
as will be briefly discussed in Chapter 5).  
 
3.8 A Neorealist Challenge 
This brings us to the fundamental question raised by neorealism as to why Canada’s 
Prime Minister would subscribe to multilateralism, the environment, and concerns over 
international reputation. For example, did reputation carry greater importance since the 
country was also participating in parallel negotiations within the International Forum on 
Forests or related to fisheries? Those within the government could not confirm that 
parallel negotiations filtered into the UNFCCC discussions; indeed, interview data 
suggested that the climate change units within Natural Resources Canada, Environment 
Canada, and Foreign Affairs were isolated from other files. So perhaps reputation 
mattered from a more general, geopolitical perspective. As Steven Bernstein proposed, 
the poor reputation suffered after COP1 ‘hurts a country like Canada since it is not a 
heavy-lifter [and] a medium power like this depends a lot on reputation’ (Personal 
Interview). This section will explore this possible argument – an argument which stems 
from a neorealist view of the state and their value-maximising behavior in foreign policy. 
                                                
21 For example, it is widely suspected that Russia’s ratification of Kyoto was tied to the EU sponsoring its 
membership to the WTO. 
84 
 
As discussed briefly in Chapter One, the theory that underpins much of 
international relations is that of realism and its modern reincarnation, neorealism. As 
explained by Burchill et al., ‘[r]ealism is widely regarded as the most influential 
theoretical tradition in International Relations, even by its hardest critics’ (2001, p. 70). 
Neorealism was born from a particular age in international politics (namely the late Cold 
War) and, in turn, has come to influence its peers and permeate the academic and policy 
communities. In many respects, neorealism represents the dominant understanding or 
worldview of global politics at this moment in time. The language alone has been widely 
assimilated by Canadian policy-makers and academics. 
In domestic society, state government and institutions decide the rule of law; in 
the international society there is no such rule, only norms of behaviour which may or may 
not be broken. As the scholar, J.G. Ruggie, remarked, ‘[t]he international system is not an 
entity capable of acting in its own behalf, for the greater social good’ (1986, p. 139). This 
was evident in the 1950s, when growing fears of nuclear war caused many to advocate for 
world disarmament; and yet, state interest prevented any such self-sacrificing behaviour.  
As Kenneth Waltz stated, ‘[w]ith each country constrained to take care of itself, no one 
can take care of the system’ (1979, p. 109).  As such, neorealism is pessimistic for long-
lasting international cooperation. ‘It puts forward a general hypothesis that any 
cooperation is short-lived, and will in general reflect the preferences of dominant states 
within the system’ (Patterson, 1996, p. 93-4). Consequently, theories such as Balance of 
Power and Hegemonic Stability Theory lay out the possible structural conditions that 
allow for periods of cooperation; for example, the existence of a single hegemonic power 
that can enforce compliance and peace. International institutions, ideas, and noble goals 
cannot change structural realities that hinder cooperation between states. Neorealism even 
doubts whether ‘the growing recognition of universal values such as humanitarianism, 
which occasionally overrides the sanctity of national sovereignty, has apparent 
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transformative potential for the system’ (Burchill et al., 2001, p. 93). In the case of the 
UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, the current structure of the international system will 
dictate state interests and, subsequently, state behaviour in the negotiation process. 
‘[S]mall countries will behave differently than large ones, and in a balance of power 
system, alliances can be expected to shift in response’ (Keohane, 1986, p. 165). 
Ultimately, neorealism looks for changes in global politics to open up new possibilities 
for multilateral agreements such as Kyoto.  
In the Canadian context, there is a wealth of literature that outlines the case for a 
mid-size power supporting multilateral action over bilateral action to bring greater 
influence internationally, and in the process why a positive reputation is essential. For 
example, under Pearsonism, international reputation was read to carry ‘symbolic prestige 
and material incentives’ such as institutional special privileges (Cooper, 1997, p. 285). 
The more cynical observers during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations believed that the 
objective of Kyoto ‘seemed to be how to please the “green” constituencies at home while 
keeping one’s national business and industry interests out of regulation’s way’ (Starkey et 
al., 1999, p. 10). Such neorealists argue that Prime Ministers Mulroney and Chrétien did 
not enter into the UNFCCC and Kyoto negotiations, respectively, because of abstract 
ambitions of environmentalism and norms of cooperation, but solely to appear green and 
boost Canada’s environmental credentials. Even if reputation can be framed along 
material and structural lines, the role of ideas and norms cannot be reconciled with 
neorealism. Neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz disregard ideas, norms, and political 
ideology and instead focus exclusively on discovering structural realities in the global 
system that encourage or constrain state behaviour. As the old saying goes, ‘politics is 
about the possible’.   
The problem, of course, is that this traditional perspective within international 
relations does not correspond to findings for this research, especially the interview data. 
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Even in those interviews where the government officials were free to discuss off-record, 
none cited materialist and structural advantages; in fact, the Kyoto Protocol would prove 
to be a divisive political issue between Ottawa and the provinces and a significant burden 
for the federal government to carry on its own (See Chapter 4). The neorealist 
commentary only came from two academics, out of 46 official interviewees and many 
more unofficial interviewees from the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COPs). The 
motivations cited and the language used overwhelmingly indicate international norms (the 
notion of “right” and “wrong”) dictating Canada’s participation. Moreover, Canadian 
climate scientists and key intellectual entrepreneurs helped set the international climate 
change agenda; and Canada even advocated a more ambitious model based on the United 
Nations Law of the Sea Convention entitled the Law of the Atmosphere. Although 
Canada is a keen ‘joiner’, there is nothing to suggest Ottawa was only participating for 
self-interest and reputation alone. Even the critical event of Canada’s ratification of the 
Protocol, which was intertwined with the country’s reputation relative to the United 
States, cannot alone explain why Canada was a strong advocate for the climate change 
regime especially during the formative years of the Convention when the United States 
was itself an eager participant. Matthew Patterson examined the actions of the United 
States in the UNFCCC negotiations and found that neorealism theory adds value to the 
analysis of climate change politics by allowing us ‘to focus on the conflictual aspects of 
the negotiations [and] leads us to think of it in terms of a collective action problem’ 
(1996, p. 113). Where it falls short is explaining how cooperation for non-security issues, 
as well as accounting for the perception decision-makers who appear to be motivated by 
certain beliefs and ideas.  
Perhaps most telling is that neorealism itself has broadened its approach to include 
the possibility that ideas could shape state behaviour in addition to structural interests. 
Noted scholars such as Hedley Bull and Robert Keohane blur the distinction and develop 
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theoretical approaches that integrate structural and strategic factors with social and 
political ideas. Academics from different streams of IR have worked to include the notion 
of ideas with a structuralist view; including Hedley Bull and Martin Wright of the English 
School; Robert Keohane and Interdependence; Robert Cox and Critical Theory; and 
Alexander Wendt and Social Constructivism. The following section will discuss such 
ideas in the Canadian context.   
 
3.9 The Right Thing to Do 
As mentioned above, there are many branches of international relations that incorporate 
the role of ideas and norms in shaping national interests; most notably that of normative 
theory and social constructivism. The former ‘attempts to clarify the basic moral issues of 
international relations’ (Quoted in Jackson and Sørensen, 2003, p. 260). For example, 
Chris Brown divides the normative controversies of world politics into two rival moral 
outlooks: cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. Cosmopolitanism focuses on 
‘individual human beings and on the whole community of humankind as the basic right- 
and duty-bearing units of world politics’; and the latter on ‘political communities, 
particularly sovereign states, as the fundamental normative units of world politics whose 
rights, duties, and legitimate interests have priority over all normative categories and 
agencies’ (Jackson and Sørensen, 2003, p. 260). In both, the moral outlook of the political 
elite, in this case study the Prime Minister and Ministers, affects how Canada’s national 
interests are framed. And certainly, when comparing the approach of Prime Ministers 
Mulroney, Chrétien, and most recently Stephen Harper, one sees a change in the moral 
outlook of the leader both with respect to the environment and multilateralism. In general, 
normative theories ‘attempt to theorise the normative practices of states and state leaders 
[emphasising] international ethics at its core concerns the moral choice of states people’ 
88 
 
(Jackson and Sørensen, 2003, p. 261). ‘When looking at questions about ethics in foreign 
policy, you must first look at the practitioners involved’ (Jackson and Sørensen, 2003, p. 
261).  
Social constructivism does not represent an anti-thesis to neorealism, but rather an 
attempt to broaden the theory to explore epistemic and ontological questions, and include 
social norms and ideas into the research programme. This is, at least, the attempt made by 
Alexander Wendt and other so-called ‘soft’ constructivists. As articulated by Christian 
Reus-Smit, ‘to the extent that structures can be said to shape the behaviour of social and 
political actors, be they individuals or states, constructivists hold that normative and 
ideational structures are just as important as material structures’ (Christian Reus-Smit 
quoted in Burchill et al., 2001, p. 216). Whereas rationalist theories emphasise material 
power (neorealism) or economic structures (neomarxism and political economy), 
constructivists argue that ‘systems of shared ideas, beliefs, and values also have structural 
characteristics, and that they exert powerful influence on social and political action’ 
(Christian Reus-Smit quoted in Burchill et al., 2001, p. 216-7). Similar to the English 
School, constructivism examines institutions and the role of norms and practices in 
maintaining and transforming the structure of the international system. In such cases, the 
IPCC and UN Secretariat have a transformative role, helping to shape the accepted 
parameters of the discussion and the emerging climate change regime. This is especially 
salient as the Canadian government did not always prepare the necessary scientific and 
economic analysis going into the negotiations, relying even more on the IPCC and 
Secretariat to provide the analysis. In doing so, one can see how international norms from 
the UN and IPCC percolated down to influence Canada’s interests during the agenda-
setting stage; and also created the momentum and justification for signing and ratifying 
the Kyoto Protocol. Unlike neorealism, constructivism explores the formation of state 
interest instead of treating it as a given. And in this sense ideas are just as important as 
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material or strategic interests to explain how Canada perceives its place in the 
international system and relationship with other states.   
Overall, norms and ideas help shape identities and state interests in three possible 
ways: imagination, communication, and constraint (Christian Reus-Smit quoted in 
Burchill et al., 2001, p. 218). First, ideas and norms may help determine what is 
politically possible or feasible in the eyes of policy-makers and negotiators. Ideas and 
values also help a country like Canada to define their positions and justify or appeal for 
support. The communication of certain ideas may also determine which coalitions form 
during the negotiations in addition to common material interests; this was certainly the 
case with the early North American alliance as well as the informal alliance between 
Japan, United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (JUSCANZ). The possibility of 
social learning between states and non-state actors is also an important aspect to the 
negotiations and the communication of ideas and values may be integral to this process. 
Lastly, ideas through social learning may actually constrain state interests, especially if 
they conflict with other ideas.  
Taken as a whole, norms have a greater influence in foreign policy when the 
Prime Minister holds a majority government and strong influence over his or her party. 
Under a minority government, the ideology of the Prime Minister may be trumped by 
bargaining within the House of Commons and between the government and external 
actors in which structural, materialist factors gain prominence. Without a strong 
figurehead, the debate will inevitably boil down to the lowest common denominator, or at 





As Weiss and Jacobson eloquently observed, ‘[i]nternational treaties resemble living 
organisms, in that they evolve and develop their own histories’ (Weiss, 2000, p. 157). 
Canada moved from a driver in the UNFCCC negotiations to the backseat years later. 
That said, norms of sustainable development and multilateral action framed Canada’s 
involvement with Kyoto, especially her initial signing. Prime Ministers Mulroney and 
Chrétien both proved to be highly supportive of the newly emerging climate change 
regime and the ideas it stood for (Bennett Personal Interview; Ogilvie Personal 
Interview). Furthermore, at the time of ratification, Kyoto offered Canada redemption on 
the international stage and a chance to differentiate herself from the United States. In 
essence, norms and material interests each aligned to support the foreign policy decision 
to ratify the Protocol. Overall, there was a high degree of homogeneity throughout 
Canada’s participation in the UNFCCC negotiations between 1988 and 1997, despite 
Conservative and Liberal parties in power. This demonstrates a close affinity to 
international norms and the UN process amongst the Canadian political parties. 
Challenged in 2006 with the emergence of a radically different worldview from Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper which will be examined in the concluding chapter.  
There still remains one limitation of this analysis of international norms: it may 
explain what brought a country like Canada to the table, but not how she played the game 
thereafter. International norms and reputation only offer an explanation as to why Prime 
Ministers Mulroney and Chrétien wished for Canada to participate and sign. The finer 
points of the text were left to the Ministries and negotiators who played a very different 
game (as discussed in Chapter 5 Section 5.4). A Prime Minister can concern his or herself 
with international norms; a diplomat with manoeuvrability. The most significant barrier to 
the IR perspective is treating the state as a unified actor, and focusing exclusively on the 
interaction between, not within, states. Interestingly, Waltz’s structural neorealism may 
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offer greater explanatory power for the domestic federal-provincial power struggle over 
Kyoto implementation more so than Kyoto’s negotiations. It is a theory tailored to 
international actors (i.e. states) but fits nicely with the domestic negotiations since the 
provinces have significant constitutional power and act more like self-interested 
governments themselves. The next chapter will discuss the structural realities of the 
Canadian state and examine whether the federal government could even implement the 
Kyoto Protocol without the provinces; as well as the two-level game between both tiers of 






Chapter 4   Structural Constraints on Federal Climate Change 
Policy 
4.1 Introduction 
The third Conference of the Parties (COP3) in 1997 were difficult negotiations for Annex 
I countries who had to agree to mandatory emission reductions. For Canada, however, 
tensions rose even earlier. The day before the Conference opened, the Canadian 
delegation was in turmoil during, what should have been a typical strategy meeting. The 
federal Ambassador for the Environment, John Fraser, with the short straw in hand, was 
tasked with announcing to provincial delegates that Canada would not adhere to the 
agreed upon target of stabilisation, and would instead pursue a stronger position of -3%. 
This would eventually increase to -6% by the end of COP3, but even -3% was an affront 
to provincial representatives. Over coffee and apple danishes, the room erupted.  
Delegates were shocked by this announcement from on high, which went against the 
federal-provincial agreement forged one month before in Regina.22 As one observer 
recounted, ‘the guys got up and stormed out of the meeting […] if there was not a firmly 
built roof over that place it would have blown off’ (McBean Personal Interview; 
Confirmed by Harrison, 2002, p. 10; Macdonald and Smith, 1997). The two delegates 
were eventually, and delicately, persuaded to return; however, the exchange 
foreshadowed years of domestic political conflict between Ottawa and the provinces over 
the Kyoto Protocol.  
Even some members of the federal Cabinet were opposed to the increased 
commitment, but for the Prime Minister, the need to ‘do the right thing’ and the political 
optics of Canada in relation to other countries remained central. As the last chapter 
demonstrated, Canada’s national identity encourages support for multilateral 
                                                
22 Pre-Kyoto strategy meeting between the federal government, provinces and territories which agreed upon 
stabilisation, with the exception of Québec who argued for greater emission reductions. 
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environmental agreements of this kind, and so it came as little surprise that Chrétien kept 
in step with other countries, especially her southern neighbour. As COP3 commenced, it 
quickly became apparent that a stabilisation target was not tenable. The EU introduced a 
target of -15% and not even the United States was prepared to hold a press conference 
announcing a measly stabilisation target.23 As Kyoto garnered increased media attention, 
key developed countries jostled to formalise new targets, leading Canada to abandon its 
stabilisation mandate. The provinces were enraged by the change, of course. The federal 
government had undertaken balanced consultations with the provinces and territories 
prior to COP3 but then failed to consult again when recalibrating its negotiation position 
during the Conference. Prime Minister Chrétien may have positioned Canada as a good 
global citizen in the early climate change negotiations, but his swift decision alienated 
many provinces; and as we shall see, the resulting antagonism between the federal 
government and provinces would dominate Canada’s attempts at implementation.  
Whereas the previous chapter examined whether and how international norms and 
strategic interests shaped Canada’s early entry into the Kyoto Protocol, this chapter 
focuses on the domestic, structural reality that worked to constrain federal policy options. 
To understand the politics of climate change in Canada, it is helpful to draw on Robert 
Putnam’s metaphor of two-level diplomacy (1988): namely, states not only negotiate 
international agreements amongst themselves at the international level but also internally 
at the national level. States are not monolithic entities (Starkey et al., 1999, p. 4) and 
negotiation positions often stem from protracted political deliberation within their borders 
as well as outside. The influence of domestic and international factors are mutually 
reinforcing, and Putnam argues for general equilibrium theories that consider the 
interaction of both domestic and international factors (1988). This is an exceedingly 
                                                
23 All Annex I countries aimed to reduce emissions below the 1990 benchmark except Russia which agreed 
to stabilisation, 8% for Australia and 10% for Iceland. All the interview data and secondary sources 
indicate, however, that a stabilisation target was considered politically insufficient for Canada. 
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difficult task, and Putnam himself could not offer a precise theoretical model, merely a 
helpful heuristic. This is especially salient as ‘the dominant discourse about “global 
warming” and “global climate change” sometimes leads analysts to think of climate 
change politics and policymaking predominantly in global terms’ and yet the dynamics 
and outcomes of climate change politics result from a number of factors cutting across 
different levels of government (Selin and VanDeveer, 2011, p. 1).24 As observed by 
Booth and Smith (1995, p. 141) environmental problems force students of international 
relations to consider domestic political processes more than is customary for the 
discipline.  
 
4.2 Canada’s Federalist System 
4.2.1 The Federalist Model 
From the outset it is important to distinguish between federal countries in structure (de 
jure) and federal countries in practice (de facto). Although many countries have shifted 
significant powers to regional governments, constitutionally the national governments 
still retain the final deciding vote. For example, in the United Kingdom, the national 
government can and did suspend the provincial assembly of Northern Ireland. In India, 
the national government can dissolve state governments under Article 356 of the 
constitution: a power it has also repeatedly exercised. De facto federalism is in fact 
decentralisation and devolution of powers, which can exist in unitary states. Far fewer 
countries are structurally federal like Canada, or have the fragmented distribution of 
population and power across its regions.  
Less than 20% of the world’s population lives in a de jure federal country (Clark 
et al., 2009). ‘[A] federal state is one in which sovereignty is constitutionally split 
                                                
24 ‘Comparative federalism has a long tradition in comparative politics, but is a much newer area of inquiry 
amongst those interested in international environmental politics’ (Quoted in VanDeveer, 2011 p. 2). 
95 
 
between at least two territorial levels so that independent government units at each level 
have final authority in at least one policy realm’ (Clark et al., 2009, p. 605). In Canada, 
the constitution recognises significant provincial powers that cannot be abolished by the 
national government. Coupled with this, taxation is highly decentralised, affording the 
provinces even greater practical control. The municipalities and provinces raise more tax 
revenue than the federal government: almost 60% of total tax revenue (Le Blanc, 2008; 
Clark et al., 2009).25 In terms of environmental policy, the provinces of Canada regulate 
most resource management, pollution control, and wildlife protection in addition to their 
control of revenue sources including personal and corporate tax, property and estate tax, 
natural resource tax, and royalties. Canada, along with the United States, Germany, and 
Brazil, is truly a federalist country in both legal structure and in practice. As we will see, 
this structure means that ‘Ottawa is inevitably consigned to playing two-level games 
without adequate authority to impose agreements on the provinces once a position has 
been reached’ (Stoett, 2009, p. 349). 
 
4.2.2 Reservation of Powers 
Unlike her southern neighbour, Canada was not born from war but from compromise. Her 
founding fathers were not revolutionaries but merchants, traders, and rentiers (Hueglin, 
2005). In 1763, New France was handed over to Great Britain in the Treaty of Paris. The 
Act of Union (1840) married Upper and Lower Canada to create the province of Canada. 
The British North American Act (1867) officially gave birth to the nation, though the 
country was still politically and economically tied to the British Crown. The Act joined 
the province of Canada with New Brunswick and Nova Scotia and also resulted in the 
creation of Ontario and Québec. Over the next 132 years, provinces and territories were 
                                                
25 In Canada, sub-national governments (the provinces, territories and municipalities) raise the largest share 
of total government revenues amongst industrialised federal countries, including the United States, 
Switzerland, Germany and Australia. 
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added and redrawn from Manitoba and the Northwest Territories (1870), British 
Columbia (1871), Prince Edward Island (1873), Yukon (1898), Saskatchewan and 
Alberta (1905), Newfoundland and Labrador (1949), and finally Nunavut (1999). This 
period also saw incremental and sustained political and economic independence from 
Great Britain, resulting in a now largely symbolic recognition of the Queen as titular 
Head of State.  
 Canada is made up of 10 provinces and three northern territories; the latter having 
recently gained greater self-governing authority. The provinces derive their powers from 
the original British North American Act of 1867, which outlines the jurisdiction of the 
federal and provincial governments. Key powers of the federal government include: 
federal lands such as national parks; criminal law; military and national defence; 
navigation and shipping; regulation of trade, commerce, and tariffs; currency and 
coinage; bankruptcy and insolvency; patents and copyright; the postal service; and the 
census. Immigration, agriculture, and justice are shared between the federal and 
provincial governments. Courts have also interpreted the Act to give the federal 
government control over issues not foreseen in 1867 such as aviation26 and 
broadcasting27. Since Canada remained a dominion of Great Britain until the Statute of 
Westminster (1931), the British North American Act does not address foreign policy 
except to say that the federal government has the authority to implement treaties that are 
signed by Great Britain (Section 132). Notwithstanding, the Courts recognise that the 
federal government has sole authority to negotiate and ratify international treaties. 
 In contrast, the provinces have jurisdiction over public lands and natural 
resources;28 regulation of private activities including financial markets; education; health 
                                                
26 Regulation and Control of Aeronautics in Canada (1932) A.C. 54 
27 Regulation and Control of Radio in Canada (1932) A.C. 304 
28 For example, Sections 92 and 92A of the Act, give provinces legislative jurisdiction over energy. Section 
109 of the Act and the 1930 Natural Resources Transfer Agreements (NRTA) grant the provinces 
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care; local government; the incorporation of companies; and the administration of justice. 
Of course, ‘some powers assigned in 1867 have disappeared as significant issues; [while] 
others have assumed vastly greater importance’ including those over the environment 
(Simeon and Papillon, 2006, p. 102). The shared jurisdictions between the federal and 
provincial governments, as well as the delegated roles given to territories and 
municipalities, have created a spider’s web of national, provincial, and local policies that 
are often difficult to disentangle. Most importantly, both the federal and provincial 
governments have legislative as well as administrative responsibilities that are not seen in 
many countries, even in other federal countries such as Switzerland or Germany.   
Canadian federalism is particularly decentralised and regionally asymmetrical, 
which gives greater regional autonomy whilst also necessitating greater consultation and 
coordination. There is also competition amongst the provinces and between the provinces 
and federal government, especially over the economy and spending. Canadians often 
complain that policies take an age to be decided through an endless series of federal-
provincial meetings and roundtables. However, for the most part, Canada demonstrates a 
high degree of cooperation between the different structures of government in order to 
deliver the services expected by the public. Canada is ranked 6th in the world on the 
UNDP Human Development Index (2011) and has a universal health care, education, and 
welfare system that demands careful harmonisation between the federal and provincial 
governments. It is this coordination that is the hallmark of Canadian federalism. As 
former Minister of Environment under Prime Minister Chrétien, Hon. David Anderson, 
remarked, ‘[w]e run a government which is strongly consultative’ (Personal Interview). 
This was echoed by John Bennett, Executive Director of the Sierra Club Canada, who 
went a step further to quip that Canada has ‘more consultation than anywhere else in the 
world’ (Personal Interview). 
                                                                                                                                            




On the other hand, when this cooperation fails, especially when regional interests 
and cultural issues cloud the provincial-federal dialogue, Ottawa can be severely limited 
in policy options. This was witnessed to dramatic effect with the National Energy 
Program (NEP) in the early 1980s, which was an energy pricing programme riding on the 
coattails of the 1970s energy crisis; and again with the defeat of the Meech Lake Accord 
(1987-1990), which sought to amend and update the Constitution Act of 1987. The NEP, 
in particular, casts a long shadow over current energy and environmental issues. At the 
time, Ottawa sought to alleviate the strain of rising oil prices on the manufacturing base 
of eastern provinces (especially Ontario) while garnering greater control of energy pricing 
and revenue-sharing in the country. However, for oil producers in Alberta, the NEP 
amounted to nationalisation and a means of siphoning revenue to Ottawa and the eastern 
provinces. It led to political turmoil between Prime Minister Trudeau and Albertan 
Premier Peter Lougheed, as well as the condemnation of the United States. At one point, 
Peter Lougheed cut oil production in defiance (a scene that one would expect between 
countries, not within). Two years later the Supreme Court ruled that the federal 
government did not have the authority to tax the oil and gas resources of a province and 
the NEP diminished its powers accordingly. It was gradually phased out as the Canadian 
economy rebounded from the 1980s recession. The NEP came to exemplify the power 
struggle between the two levels of government; and moreover, the expectation that 
Premiers will fight against any and all federal encroachment. This was demonstrated with 
one controversial photograph taken of Prime Minister Trudeau and Premier Lougheed, 







Figure 5 Trudeau and Lougheed Toasting Champagne Glasses at the Signing 
 (Source: CBC, 1981) 
 
The photograph was decried by the oil producers of Alberta, with Lougheed later 
revealing that ‘allowing the picture [to be taken] was one of the biggest mistakes of his 
political career’ (CBC, n.d.). The domestic negotiations between Ottawa and the 
provinces can become so contentious that even a photograph showing fraternity between 
the Prime Minister and Premier can prove damning to their reputation.  
 
4.2.3 Coordination amongst First Ministers 
Canadian regionalism, the distribution of powers, and tarnished episodes like the National 
Energy Program or Meech Lake Accord raise the stakes for coordination between the two 
levels of government. Multiple veto points in the federalist system mean that a small 
number of provinces can hold domestic negotiations hostage for matters of national 
importance. The power dynamics between Ottawa and the provinces also means that the 
importance of executive-to-executive negotiation cannot be overstated. This is reinforced 
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by the fact that the Prime Minister holds significant powers over both Houses of 
Parliament, with strong party loyalty in the House of Commons and the ability to appoint 
new Senators.29 In fact, the Cabinet has steadily increased from 25 in 1993 to the current 
38 members. Barring a minority government in Parliament, the Prime Minister sets the 
political agenda, and this is mimicked at the provincial level where the Premiers are 
almost always the leader of the governing party as well as the head of the executive 
branch of the provincial government. Similar to the Prime Minister, Premiers serve as 
Head of the provincial Legislative Assemblies and appoint their own Cabinets. This 
arrangement means that power is most successfully played out between the federal and 
provincial executives: the Prime Minister and Premiers, followed by their first ministers, 
cabinet members, and other senior officials. 
Notwithstanding, intergovernmental consultation and coordination processes are 
often informal and ad hoc. At the federal level, the Prime Minister is assisted by a 
Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs and Secretariat within the Privy Council Office, 
who track and facilitate communication and meetings between jurisdictions. The 
provinces and territories have their own corresponding counterparts responsible for 
intergovernmental relations, and policy issues are brought to the table based on their 
perceived urgency. Arguably the most important issues take place at the First Ministers’ 
Conferences between the federal, provincial, and territorial government Premiers.30 They 
are convened via multi-agenda meetings or issue specific, though their frequency 
fluctuates with the political agenda in Canada. The next level are the Ministerial meetings 
within Agriculture, Education, Environment, etc., which are often co-chaired by the 
federal and provincial Ministers. There are, of course, informal, bilateral conversations 
                                                
29 Although there are some common conventions about how the Cabinet is selected, members are chosen to 
support rather than obstruct the Prime Minister.  
30 The scholar Douglas Macdonald is one of the few who have investigated these First Ministers’ 
Conferences in relation to climate change. 
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between the Prime Minister, Premiers, and Ministers throughout the year along with 
innumerable meetings between federal bureaucrats and their counterparts. 
 
4.2.4 Parliament 
The Canadian Parliament is formally divided between the House of Commons and the 
Senate, whose members are appointed to life terms by Cabinet and which currently 
comprises 105 members, with each province given a set allocation of seats. The role of 
the Senate is to revise and correct legislation from the House of Commons, although in 
practice, the Senate rarely opposes the Commons except when it presents an initiative to 
which Canadians are largely opposed and for which there is no popular mandate. It has 
also been known to veto bills passed by the House of Commons when controlled by a 
party not holding majority in the Commons. The fundamental reason the Senate rarely 
vetoes is down to the fact that its members are unelected. Only when the Commons acts 
against popular mandate and on highly controversial issues will the Senate seek to 
override the democratically elected House. To illustrate, between 2003 and 2009, the 
Senate recommended amendments to 37 of the 300 bills accounting for 12% of the bills it 
studied (The Senate Today). There have been repeated attempts to reform the Senate 
including the Charlottetown Accord, which was defeated in the 1992 referendum, and the 
defeated 2006 amendment to enlarge the Senate with greater representation for the 
western provinces. As a 2001 Parliamentary Report stated, the Senate is ‘accused of being 
a rubber stamp when it passes legislation quickly or of overstepping its mandate [when] 
the power of veto is exercised’ (Parliament of Canada, ‘The Canadian Senate in Focus’. 
2001, website). All the national parties supported either reform or abolition of the Senate 
and renewed calls following the Senate expenses scandal of 2012. 
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This brings us to the House of Commons, the most powerful legislative branch. 
The House of Commons has 308 elected members − a number which will rise to 338 MPs 
after the 2015 election. Each MP represents an electoral district, with elections held every 
five years or under a vote of no confidence. ‘The logic of parliamentary government, in 
which the governing party must maintain the confidence of the House, yields strong party 
discipline. […] Members of Parliament are not only required to toe the party line, but also 
shielded, at least to some degree, by a collective “circling of the wagons”’ (Harrison, 
2002, p. 6). MPs almost exclusively vote along party lines, so a majority government has, 
in theory, the muscle to pass legislation with minimal Senate interference. This system 
has historically contrasted with that of the United States, although the US Congress has 
increasingly demonstrated strong party discipline in recent years, for better or worse.  
 
4.2.5 The Courts 
The judiciary is the final branch of government, whose highest level is the Supreme Court 
of Canada. It does not mediate or dictate policy and thus does not feature in this thesis as 
a significant player in climate policy-making. However, it is important to elaborate on 
two scenarios: one past and one future. Firstly, the federal government has the power to 
pledge Canada to an international agreement such as the Kyoto Protocol despite the fact 
that it can only implement said agreement within its existing powers. As explained 
before, the environment is regulated by both federal and provincial powers under a 
system of concurrency, although the international level negotiations are the sole 
jurisdiction of Ottawa. This is especially salient for a borderless pollutant like greenhouse 
gases. As with the cases of broadcasting and aviation, GHGs transcend boundaries and so 
the federal government has the authority to regulate emissions through its legislative 
powers. Of course, this did not prevent provinces from threatening a legal challenge to 
Kyoto (See Section 4.5).  
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Secondly, the Courts cannot compel the federal government to uphold its 
international commitments. At least there is no precedent yet to do so. In a private suit 
against the government, Friends of the Earth v. Canada, (2008 FC 1183, appeal 
dismissed 2009 FCA 297), the Supreme Court determined that the federal government 
was not in breach of its own Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act (KIPA) by failing to 
reduce GHG emissions, and refused to hear subsequent appeals. The reason for the 
dismissal came down to the use of the word ‘ensure’ in the Act, which in the Court’s 
opinion mandated a process of policy development rather than an enforceable 
commitment to reduce GHG emissions. That said, the Courts have increasingly been used 
to either push through or block GHG-intensive economic activities. Although the 
Supreme Court of Canada has precluded itself from such interventions, it will no doubt 
become more important in the future.31 
 
4.3 Canada’s Slow Ratification Process 
After the Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997, Prime Minister Chrétien and the federal 
government lost goodwill amongst the provinces who widely condemned the federal 
‘stunt’ or ‘betrayal’ of signing up to tougher targets than had been previously agreed with 
the provinces (Personal Interview with unnamed source from the Canadian COP3 
delegation; Stoett, 2009, p. 350; Supported by Simpson et al., 2007; Gordon and 
Macdonald, 2011; Stilborn, 2003). Canada’s stronger Kyoto commitments bolstered her 
standing in the international negotiations yet alienated the provinces. It was also a 
demonstration of the international driving the domestic: international reputation and 
norms of environmental stewardship trumping domestic concerns from the provinces. 
                                                
31 There are also provincial lawsuits; for example, the climate scientist, Andrew Weaver, sued the climate 
sceptic, Timothy Ball, for libel in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, 2011. Timothy Ball wrote pieces 
for the online Canada Free Press website. Andrew Weaver went on to become the deputy leader of the 
Green Party in BC. 
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Following Kyoto, the Premiers of Saskatchewan and Manitoba ‘denounced Ottawa’s 
failure to work co-operatively with the provinces’, while Alberta’s Premier, who would 
become one of Kyoto’s most vocal opponents, declared the commitment unacceptable 
(The Globe and Mail, December 12, 1997).32 Even the federal Minister of Natural 
Resources, Hon. Ralph Goodale, who hosted the pre-Kyoto consultations with the 
provinces, was reportedly left ‘steaming’ by the change of course and even spoke of 
resignation, although he never acted upon the threat (Simpson et al., 2007, p. 33).  Both 
the Kyoto commitment itself and the process by which it had been achieved proved to be 
a persistent source of grievance amongst the provinces, which shaped the next round of 
domestic consultations and the path towards implementation (Bruce and Russell, 2004, p. 
206; Simpson et al., 2008, p. 61).  
There was also a deep-seated reason this change in targets damaged relations 
between Ottawa and the provinces. The devolution of powers in Canada means that the 
provinces are naturally suspicious of federal authority, especially control over natural 
resources, which the federal government has tried to regulate through international and 
interprovincial trade, taxation, and other constitutional powers. Canada’s political history 
is characterised by this power struggle between the two levels of government; including 
the territories who are gaining greater autonomy. In particular, the National Energy 
Program (NEP) of the 1980s was repeatedly referenced in the interviews, unprompted, as 
a cautionary tale about the problems that ensue when the federal government encroaches 
on energy resources. The comparisons between climate change mitigation and the NEP 
did not go unnoticed (Smith, 1998, p. 29), especially for Chrétien who had been Minister 
of Energy during the NEP’s phase-out in the 1980s. As explained earlier, Ottawa 
possesses some, though limited, authority to regulate transboundary GHG emissions 
                                                
32 It is important to note that many of the provinces changed their position on Kyoto between COP3 in 1997 
and ratification in 2002. For example, Manitoba became an advocate for ratification five years later. 




under the criminal powers and the ‘peace, order and good government’ clause of the 1867 
British North America Act (clause 91). However, the legacy of the NEP would have 
provided a stark warning to the federal government about the political costs of taking a 
hardline approach with the provinces.33 This, in turn, raised the stakes for consultation 
and bargaining between Ottawa and the provinces in the years that followed COP3. It 
most likely dissuaded the federal government from pursuing a more ambitious policy 
stance (such as a carbon tax) and put increased importance on Canada’s coordination 
mechanisms.  
The next step for Kyoto was the process of ratification, which could have occurred 
at any time under Chrétien’s majority34 government but did not go through until 2002. 
One cynical view was that climate change lost immediate relevance after Kyoto was 
signed. As one of the academic scientists on the Canadian COP3 delegation now turned 
science policy-maker, observed,  
‘once we came back from Kyoto it was sort of like we had done this and it was 
put right back to the back burner. They set up 18 issue tables and if you are a 
bureaucrat you know that the best way to not do anything was to set a cross-
sectional, provincial-federal, business, ENGO group and let them work on it for 
years’ (Gordon McBean, Personal Interview).  
Certainly the file appeared to fall from the Prime Minister’s radar (although it returned to 
priority status in the lead up to ratification in 2002 when the file moved from Natural 
Resources Canada to the Prime Minister’s Office and Privy Council, See Chapter 5). The 
other view was that ratification was delayed in order to shore up support amongst the 
provinces, to mend the bad will from COP3, and provide time to study and formulate 
                                                
33 Alberta challenged federal authority to regulate emissions generated by the province’s fossil fuel 
industry. However, this was done so solely within the media. The challenge was never brought to the 
Courts. 
34 Unlike the United States, Canada’s Parliament was not a barrier to ratification so long as the Liberal 
Party enjoyed a majority government. As former Cabinet minister, Warren Allmand, confirmed ‘[the] only 
time […] Parliament has had an impact on [UNFCCC] policy were periods of minority government or a 
slim government majority (quoted in Savoie, 1999, p. 93). There were, of course debates with the House of 
Commons with support from the NDP and objections from the Reform Party. There were also leaked 
‘reports of dissent within the Canadian Liberal caucus’, however the majority of the Liberal MPs supported 
ratification with the remaining expected ‘to toe the party line’ (Harrison, 2006, p. 6).   
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implementation policies in advance of ratification. As mentioned before, Canada had not 
undertaken adequate research and analysis on GHG mitigation in advance of COP3. It 
was even unclear at the time how carbon sources and sinks would be measured for 
compliance. This leads to a final, third explanation for which ratification was delayed to 
strengthen Canada’s international position. To some extent, Canada was overly confident 
that her large forests would act as a carbon sink, essentially reducing the country’s Kyoto 
target by one-third or 60 million tonnes of greenhouse gases a year (Macdonald, 2001). 
Canada also aggressively sought to receive credit for exporting clean energy (namely 
natural gas and hydropower) under the UNFCCC that would also reduce her commitment 
by roughly 30%. The proposals did not gain much traction in the international 
negotiations but Canada did receive some credit for the country’s carbon sinks ‘open[ing] 
the way for ratification’ as pronounced by Chrétien (quoted in Bjorn et al., 2002).  
The Prime Minister was coy about Canada’s intentions to ratify right up to his 
announcement in the summer of 2002. That April he vaguely said he would ratify ‘one 
day’ and his Minister of Environment stated, ‘Canadian ratification would be a lot easier 
if we had clean energy credit recognition by the Europeans and the other nations’ (Ottawa 
Citizen, 2002). Collectively, all these domestic and international factors slowed the 
ratification process as Canada studied the policy options at home and pushed for 
favourable terms in the UNFCCC negotiations. However, they had the unintended 
consequence of delaying action from the provinces and impacted implementation as much 
as any concession won in the UNFCCC negotiations. 
Whether viewed cynically or pragmatically, the decision to delay ratification for four 
years slowed implementation and changed the course of the domestic debate following 
COP3. As the Chairman of the Shell Group of Companies, Sir Mark Stewart, said in a 
personal discussion,  
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‘[Canada] did it wrong. [She] should have ratified first and then challenged 
industry to come up with the cheapest way of doing it. If you challenge them 
beforehand to find reasons for not doing it then they will be very ingenious in 
finding reasons not to do it. […] But if you simply tell them it is a fait accompli 
then they will use all that ingenuity to find ways of avoiding the high cost 
(recounted by Hon. David Anderson, Personal Interview; Supported by Bennett 
Personal Interview).  
The uncertainty surrounding ratification made the domestic dialogue more difficult as key 
provinces, industry groups, and companies tried to prevent implementation of any kind 
(See Chapter 5). The discussion did not focus on how but whether Canada should meet 
her Kyoto commitments. Even members of Chrétien’s own Cabinet were opposed to 
ratification (Hon. David Anderson, Personal Interview; Bjorn et al., 2002).35 In fact, 
Canada’s own Minister of Environment at the time admitted he was uncertain Canada 
would seek ratification when his Ministry released Canada’s National Implementation 
Strategy in 2000. When ratification was finally announced years later, it came as a shock 
to his Cabinet (Hon. David Anderson, Personal Interview; Gordon McBean, Personal 
Interview) – and once again this decision was not made in collaboration with the 
provinces.  
 
4.4 Canada’s Obstacles to Policy Formation, 1997-2005 
The Kyoto Protocol exposed institutional weakness in Canada’s capacity both to 
formulate policy options and to coordinate deliberation over their merits between the 
federal and provincial government. ‘[Ottawa] was not strong enough to induce 
compliance’ after it charged ahead of consensus in 1997 (Gordon and Macdonald, 2011, 
p. 15). In addition to exacerbating regional divisions, of which there are many (Section 
4.6.1), Ottawa also lacked the capacity to study, consult, and negotiate implementation 
strategies across all 10 provinces. The section below will examine the lack of capacity by 
                                                
35 For example, the Minister of Industry Canada, Hon. Alan Rock, is credited with having had serious 
reservations about Kyoto’s ratification (Bjorn et al., 2002, p. 52). 
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both tiers of government and failed channels of negotiations between Ottawa and the 
provinces which undermined national policy formation. As explained by Jeffrey Simpson 
et al., ‘[b]y unilaterally breaking consensus in choosing its Kyoto commitment, Ottawa 
had to start over again, selling the reality of global warming, while trying to recreate a 
consensus amongst the provinces on a new target […] it never succeeded’ (2008, p. 61). 
 
4.4.1 Weak Capacity 
After COP3, Ottawa needed to play catch up with its own climate and economic analysis. 
Leading up to the Kyoto negotiations, Canada had not undertaken adequate study of 
climate change mitigation or how it would impact the country (Personal Interviews; 
Simpson et al, 2007); or indeed, even how to measure the carbon sources and sinks within 
its borders. As one prominent climate scientist on the Canadian COP3 delegation 
revealed, Canada is a great ‘joiner’ and environmental treaties have significant buy-in 
within the country; however, they did little analysis prior to the negotiations and had no 
understanding of what emission targets meant in terms of domestic Canadian policy 
(anonymous Personal Interview; Supported by Simpson et al., 2008, p. 60-1). This was 
echoed by Richard Ballhorn, former Director General of Foreign Affairs Canada and key 
member of past UNFCCC Canadian delegations. He observed that climate change is a 
unique problem from a negotiation standpoint as it was driven by international activity 
before domestic activity. ‘Usually things are driven the other way [and as such] there was 
no track record of knowing what [Canada] could do’ (Personal Interview). In essence, 
Canada purchased the house before calculating the mortgage. 
 Likewise, cash was at a premium at that time. One over-arching reason Canada 
displayed a knowledge gap was the reduced capacity of the federal government as a 
whole. The Kyoto Protocol was signed during a period when the government was trying 
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to shrink the size of the state in response to mounting national debt. Chrétien’s Liberal 
Party swept into power in 1993 with 177 seats and quickly sought to reduce Canada’s 
deficit of $554.2 billion CAD: the highest annual deficit of the G7 countries at the time. 
Canada's debt-to-GDP ratio was 68.4% and growing. Prime Ministers Jean Chrétien and 
Paul Martin both embarked on periods of austerity: paying down $36 billion CAD of the 
national debt while cutting taxes by $100 billion CAD between 1995-2000. The 1995 
budget cut federal programmes by $10.4 billion CAD (8.8%). The government further 
reduced $4.5 billion CAD over two years in transfer payments to the provinces who were 
also struggling and seeking to downsize their respective environment programmes. In 
addition, the federal public service also witnessed 45,000 job cuts between 1995-1998.  
Figure 6 Total Federal and Provincial-Territorial Programme Spending  
(Source: Canadian Department of Finance, website) 
 
Under Chrétien, the federal government went through a period of downsizing not 
witnessed since the end of World War II. This not only impacted the capacity of key 
Ministries and provinces, it also goes some way to explaining why research and voluntary 
policies were pursued over more ambitious carbon pricing policies. As Doern (2004) and 
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Macdonald (2007) argue, these budget and personnel cuts throughout the 1990s are ‘one 
of the key factors why voluntary codes and other types of “reinvented regulation” were 
advocated’ (Doern, 2004, p. 68). Simply put, they cost the state less to implement. The 
federal government was contracting at the time it sought to meet its Kyoto commitments; 
commitments that became more expensive to fulfill with each year that passed and carbon 
pricing programmes becoming increasingly unaffordable. In fact, it was surprising the 
federal government spent as much as it did ($3.7 billion CAD) on its climate change 
programme during this period of downsizing. 
The provinces also lacked capacity. Since the 1990s all the provinces had 
undergone major restructuring. With the federal government cutting its transfer payments, 
the environment departments of all 10 provinces saw large cuts in their budget and staff. 
‘Newfoundland and Québec reduced their environment-department funding by 65% 
between 1994 and 1998, Ontario by 43% from 1995 to 1998, BC by 35% from 1995 to 
2000, and New Brunswick and Alberta by 30% from 1994 to 1998.’ (David R. Boyd 
Quoted in Macdonald, 2007, p. 137). ‘Many of the jurisdictions did not even have the 
personnel to attend the [consultation] meetings’ between Ottawa and the provinces (John 
Bennett Personal Interview). This both hampered consultation with the federal 
government and limited their ability to produce provincial policy. As an anonymous 
government source at Environment Canada confirmed, the Ministries simply did not 
‘have the resources to devote to the implementation of [Kyoto]’ owing to cutbacks across 
their department (Personal Interview). By the time of ratification, only two out of 10 
provinces, Québec and British Columbia, had produced climate change plans of their 
own, and the first provincial legislation was not produced until 2003.36 The impacts of 
these cutbacks on provincial capacity were confirmed by a study done by the 
Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, who argued that ‘reduced government 
                                                
36 Alberta’s Climate Change and Emissions Management Act, S.A. 2003, c. C-16.7  
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resources’ impeded climate change policy (Quoted in Macdonald, 2007, p. 143). Even 
provinces that supported Kyoto, such as Québec, were wary of the cost of rolling out a 
large carbon pricing programme.  
Another significant capacity barrier for the federal government was the lack of a 
central office to formulate and coordinate national climate change policy. Both current 
and former Ministers of Environment as well as the former Chair of the National 
Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy cite the compartmentalised nature of 
the Canadian bureaucracy as one of the greatest obstacles to federal climate change policy 
formation (See Chapter 5 Section 5.6). As the former Chair of the NRTEE, Glen Murray, 
explained, one ‘cannot look at the issue without coming up with half a dozen Ministries 
that have to be at the table and that is just not functional’ (Personal Interview; supported 
by federal Minister of Environment, Hon. Peter Kent). At the federal level the climate 
change file was principally divided between Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) and 
Environment Canada (EC),37 whilst a joint federal Climate Change Secretariat was 
established in 1998 to report to Parliament and coordinate federal-provincial relations. 
Twelve federal departments including Foreign Affairs, Industry, Justice, and Transport 
were also involved; as well as bodies such as the Privy Council and Treasury Board 
Secretariat. Officially the Climate Change Secretariat was designed to ‘co-ordinate policy 
development by means of an interdepartmental committee of assistant deputy ministers 
drawn from ten or more relevant federal departments [who then] report to an ad hoc 
committee of deputies from those departments [before] moving up to the elected level’ 
(Bjorn et al., 2002, p. 61). In practice, the Secretariat was ‘a facilitator without authority’ 
(Bennett Personal Interview). The process became too fragmented; hampered further by 
the fact that many of these Ministries disagreed about Canada’s involvement with the 
                                                
37 NRCan would ‘take the lead in developing and coordinating Canada’s domestic implementation strategy’ 
while Environment [Canada] took lead ‘on Canada’s international agenda’ (Bjorn at el., 2001, p. 55). 
However, in practice, the Minister of EC, Hon. David Anderson, championed domestic ratification, and the 
roles between both departments became blurred. 
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Kyoto Protocol and even the country’s decision to ratify. This disagreement was well 
documented in the broadsheets and cast doubt on Chrétien’s overall mandate. How could 
Ottawa hope to introduce robust climate change policies without agreement amongst her 
Ministries? Other countries such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have 
integrated central agencies. This was probably one of the reasons the climate change file 
briefly moved from NRCan to the Prime Minister’s office and Privy Council office in the 
lead up to ratification. However, for most of Canada’s climate change policy process, the 
file was divided between Natural Resources Canada, Environment Canada, and Foreign 
Affairs Canada, with NRTEE and Climate Change Secretariat coordinating domestic 
consultations and departmental coordination. None had the necessary authority to act 
alone and each had different, albeit overlapping mandates. Climate change is a complex 
environmental and economic problem requiring reform across the board from 
transportation, infrastructure, and energy planning, to forestry, agriculture, and especially 
spending. Canada’s segregated climate change programmes, particularly between NRCan 
and EC, had disastrous consequences for implementation and was punctuated by 
bureaucratic fighting, as the next chapter will examine in greater detail (Section 5.6). 
 
4.4.2 Ineffective Consultation between Ottawa and the Provinces 
Upon the return of the Canadian delegation in 1997, the government’s first step was to 
host The Kyoto Conference on Climate Change: Let’s Get the Ball Rolling. As the name 
suggests, Ottawa was keen to mobilise action, especially amongst the provinces. It stated 
‘[t]hat the federal government undertake its own actions and encourage its partners to 
take the necessary measures to stabilise greenhouse gas emissions […] in accordance with 
the recent agreement between the federal, provincial and territorial Ministers of Energy 
and the Environment’. The agreement was the Canada-Wide Accord on Environmental 
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Harmonization (signed by all except Québec).38 The pre-existing Canadian Council of 
Ministers of the Environment (CCME) became the driver of federal-provincial 
consultation on climate change. The CCME is comprised of the 14 Ministers of 
Environment who meet annually to discuss and coordinate environmental policy. They 
designated the National Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy (NRTEE) as 
the focal point for climate change consultations. Collectively, all of these bodies are 
designed to foster coordination and harmonisation of public policy between the two levels 
of government. Below we will examine the effectiveness, or ineffectiveness, of the 
NTREE as the main group responsible for consultation and policy formation in Canada’s 
emission reduction targets.  
The National Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy is an independent 
policy analysis group comprised of scientists, environmental groups, labour and industry 
leaders appointed by the federal government (for more information on the key stakeholder 
groups, See Chapter 5). Their mandate was to study the impacts of climate change and 
mitigation options: to find ‘sustainable pathways that help preserve our environment 
while building a strong economy’ (NRTEE website) and the body fitted well within the 
overall consultative approach of the Chrétien government.  
The first action for the NRTEE was to understand what Kyoto meant for the 
Canadian economy and regional interests. There were, of course, other bodies such as the 
National Air Issues Steering Committee (NAISC) and the National Air Issues 
Coordinating Committee (NAICC); as well as the Annual Premiers Conference, First 
Ministers Conference, and most recently, the Council of the Federation. However, those 
interviewed, especially the former Environment Ministers themselves, confirmed that 
                                                
38 Québec is not a signatory but reserved the right to participate in joint environmental efforts under the 
Accord. It criticised the Accord as amounting to a devolution of federal responsibilities to the provinces; 
highlighting the federal-provincial paradox in which both levels of government seek to retain their powers, 
but deflect spending responsibilities.  
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NRTEE was the main forum for consultation between the provinces, territories, and 
federal government throughout this period.  
Glen Murray,39 former Chair of the NRTEE (and former Mayor of Winnipeg, former 
Chair of the Big City Mayors Caucus, and subsequent Minister who has run under both 
the Liberal and Conservative parties) described the Roundtable thus: 
‘The idea is, the people that have to be actors in implementing are brought 
around to think about it. They work with environmentalists and ecologists to try 
to get their head around the research, science, and economic advice.’ 
‘We put it through the lens of different orders of government, sectors of society, 
and the economy. To give the government advice that is savvy and will be 
responded to predictably in the oil patch in Alberta, in the National Assembly in 
Québec, amongst Northern People, at the municipal level, and in corporate 
Canada and in labour Canada. So we have a pretty big role. We are not just 
policy advisors. What we do is a sort of national engagement’ (Personal 
Interview). 
What is most revealing in his description was that NRTEE sought advice that would be 
‘responded to predictably’ in all levels of government and in Canadian society. In many 
ways the NRTEE was a national vetting process for different climate change policies; 
though the Chairman was careful to say that NRTEE only sought to inform, not shape, 
federal government policy. This was reiterated by another former head of the NRTEE, 
David McLaughlin, who stressed ‘we are at arm’s length from government’ (Woodrow 
Wilson Institute Panel, 2012). The Roundtable produced reports that considered multiple 
carbon pricing policies and tried to balance the concerns of business and environmental 
groups. There were concerns that the NRTEE was biased towards business (in fact, labour 
unions at one point boycotted the proceedings in opposition). Certainly the consultations 
were ‘no bastion of [environmental] radicalism – jokingly referred to as “the radical 
centre” or “rabid moderation”’ (Foster, 2012). As a result, their proposals aimed to appeal 
                                                
39 Interestingly, Glen Murray was considered a controversial appointment though also praised as a strong 
character. Personal Interview with anonymous negotiator in the 1997 Canadian UNFCCC Delegation. 
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to the widest contingent of society whilst also basing recommendations upon tried and 
tested models such as emissions trading to tackle Acid Rain in North America.  
 Overall, the NRTEE succeeded in its mandate (bringing together different levels 
of government and stakeholder groups); but failed to foster provincial action or even 
diminish the heated rhetoric and power politics between Ottawa and the provinces. As 
summarised by Glen Toner (2002), in Canada, ‘intergovernmental co-ordination is a 
major and time-consuming preoccupation and the politics of the intergovernmental arena 
is often extremely conflictual’.  As one unnamed government official and former member 
of the Canadian UNFCCC delegation summarised: ‘NRTEE has been a bit of a 
disappointment’ (Anonymous Personal Interview). However, NRTEE was devised to be 
an independent, apolitical consultation body. It could never overcome the regional 
divisions and power politics between the federal and provincial positions because it did 
not represent the federal government. It is true that analysis and study were required after 
the Kyoto Protocol was signed so that the implications of climate change policy as well as 
inaction could be assessed. However, the next step required that the federal government 
formally negotiate a deal with the provinces, not run more stakeholder consultations. As 
NRTEE’s current head explained, ‘Canada to date has not had a lot of formal engagement 
at an inter-governmental level in terms of saying ‘ok, let’s get a pan-Canadian policy. 
[…] There has been some dialogue and there is a lot of tactical work […] but there has 
not been that policy integration [between the two levels of governments]’ (McLaughlin, 
2012). An independent roundtable can offer impartial information and advice but it is not 
a substitute for formal negotiations between the First Ministers, Premiers, and Prime 
Minister. It is surprising that the First Minister's meetings, which carry more weight 




‘[A]ll the provinces demanded that the federal government take the ratification 
decision to the level of a First Minister's meeting. The federal government 
refused to use that federal-provincial mechanism, unilaterally ratified despite 
vociferous Alberta objections and then proceeded to develop its own programme 
for regulating industrial emissions. […] At this point the supporting system of 
joint federal-provincial committees ceased to function’ (Gordon and Macdonald, 
2011, p. 16). 
A codified and politically powerful coordination mechanism might have improved the 
chances for consensus between the federal and provincial governments, as seen in the EU 
(Macdonald et al., 2013). However, Alberta, in many ways, remained a default veto 
(Macdonald, 2008). The way NRTEE was mandated meant that, ‘[i]t was perhaps 
inevitable that what could be achieved by consensus fell short’ (Bruce and Russell, 2004, 
p. 207). Eventually, with the election of a majority Conservative government, NRTEE 
was disbanded in 2012 after its modest recommendations went against the Conservative 
government.40 Hon. Peter Kent, Minister of Environment under the Conservative Party 
said, ‘[o]ne major point of disagreement with the National Roundtable report was, it again 
recommended carbon pricing […] our government is not going to impose a carbon tax on 
Canadians’ (Quoted in Wherry, 2012; Supported by Kent Personal Interview; Simpson, 
2012).  
 
4.5 Provincial Vetoes on Federal Action, 1997-2005 
The provinces are far from uniform in their approach to the Kyoto Protocol and climate 
change in general. For example, Québec saw initial opportunities under Kyoto to receive 
credit for exporting clean energy (hydropower) to the United States. Others, like Ontario, 
relied on coal-fired plants to fuel their manufacturing sectors and worried about the costs 
of compliance (although Ontario has recently begun the process of phasing out its coal-
fired plants).  
                                                
40 It was also suggested that NRTEE further angered the Conservative Party because it recommended an 




Figure 7 Main Provincial Contributors to National GHG Emissions (Mt), 2009 
 
The provinces represent divergent environments and economies with unique 
vulnerabilities to a changing climate and a changing energy sector. However, all were 
wary of the costs of implementation to some degree as well as federal intrusion over their 
powers over energy and the environment. This was exacerbated back in 1997 when the 
government admitted it would face difficulty adhering to the new Kyoto targets. As David 
McLaughlin, President of the NRTEE, observed,  
‘the Kyoto debate got off, in many respects, to a bad start in Canada. Early on, 
the same government had signed [up to Kyoto but acknowledged] we will have 
difficulty meeting the targets. That had an impact as to how we have gone 
forward [since then]’ (Presentation, Woodrow Wilson Institute Panel, 2012).  
It made the provinces anxious that the federal government would pursue sweeping GHG 
regulations with the implementation costs falling to the provinces’ budgets (and of 
course, fears of the impact to their industries). Alberta threatened a legal challenge to the 
federal government’s authority to sign up to the Kyoto Protocol (Dion Personal Interview; 
Supported by Kukucha, 2005). However, this ‘posturing’ only played out in the 
broadsheets, not in the Courts (Jansen, 2002, p. 113). That said, the threat remained of a 
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legal challenge from the provinces, even regarding powers, which, at face value, fall 
within federal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court overturned Ottawa’s national energy tax 
(National Energy Program) in the 1980s and the most recent Harmonized Sales Tax 
(2013) was only permitted by the Court if provinces were allowed to opt out. As Hon. 
Stéphane Dion, former Leader of the Liberal Party and Opposition, admitted, a federal 
carbon pricing programme would most likely see a legal challenge, even if his party 
believed it would be upheld (Personal Interview).  
‘The courts have been fairly generous in finding federal powers over the 
environment. For example, in R. v. Hydro Québec, the Supreme Court of 
Canada examined whether the federal government had the power to implement 
toxic substances regulations under its criminal law powers. […] However, the 
decision was close (five to four)’ (Green, 2008, p. 249).  
In other instances, federal powers were overturned, most notably with the National 
Energy Program. In fact, ‘the Supreme Court of Canada largely dismissed the federal 
powers of peace, order, and good government as a basis for federal environmental 
jurisdiction, but upheld the toxics regulation provisions of the federal Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act under the criminal law power’ (Lucas, 2004, p. 185). 
Interviews with key Ministers revealed that they were of the opinion that the federal 
government did have the authority to introduce a carbon pricing system under the 
criminal code (which was pursued by the federal government’s Large Final Emitters 
Program), but a legal challenge from the provinces was highly likely. Even if the courts 
upheld federal powers, the political and financial costs of a lengthy Supreme Court battle 
surely could not have been appealing.  
In addition, the federal government was hampered by the political tactics of anti-
Kyoto provinces such as Alberta and British Columbia (and to a lesser extent Ontario). 
For example, when Chrétien announced Canada’s intention to ratify Kyoto in 2002, 
Alberta’s Premier ‘presented the Prime Minister with a letter purportedly signed by all 
provinces except Québec, stating that a detailed, national plan [for implementation] must 
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be developed before Kyoto could be ratified [although] Manitoba and PEI soon joined 
Québec in disassociating themselves from the letter’ (Macdonald, 2001). When the 
federal government came out with an updated climate change plan that year, all of the 
provinces criticised the federal strategy as seen in the statement by the provinces released 
after the joint meeting of Energy and Environment Ministers in Halifax, October 2002. 
Although some provinces supported ratification such as Manitoba and Québec, they all 
felt they had been side-lined in the policy process, which fuelled the anti-Kyoto 
opposition (Personal Interviews; Macdonald, 2001). Former Minister of Environment, 
Hon. David Anderson agreed that provincial inaction slowed the ratification process in 
Canada, due to inadequate capacity (Section 4.4.1) and lack of commitment from the 
provinces (Personal Interview). 
Leading the charge was Alberta, whose Premier,Hon. Ralph Klein, viewed Kyoto 
as a severe threat to their oil and gas industry. NRTEE did little to stem their fears; and 
so, Alberta dedicated funds to anti-climate change and anti-Kyoto campaigns (CBC 
News, 2002) obstructing Ottawa’s attempts to mobilise provincial action. It was joined by 
a vocal anti-Kyoto lobby within business (Chapter 5). Alberta went further to lobby the 
western provinces to reject federal proposals and back an alternative Alberta proposal 
(Smith and Victor, 2004, p. 221).41 They were also active at the international negotiations, 
working with anti-Kyoto groups in the United States as well as pushing for a rival, 
international agreement: the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate.  
After ratification, when the federal government was in the process of finalising a 
new climate change programme, Alberta pushed through its own, less stringent plan 
designed to pre-empt Ottawa (Gordon and Macdonald, 2011). Alberta’s plan stated, 
‘atmospheric carbon dioxide and methane are not toxic and are inextricably linked with 
the management of renewable and non-renewable natural resources, including sinks’. 
                                                
41 Proposal entitled, Alberta and Climate Change: Taking Action, 2002. 
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This directly contradicted the federal government’s plan to regulate GHG emissions as a 
‘toxic’, controlled substance under the criminal code. The Alberta plan may also have 
been designed to prevent the federal government using the “peace, order, and good 
government” clause if the provinces showed an inability or unwillingness to address a 
national issue such as climate change (Lucas, 2004).42 This pre-emptive action occurred 
again in 2007, when Alberta became the first province to introduce a carbon pricing 
system with revenue directed towards green technology. Each time Alberta introduced a 
“Made-in-Alberta” solution separate to Canada’s national Kyoto commitments. This type 
of political manoeuvring proved effective in undermining federal efforts while granting 
favourable terms to business.  
 
4.6 Barriers to Unilateral Federal Action 
By the time the Kyoto Protocol was ratified in 2002 it is fair to say that federal-provincial 
consultation failed to mobilise action on the part of the provinces, or even generate 
effective federal policies. Canada’s national emissions grew to 715 megatonnes that year, 
a 5.6% growth from 1998 and more than 11% from her Kyoto target. Between 1997 and 
2005, Ottawa used her more limited powers to a) regulate emissions as a controlled 
substance through the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (a proposal which was 
later withdrawn under Conservative pressure in 2005)43; b) introduce voluntary initiatives 
(such as the voluntary Memorandum of Understanding to reduce the automobile 
industry's emissions by roughly 5% by 2010); c) fund public awareness campaigns (such 
as the One-Tonne Challenge); and d) sponsor green technologies (as seen in Canada’s 
                                                
42 ‘A factor weighing in favour of federal peace, order, and good government jurisdiction: R. v. Crown 
Zellerbach’ (Lucus, 2004, p. 196). 
43 GHG emissions such as CO2 were “managed” under CEPA, they were not labelled as “toxic” – a 
classification which disappeared in 2005 to allow for the government’s proposed credit trading system.  
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Action Plan 2000, agreed by all the provinces except Ontario44). The new plan in 2002 
represented a departure from consensus with the provinces who had no hand in its 
development; however the national plan could still only use instruments under federal 
control. In 2005, Ottawa released Project Green and a notice of intent was issued for the 
credit trading system for Large Final Emitters (LFE) Program, which sought to limit 
carbon intensity rather than impose an absolute cap (following the inclusion of GHGs as a 
controlled substance). However, the plans were scrapped after the Liberal government 
lost the 2006 election. In total, Ottawa spent $3.7 billion CAD between 1997 and 2005 
and yet failed to stem the growth in GHG emissions. And since 2005, all specific climate 
change programmes, such as the One-Tonne Challenge, have been dismantled by the 
Conservative government. In 2007, the Conservative government released Turning the 
Corner in 2007 and announced a new target to replace their Kyoto commitments: to 
reduce GHG emissions by 20% below Canada’s 2006 level by 2020. For a summary of 
federal climate change policies between 1997 and 2011, see Appendix C. Throughout this 
period, Ottawa faced significant barriers to act unilaterally on climate change which can 
be evaluated under three broad issues: a) Canadian regionalism, b) limited federal powers 
over the environment and energy, and c) uncoordinated provincial action on climate 
change. The rest of the chapter will evaluate all three.   
 
4.6.1 Canadian Regionalism  
The sub-text to Canada’s domestic debate over climate change can be found in deep-
rooted regional divisions. Pick up any textbook on Canadian politics and one of the first 
chapters will be dedicated to regionalism. In contrast to other countries such as the United 
States, ‘regional differences tend to find greater expression in Canada’s more 
decentralised federation’ (Harrison, 2007, p. 7) and this is one of the main reasons why 
                                                
44 Ontario citing that the province’s Air Quality programme was sufficient. 
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Canadian politics gives significant weight to stakeholder involvement (as we will see in 
the next chapter).  
Figure 8 The Milch Cow 
(Source: Grain Growers Guide, 1915) 
 
This is exemplified with the Kyoto Protocol as explained by Rodney White, former 
Director of the University of Toronto’s Institute of Environmental Studies. ‘[It was] a 
nightmare scenario for the federal government because [Kyoto] was going to accentuate 
regional differences’ (Personal Interview). This is supported by Simpson et al., ‘[a]ny 
policy that targets one or two provinces will fail’ (2007, p. 25). Although the federal 
government stressed the use of Kyoto’s flexible mechanisms and the costs of inaction 








Figure 9 Changes in Provincial GHG Emissions 1990-2009 (Metric Tonne CO2)  
(Source: Holmes, 2012)45 
 
This nightmare scenario was made worse by the fact that the Cabinet was divided over 
the Kyoto Protocol. In fact, Natural Resources Canada and Environment Canada 
represented different regional interests; with the former more closely tied to the energy 
sector and the latter with scientists and green groups (as will be discussed in Chapter 5). 
In addition, the Liberal Party had few MPs in key fossil fuel provinces such as Alberta 
and Saskatchewan, who have their own regional parties (See Table 5 below for the 
number of elected Liberal MPs in both Provinces). Scholars such as Lipset (1968) and 
Macpherson (1953) describe how ‘regional class structures and economic conditions [in 
                                                
45 Note that the greenhouse gas emissions have started to creep back up in the recovery of the 2008 global 





















the early 20th century] were central to the emergence and persistence of right-wing and 
left-wing agrarian parties in Alberta and Saskatchewan, respectively’ (Bickerton and 
Gagnon, 2009, p. 83). These western regional parties are still a feature of Canadian 
politics today and in the case of climate policy they served to amplify western opposition 
to any federal climate policy that seemed to target these two provinces. 
Table 5 Number of Elected Liberal MPs in Alberta and Saskatchewan  
 
The Liberal Party enjoyed the strongest representation in the eastern provinces and with 
only a handful of MPs in the Prairies (Table 4). As such, Chrétien’s climate change 
programme was vulnerable to the charge of being a regionalist initiative with the east 
imposing emission restrictions on the west. This, of course, was the same regional 
dynamic that had played out during the late 1970s and early 1980s over the National 
Energy Program. But by the 2000s, changing demographic and economic patterns made 
western Canada more powerful than it had been a generation before, and so the ruling 
Liberals had to be even more mindful of western sensitivities, and this partisan political 
concern with the politics of Canadian regionalism was a significant obstacle to unilateral 
federal action in the face of western opposition to climate policy.  
 
4.6.2 Limited Federal Powers to Implement Kyoto 
As discussed earlier in the chapter, Ottawa’s policy options to meet Kyoto fell within a 
limited spectrum. At one end, Ottawa could buy her Kyoto reductions without any 
Canadian Parliament Number of Liberal MPs 
36th Parliament 1997-2000 2 (Saskatchewan), 2 (Alberta) out of 155 MPs 
37th Parliament 2001-2004 2 (Saskatchewan), 2 (Alberta) out of 172 MPs 
38th Parliament 2004-2005 1 (Saskatchewan), 1 (Alberta) out of 135 MPs 
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domestic mitigation through straight accounting provisions by taking credit for Canada’s 
growing forests along with inexpensive “hot air” from Russia and Ukraine (Smith and 
Victor, 2004, p. 221). This would have done nothing to help the country’s green 
credentials or international reputation, nor would it have matched public sentiment; 
however, it was a policy option that Ottawa could but did not pursue.46 On the other side 
of the spectrum, the federal government could use its powers over taxation to issue a 
national carbon tax offering a straightforward system to reduce absolute emissions (See 
Harrison, 2010).47 This, however, carried an enormous political cost in a country divided 
by regional interests, since a carbon tax would be essentially a tax on one particular 
region of Canada (Alberta and Saskatchewan in the Prairies) and would accentuate 
regional divisions during a time when Chrétien wanted to bring the provinces on side. In 
fact, back in 1994, Chrétien was quoted reassuring an audience in Alberta, ‘[r]elax, relax 
… [a carbon tax] is not on the table, and it will not be on the table’ (Corcoran, 1994 
quoted in Macdonald, 2008, p. 230). Once again, the comparison between the National 
Energy Program and a new carbon tax would have been obvious. The fear over a carbon 
tax also incited the fossil fuel sector, with major trade associations dedicating significant 
lobbying effort to prevent it (See Chapter 5). As such, Ottawa put Natural Resources 
Canada based in Alberta, in charge of the climate change file and pursued technological 
and voluntary measures which failed to bring about widespread emission reductions. The 
government only developed a slightly more ambitious cap-and-trade system (Large Final 
Emitters Program) once Environment Canada took the helm many years later, though this 
programme was never realised once the Liberal Party lost the 2006 election.  
                                                
46 Harrison (2010) explains that international credit purchases were included in the federal government’s 
Project Green (2002) but were ‘studiously omitted’ because it ‘did not play well with voters at home’ (p. 
183). In an earlier PMO draft, Project Green proposed over 100 metric tonnes per year amounting to almost 
40% of Canada’s reductions. 
47 A cap-and-trade system falls within the federal powers over interprovincial trade yet would have still 
required negotiation with the provinces. As Stéphane Dion, Former Leader of Canada’s Liberal Party, 
speculated, the provinces would have also sought to challenge the federal powers over cap-and-trade even if 
they had won. 
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  It was not until the 2008 election, five years after Chrétien stepped down, that the 
issue of a national carbon tax was proposed once again by the Liberal Party. Stéphane 
Dion, former Minister of Environment under Prime Minister Martin and leader of the 
Liberal Party in opposition from 2006 to 2008, made the carbon tax a feature of the 
Liberal platform, entitled The Green Shift.48 In fact, climate change became a red button 
issue for the 2008 election with each of the parties proposing their own strategy for 
reducing emissions.  For this research, Stéphane Dion was interviewed and candidly 
admitted that the carbon tax proposal probably cost him the election.49 He explained that 
he did not know of anyone who had won an election based on a carbon tax; and as such, 
he took a major gamble during the election. Such a tax can be a straightforward means to 
modify consumption and behaviour to reduce CO2 emissions (roughly 79% of total 
Canadian GHG emissions) but it is politically more difficult to sell than a cap-and-trade 
system, or indeed softer technological and voluntary measures. Even Alberta’s emissions 
trading system, which essentially operates as a de facto carbon tax since corporations 
chose to pay the fine rather than trade credits, avoids the label of a tax (Meadows, 2008). 
Dion spoke of the difficulty of effectively communicating and persuading voters about 
the tax, even a revenue neutral tax; and more importantly, one that kept revenue within 
each province, thus side-stepping the mistakes of the National Energy Program. Both the 
Conservative Party and the New Democratic Party (to the right and left of the Liberal 
Party) proposed cap-and-trade systems over a tax and Dion admitted that members of his 
party distanced themselves from the “Dion tax” as it was popularly referred. Various 
carbon pricing systems had been introduced in Alberta and Québec before the election, 
                                                
48 The Green Shift 2008 proposed a tax on GHG emissions applied to all fossil fuels with the exception of 
gas at the pump, which has separate, pre-existing taxes. Diesel and aviation fuel would not have increased 
in the first year also owing to pre-existing taxes. The plan consisted of an initial tax of $10 per tonne of 
GHG emissions, increasing every year to a maximum of $40 per tonne within four years. The tax would 
also be matched by reductions in personal income and corporate taxes. Rural and Northern communities 
would have seen an additional tax credit due to their greater reliance on diesel for basic livelihood. 
49 In British Columbia and Australia a carbon tax would also prove costly in bid for re-election. In 2013, 
Australia’s Opposition leader Tony Abbott has declared the election a ‘referendum on the carbon tax’ 
(quoted in McGuirk, 2013). 
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and in British Columbia that year. However, these taxes were not platform issues during 
elections. The most ambitious of these (the BC carbon tax) was introduced three years 
after an election with the ‘tremendously popular’ Premier Gordon Campbell (Dion 
Personal Interview). These other carbon taxes in two of the four most populous provinces 
would have further hampered a federal carbon tax since it would appear to voters as a 
duplication of policy and burden.  
Dion divulged one revealing meeting between his Liberal team and 
representatives from the Canadian oil industry. The industry leaders said that they 
preferred Dion’s carbon tax to the incumbent, Stephen Harper’s carbon trading 
programme, which provided little certainty for their future business models and would 
have only assisted their lawyers, not their shareholders (Supported by Lucas, 2004). Of 
course, Dion’s team was delighted to hear this and asked if they could thus count on their 
support in the election. Instead, the industry representatives said ‘no, they will destroy us’ 
(Dion Personal Interview). They explained that they did not believe Prime Minister 
Harper would actually follow through with a cap-and-trade system (a prediction which 
has so far proved accurate) and ‘no plan was better’ than a carbon tax. As Dion described, 
they were worried most by Dion’s ‘sincerity’, even though his plan was preferable to their 
own business interests.  
In the end, Dion and the Liberal Party failed to communicate and persuade the 
carbon tax to voters (Dion Personal Interview). The Liberals lost an additional 26 seats in 
Parliament. The Conservatives won seats but remained 12 short of a majority government 
until 2011. There currently stands no federal carbon pricing system, and no proposal has 
come close since the Liberal credit trading system for Large Final Emitters which was 
stopped when the Conservative Party took Parliament in 2006. In fact, since then, the 
federal government has witnessed a fundamental reshuffle of all the key national parties. 
Both the right, Conservative Party, and left, New Democratic Party have increased in 
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influence; while the center-left Liberal and Bloc Québécois parties have lost seats over 
the past two elections (See Appendix D for break-down of political parties). Since 1997 
the political landscape of Ottawa has fundamentally changed, and with two successive 
minority governments between 2006-2011, the introduction of an ambitious federal 
carbon pricing programme proved impossible given the lack of consensus and the wider 
partisan political differences.   
 
4.6.3 Proliferation of Uncoordinated Provincial Initiatives 
When the provinces finally began to formulate their own provincial plans to address 
climate change after 2000, there was little coordination with one another or the federal 
government. The provinces hold far-reaching powers and their host of directed measures 
runs just as wide, including grants for retrofitting buildings, subsidies for renewable 
energy, and various tax credits. Some like Alberta and Québec have pursued modest cap-
and-trade programmes, with Manitoba, Ontario, and New Brunswick having publicly 
committed to following suit. British Columbia introduced a carbon tax. However, none 
have seen large reductions in emissions and most have fairly weak commitments to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The most notable exception is Ontario’s decision to 
shut down its coal-fired plants, which will lead to significant emission reductions in the 
coming years, while also improving air quality and reducing acid rain, which were key 
considerations in the decision.  
In addition to their divided economic interests explained in earlier sections, 
another reason why the provinces have been reluctant to adopt stronger emission targets 
is their closely linked markets with the United States (especially the electricity grid). Thus 
the New England states, along with Québec and the Maritime provinces of New 
Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland, formulated the New 
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England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers (NEG-ECP) Climate Change Action 
Plan; while in the west British Columbia and Manitoba were heavily involved in plans by 
the Western Climate Initiative, led by the governors of California, Oregon, and 
Washington, to formulate a regional cap-and-trade regime. Economically, the individual 
provinces are woven more tightly with the United States than with one another, which 
might explain their uncoordinated and ad hoc approach.   
 
4.7 Conclusion 
The structure of Canada’s federalist system demonstrates the importance of a decisive 
executive but also severe limitations on the federal government. If Chrétien had not 
intervened in the UNFCCC negotiations, the country would not have signed the target of  
-6% since the Canadian delegation did not have the authority to go past their mandate 
without approval from their Ministers or Prime Minister. Moreover, Chrétien pushed 
ratification through in 2002 without provincial support, or even consensus amongst his 
Cabinet. As the Minister of Environment at the time revealed, Chrétien’s Cabinet was ‘far 
from unanimous’ in its support of ratification (Anderson Personal Interview). The climate 
change file also moved briefly in 2002 from Natural Resources Canada to the Prime 
Minister’s Office to formulate a new, albeit hasty plan for implementation. It is easy to 
assume that the failure in implementation came from the top just as the decision to join 
Kyoto did; after all, Chrétien was in the autumn of his leadership and Kyoto may have 
been seized upon as a priority issue (as proposed by Macdonald, 2008). More likely, 
however, were that unavoidable realities in the Canadian system, hindered by 
miscalculations and missteps after COP3, set the country up for failure. Limited federal 
powers to reduce emissions through taxation or interprovincial trade, coupled with 
reduced capacity by both Ottawa and the provinces, restricted policy formation. 
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Moreover, stark regional divisions made Kyoto a politically sensitive issue, especially 
any proposal for a carbon tax. NRTEE did not have the political muscle or the mandate to 
bargain between Ottawa and the provinces. Lastly, delayed ratification coupled with 
provincial and industry tactics undermined the consultations and Ottawa’s political 
powers. As summarised by Kathryn Harrison, ‘it is inconceivable that a Canadian federal 
government could fully implement the Kyoto Protocol without significant provincial 
cooperation’ (2002, p. 7; Supported by Lucas, 2004). Although the provinces were 
obstructionist, chief amongst them Alberta, they were also vital for successful 
implementation; and by not choosing to undertake more formal bargaining through the 
Joint Ministerial Meetings or similar, the federal government further limited its options to 
meet the Kyoto Protocol. 
Overall, Canadian politics resemble a process of federal-provincial diplomacy 
(Simeon, 1972). Too often, international relations does not address the domestic powers; 
and yet it is these powers which shape the options available to each government, 
federalist or otherwise. What is fascinating is that the provinces who were so detrimental 
to Ottawa’s climate change ambitions would later go on to surpass the federal 
government: issuing their own carbon taxes, joining regional cap-and-trade initiatives in 
North America, issuing reporting requirements for carbon capture, and closing coal-fired 
plants at large cost. Although no province has reduced their growth in emissions by any 
significant level, and some like Alberta continue to rise unabated, what has been 
interesting to observe is the development of carbon tax or cap-and-trade systems without 
any support or coordination from Ottawa.  
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Chapter 5   The Role of Interest Groups 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3 we described Canada’s sudden decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol during 
Prime Minister Chrétien’s trip to the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development. 
The decision was the Prime Minister’s alone, with many Cabinet members and lobby 
groups surprised by the decision, especially since domestic consultations failed to garner 
agreement or action amongst the provinces. That said, the announcement at the World 
Summit afforded an ideal platform in front of world leaders and press, for which Chrétien 
received the customary standing ovation. The reaction of opponents back home was swift. 
Anti-Kyoto groups increased lobbying pressure in Ottawa and reignited a public 
campaign which included full-page newspaper advertisements warning that the Protocol 
would bankrupt the country (White Personal Interview; supported by Macdonald, 2001). 
When Canada’s ratification was formalised in December 2002, a mere formality for the 
majority government at the time, Chrétien’s response to domestic opposition came in the 
form of a letter the day after from the Minister of Natural Resources,50 Hon. Herb 
Dhaliwal, addressed to the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP). In the 
letter the government promised that the oil and gas industry would not pay a price on 
carbon greater than $15 CAD and that industry’s target would only be 15% below 
business-as-usual by 2010 (Kaija Belfry, 2010; Harrison, 2007; Reuters, 2003; White 
Personal Interview; Murphy Personal Interview; Bramley Personal Interview). No formal 
agreement was ever signed between government and industry, though the letter was the 
result of three months of negotiations between the Prime Minister’s deputy (the Clerk of 
the Privy Council), the NRCan Deputy Minister, and the President of CAPP on behalf of 
the petroleum sector (Kaija Belfry, 2010). On paper this appeared to be an enormous 
                                                
50 Although the letter was penned by Hon. Herb Dhaliwal, it was a promise made by Chrétien and the 
federal government. Hon. Herb Dhaliwal was chosen because Natural Resources Canada is the Ministry 
with the closest ties to industry. 
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concession to large emitters, as the National Climate Change Process estimated abatement 
costs to be closer to $250 per tonne of carbon, not $15; while the 15% guarantee was 15% 
shy of the government’s own estimates of what would be needed to meet its Kyoto targets 
(Harrison, 2007, p. 18). Some, especially within the press, accused the government of 
selling out to the powerful oil and gas industry with such a large concession. What they 
overlooked was a shrewd countermove to neutralise industry opposition. 
As Rodney White, former Director of the University of Toronto's Institute for 
Environmental Studies and long-time expert on Canada’s climate change policy, 
explained, the letter silenced the opposition overnight. ‘It was beautifully done − a very 
clever politician. Let them jump up and down and then say “don’t worry, we will take 
care of it”’ (Personal Interview). The $15 promise did not even specify what was meant 
by a tonne. Media outlets often confuse a tonne of carbon versus a tonne of carbon 
dioxide but it changes the value dramatically.51 The ambiguity was purposely done 
(White Personal Interview). It defied anti-Kyoto groups that implementation would hurt 
Canada’s fossil fuel economy, while leaving the government without any legal 
obligations to industry and few specifics to be measured against in the future. 
This chapter explores how, why, and with what wider effects did pressure from 
interest groups shaped Canada’s response to Kyoto. Interest groups appeared to enjoy a 
high degree of influence over Canadian climate policy. Between 1997 and 2002, the 
federal government had committed itself to an extensive consultation process which 
offered organised interest groups such as environmental nongovernment organisations 
and corporations with increased access. Interest groups also accompanied Canada’s large 
delegation teams to all the UNFCCC negotiations. So did interest groups, especially 
industry, play a deciding hand in the country’s climate change policy? Many credit 
Canada’s failed implementation to powerful business interests (Stoett, 2009; Patterson, 
                                                
51 One metric ton (tonne) of carbon equals 3.67 metric tons of carbon dioxide. 
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1996). However, they often oversimplify the heterogeneous nature of organised industry 
groups. Such claims also make assumptions about how such influence is wielded, often 
borrowing ideas from the American experience, which may not apply especially well 
north of the border. Canada’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol is an especially note-
worthy episode because it is one of the few examples where ‘business lost a battle over 
policy’ (Macdonald, 2001, p. 2).  
Drawing upon interpluralist theory of politics and policymaking (i.e. Lindblom, 
1977), this chapter will examine the major stakeholders in the Canadian climate change 
debate and rehearse the main arguments about how organised interest groups can 
influence and shape domestic Canadian climate change policy. In Chapter 4, the exchange 
between Hon. Stéphane Dion’s election campaign team and leading industry groups 
suggested something of the potential of business to influence the agenda. They claimed 
they would ‘destroy’ Dion, and he in turn attributed his defeat in the election to organised 
opposition to his carbon tax proposals helping to tip the balance in a number of key 
ridings (Dion Personal Interview). But industry was not the only organised interest group 
seeking to influence federal climate policy in Canada. Key environmental nongovernment 
organisations, the labour movement, and the Federation of Canadian Municipalities also 
sought to influence public opinion in their favour and to influence federal policy through 
multiple tactics. Interviews with all of the key stakeholders revealed how agenda-setting 
was treated as a competitive game between these players as they vied for public support 
and political leverage. So are they correct? Does interest group competition ultimately 
shape the climate change agenda? In this chapter we will examine where and to what 
extent organised interest groups exercised influence on the actions of the federal 
government under Chrétien’s Liberal Party. The chapter begins by reviewing pluralist 
theories of policy influence before introducing the main stakeholder groups in the 
Canadian climate change debate at the time. The chapter goes on to discuss their ability to 
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shape policy through four channels of influence: campaign finance, agenda-setting, 
threatening capital strike and job loss, and working with government departments to 
influence policy from within. Finally we close with wider reflections of pluralist theories 
and their contributions to the political geographies of the policy process. 
 
5.2 The Pluralist Approach 
Group, pluralist theories argue that the identification and policy response to problems 
such as climate change are the result of the interaction of organised and unorganised 
interest groups in society. An entire population is viewed as a collection of interest 
groups; most of whom will be silent on environmental policy issues until their interests 
align in favour or against emerging policy issues. Governments also have their own 
policy preferences, which in turn means that some interest groups enjoy privileged access. 
However, pluralism differs from the state-centric approach of the previous chapters in 
how it weighs the relative importance of government and nongovernment interest groups. 
In Chapter 3, the federal government was treated as ‘a more or less independent generator 
of policy’ (Mitchell, 1997, p. 16) and so the focus was on how power is distributed within 
the branches of the Canadian state. Group theory turns this on its head, eroding the line 
between government and the rest of society. Although the political and ideological 
preferences of government decision-makers is important, they are not the only ones who 
define a policy issue or set the agenda. The important thing to bear in mind is that a 
pluralist approach will treat the federal government as a “group” in society (Mitchell, 
1997, p. 16) whose success depends on the support of other interest groups in society 
(Dahl, 1961).  
For pluralist theories, organised groups will influence government either directly 
through buying votes in the form of campaign finance or assisting government to design 
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policy; or indirectly by influencing public opinion or threatening to withdraw capital 
(capital strike or flight) as well as cut jobs. In this case study, close attention is paid to 
industry to test whether they were able to change the federal government’s strategy to 
Kyoto under the Liberal Party. As a leading academic in the area of Canadian climate 
change policy, Douglas Macdonald, explained that just as the government can use a 
combination of carrots and sticks to influence industry and business behaviour, so too can 
industry employ similar tactics – ‘promising to provide or threatening to withhold 
investment and related job creation, financial support for political parties and individual 
candidates, and public support or condemnation of government policy’ (2001, p. 6). The 
work of Neil Mitchell also forms another cornerstone for the analysis. He offers a 
nuanced argument for how ‘the political system is loaded to favour business’ although it 
is not fool proof (1997, p. 3). In his book, The Conspicuous Corporation, Mitchell offers 
a pluralist view between multi-actor theories and business dominance theories. He 
expands on the work of Charles Lindblom (1977) to argue that ‘business exercises 
disproportionate ideological influence [on society], that maintaining business confidence 
concerns government officials, and that business political resources are formidable’ 
(1997, p. 6). That said, business interests do fail, especially when arrayed against other 
organised interest groups and when their objectives are fundamentally incompatible with 
the ideological preferences of the public or government. As mentioned before, the Kyoto 
Protocol is a significant case study because it represented, for a time, one of those failures 
by industry (Macdonald, 2001). Such cases contradict the theoretical argument of 
Lindblom’s theory of business dominance and as such they ‘provide the analytical 
opportunity to identify the conditions under which business political power breaks down 
and to refine theory’ (Mitchell, 1997, p. 7).  
This chapter will focus on critical events in Canada’s domestic climate change 
debate to examine how interest groups acted and reacted, succeeded and failed, to 
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influence the federal government’s Kyoto strategy. However, before continuing, it is 
important to address how stakeholder interest in the climate change arena is multifaceted 
and ever-changing. Even within industry, and again within the oil and gas sector, the 
interests of corporations and trade associations are far from unanimous. It is outside the 
scope of this research to investigate the battles over messaging within these broad interest 
groups; however, it is important to remember that influence and resources are not shared 
evenly within such groups, with dominant individuals and corporations driving their 
overall message. The sections below will lay the groundwork and map the four main 
organised interest groups in the Canadian climate change debate, amalgamating each 
group’s main concerns and policy objectives for each to provide context for the 
subsequent analysis.52 These groups include environmental nongovernment organisations 
(ENGOs), the labour movement, the federation of Canadian municipalities and industry 
groups. Particular attention is paid to industry, which is by far the largest and most 
diverse group in terms of the evolution of the domestic debate over Kyoto ratification and 
implementation. Unlike previous chapters, the public is not treated as a distinct group 
since pluralism regards the public as a collection of interest groups, albeit mostly silent. 
The media will also not be introduced as a separate group but a mouthpiece for others. 
The media can and does influence the political agenda, especially how issues are framed 
in the public sphere (Boykoff, 2011). Moreover, key Canadian publications such as the 
National Post did appear to align with certain interest groups and try to shape the agenda 
accodingly. However, overall the Canadian media was a lagging indicator and did not 
demonstrate a unified agenda on the Kyoto Protocol during this time period. The media 
was too diverse in its opinions to be analysed as a distinct group. Prominent members of 
                                                
52 Other groups included academic bodies such as the University of Toronto and the Energy Research 
Group at Simon Fraser University, Science for Peace, and the United Churches of Canada. However, this 
analysis focuses on the most active stakeholder groups: environmental nongovernment organisations, labour 
unions, the Federation of Municipalities acting on behalf of Canadian cities, and industry groups. 
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the press are included as part of other key interest groups, but the media itself was not an 
organised interest group in and of itself.  
 
5.2.1 Green Groups 
Environmental nongovernment organisations were one of the earliest vested stakeholder 
groups in the climate change debate. It is widely documented how such green groups, 
along with the IPCC and scientific community, first identified and framed “global 
warming”, putting it on the political agenda back in the late 1970s and early 1980s. As 
explained by Wendt and Duvall, such organisations can become the ‘preconditions for 
meaningful state action’ (1989, p. 53); and much academic study drawing from epistemic 
communities demonstrates the role of the global scientific community, the IPCC, and key 
non-state actors in bringing climate change to the political agenda and initially framing 
the problem (Haas, 2000; Patterson, 1996).  
At the time, climate change was best understood at the global scale and there was 
limited appreciation of its impact on regional and local environments. Unsurprisingly, 
only international and national ENGOs dedicated significant resources to the file. 
Attendance at the UNFCCC negotiations and lobbying efforts in Ottawa also required a 
fair share of financial and technical expenditure which excluded smaller, more locally-
focused ENGOs (although a network of ENGOs, Climate Action Network Canada, was 
formed to compensate for this by creating a facility for sharing information and 
coordinating policy work). Prior to 2006, the most active ENGOs in Canada included the 
Sierra Club of Canada, Greenpeace Canada, the Pembina Institute, the David Suzuki 
Foundation, and to a lesser extent Pollution Probe (Ogilvie Personal Interview; 
Hengeveld Personal Interview; Bramley Personal Interview). After 2006, development 
nongovernment organisations began to take a more active role in the climate change 
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debate, and sought to reframe climate change as a development, poverty, and human 
rights issue. However, the five ENGOs listed above were the most active organisations 
during this early period, under the Liberal government. They dedicated consultants to 
work both nationally and internationally on the issue, participated in consultations and 
task groups including forming part of the UNFCCC Canadian delegation teams, and 
organised public meetings and campaigns to shape and influence public opinion. Straight 
away, it is obvious that this is not a large number in comparison to other Annex I 
countries, although as we will see, their influence was substantial despite their small size 
and number. 
 
5.2.2  Unions and Organised Labour  
The labour movement was another early entrant into the Canadian climate change debate, 
where it has been active since the 1990s. Organisations included the Ontario Energy 
Coalition, the Canadian Labour Congress, and most notably the Communications, Energy 
and Paperworkers Union of Canada (CEP) who were the largest union representing 
workers in oil and gas, pulp and paper, and other heavy emission industries including oil 
sands.53 Their rationale for supporting Kyoto was more historical than economic. As 
Brain Kohler, an early advocate for climate change action within CEP, explained: ‘[w]e 
wanted to be able to say something positive […] and not, as some unions have done, be 
the last defenders of the indefensible […]  defend[ing] our right to clear-cut trees or pump 
the soil’ (Personal Interview;  Supported by Swift, 2003).54 The CEP took the same 
approach to pulp and paper in British Columbia, where they called for an end to clear-
                                                
53 In 2013, CEP and the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW) joined to form Unifor for Canada (Unifor), the 
largest private sector union in Canada. 
54 Incidentally, it was Brian Kohler who invited Henry Hengeveld, Senior Advisor on climate change from 
Environment Canada, to make a presentation to the CEP committee explaining the science behind climate 
change. Environment Canada was keen to reach out to prominent labour unions to make the case for action 
on climate change. 
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cutting and pushed for more sustainable forestry management, including more public 
consultations (Swift, 2003). In the past, some unions fought against environmental 
regulation in heavy polluting industries in order to safeguard profit and therefore jobs. 
This backfired when companies eventually switched and declared themselves green: 
leaving the unions ‘hanging out there with no credibility left whatsoever’ (Kohler 
Personal Interview). CEP did not want to be seen as ‘getting into bed’ with industry 
(Swift, 2003, p. 91), so Brain Kohler and others such as the Superfund for Workers in the 
United States fostered the idea of ‘just transition’, which recognises that practices must 
change, as long as this is done in a way that is just for workers and communities (Kohler 
Personal Interview). As Brian Payne, President of CEP, said, ‘it does not have to be a 
question of jobs or the environment, clearly we can have both’ (Speech, 2002 quoted in 
Swift, 2003, p. 94)). ‘Just transition’ was fostered by key intellectual entrepreneurs to 
become the overarching policy position of the labour movement in Canada. Moreover, the 
country’s labour movement was invested in Kyoto: viewing itself as one of the primary 
stakeholders in the climate change debate (for example, CEP’s President sat on the 
National Round Table of Energy and the Environment) and pushing for ratification so 
long as workers’ rights were preserved. In fact, the Canadian labour movement was both 
unified and more receptive to Kyoto, especially compared to their counterparts in the 
United States who were split in their support or absent altogether from the domestic 
debate (Kohler Personal Interview).  
This was echoed at the global level and the constellation of international unions 
and associations. The most visible in the climate change debate were the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), the Global Union Federation (GUF), and 
the International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine, and General Workers’ Unions 
(ICEM) although there were many more. ICEM and ICFTU, in particular, were involved 




Canadian city governments were also a strong voice in the domestic and international 
climate change debate. They are an order of government, and certainly prefer to be seen 
as such rather than as stakeholders; however, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities 
(FCM) and the World Mayors Council on Climate Change are included in the analysis as 
they are associations with no constitutional powers.  
Unlike the provinces who were slow to adopt robust climate change policies, 
many municipalities55 were forerunners in the domestic and international climate change 
debate with the FCM pushing for Kyoto implementation and often coordinating action 
between Canadian and US cities. They lobbied provincial and federal orders of 
government, though they enjoyed more success with their own local implementation than 
in setting the domestic agenda and pushing the provinces to act. What was driving these 
associations? As Mary Jane Middelkoop, Senior Policy Analyst at FCM, explained, ‘the 
bottom line [and] the possibility of liability’ were the chief concerns for Canadian 
municipalities (Personal Interview). In the early 2000s, the municipalities were more 
concerned about the vulnerabilities to climate change and the cost of adaptation under 
their public service duties, whereas the provinces were worried about the cost of Kyoto 
compliance and their revenue tax base from industry. For example, the municipalities of 
Ontario not only faced record floods but also class action lawsuits following their failure 
to anticipate and cope with the yearly increase of water. The same applies to water 
shortages or other significant climate impacts. There are now training programmes for 
Canadian municipalities warning that ‘[a]s the public begins to better understand the 
impacts of climate change, the risks of legal action increase if municipalities fail to take 
appropriate action to adapt to these changes’ (Penney et al., 2011). So the World Mayors 
Council on Climate Change and the FCM advocated large reductions in greenhouse gas 
                                                
55 For example, in sharp contrast with the Ontario government, the province’s largest city, Toronto, 
established targets and has since cut its greenhouse gas emissions by 15% of 1990 levels (Purcell, 2013). 
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emissions and robust action on the part of federal and provincial governments. This is 
significant because of their proximity to voters and the fact that more than half of 
Canada’s greenhouse gas emissions are attributable to municipalities (Middelkoop 
Personal Interview).  
 
5.2.4 Industry Groups 
As soon as the UNFCCC process began, it captured the attention of a wide range of vital 
industries within Canada. In recent years, other sectors have entered the debate; however, 
11 industries have been the most active since climate change came onto the agenda. 
These can be divided between the heavy polluters including automotive, mining, steel, 
chemicals, cement, fertilizer, pulp and paper, and oil and gas; and the low carbon 
industries: the insurance industry, timber, and the low carbon energy sector. By far the 
most active in the Canadian climate change debate was the oil and gas sector which has 
grown prodigiously in Canada since the 1990s. It was at this time that Canada’s two 
largest sectors, the automotive industry in Ontario and the forest industries in Ontario, 
British Columbia, and Québec were overtaken as Canada’s leading net exporters by crude 
and petroleum oils, predominately from Alberta (See Figures below). This realignment of 
wealth in the country from east to west increased both the regional divisions (discussed in 




Figure 10 Canadian Net Exports 1995  

















Figure 11 Canadian Net Exports 2010  
(Source: MIT Observatory of Economic Complexity adapted by Melanson, 2013)  
 
The position of each industry stakeholder can be viewed as the aggregate of each 
sector, the trade associations that represent them, and the position of individual 
corporations. Overall, the industry response to the Kyoto Protocol in Canada ranged from 
supportive or silent to vehemently opposed. It is easy to stereotype industry as dirty and 
naturally opposed to environmental regulation; especially in the case of Kyoto where a 
select opposition garnered the majority of attention in both the media and on Parliament 
Hill. These included major businesses such as Exxon’s subsidiary Imperial Oil 
(Stevenson, 1999) and trade associations, most notably the Canadian Association of 
Petroleum Producers (CAPP)56, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, the Canadian 
Manufacturers and Exporters Association (CME), and the Business Council on National 
                                                
56 Although the CAPP became increasingly moderate and nuanced in their position since some of their 




Issues, which later became the Canadian Council of Chief Executives (CCCE), all of 
which undertook anti-Kyoto campaigns though many have since softened their position. 
Despite this vocal opposition, it is important to emphasise that they did not represent 
industry as a whole. The data do not demonstrate ‘virtually unanimous opposition’ to 
Kyoto as some scholars have suggested (Harrison, 2010, p. 172). As demonstrated by the 
Carbon Disclosure Project, which surveys hundreds of companies in the world about 
their views and actions on climate change and the Kyoto Protocol, there is no consensus 
within industry, even amongst the oil and gas sector (reflected again in Personal 
Interviews). 
Figure 12 GHG Emissions from Canadian Industries 1990-2008  
(Source: Environment Canada) 
 
A number of major corporations such as Shell Canada, Petro-Canada, BP Canada, 
DuPont, United Technologies, Dow Chemicals, Alcan, and Sunoco were either quiet or 
cautiously supportive of Kyoto (Supported by Bramley Personal Interview). Many went 
so far as to take proactive steps and introduce voluntary emission reduction targets for 
their production (Jaffe, 1999), though none wanted to see a reduction in overall 
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consumption (Macdonald, 2001). For example, in 1998, BP introduced a voluntary target 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from their operations by 10% from 1990 levels by 
2010. They reached this target with no net economic cost to BP (John Browne, CEO of 
BP, quoted by Harris, 2002). Many of these corporations most likely lobbied the 
government in private to delay or alter Canada’s implementation strategy to secure more 
favourable terms; however, they did not publicly denounce the Protocol or the overall 
policy objective to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The majority of the corporations 
who entered the climate change debate in Canada sought to work with the federal 
government, especially in the national consultation process and sectoral agreements (See 
Section 5.6 later in the chapter) rather than fight the basic policy objective. Nowadays 
almost all large corporations within high carbon industries have adopted voluntary 
policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in their production. This corresponds to long-
established research on ecological modernisation (Christoff, 1996; Buttel, 2000) and the 
greening of business in the 1980s and 1990s: the rise of corporate social responsibility 
and spread of voluntary environmental initiatives by corporations (Dashwood, 2012; 
Gibson, 1999; Macdonald, 2001). Norms on sustainable development, public backlash 
and boycotts, court cases against polluters (especially from First Nations), reduced access 
to finance for environmentally risky projects, and a fundamental change in the 
relationship between corporations and regulators combined to change how corporations 
approach environmental issues in Canada. By the time global warming entered the public 
discourse in the late 1990s, many like BP and Sunoco were taking early steps to adopt 
voluntary targets to maintain public legitimacy and pre-empt more rigorous government 
regulations.  
 In addition to the high carbon industries, the other key stakeholders concerned by 
Canada’s climate change policy included insurance, forestry, and low carbon energy. 
They were strong advocates for the Kyoto Protocol, seeing benefit in robust regulation to 
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reduce greenhouse gases. The insurance industry, in particular, had been active since the 
1980s in adjusting their risk analysis of the impacts of climate change in line with that of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The forestry sector (excluding pulp and 
paper which produces significant emissions) saw potential in Kyoto if it also carried 
credit for maintaining carbon sinks: trees and soil. Growing plantation forests can be a net 
sink in which to store CO2 from the atmosphere. This side of the forestry sector actively 
encouraged the government’s efforts to pursue credits from the UNFCCC for maintaining 
Canada’s large forests.57 The last group was the low carbon energy sector, which includes 
in order of importance: hydroelectricity, nuclear, natural gas, wind, biomass, geothermal, 
and solar. They all supported Kyoto if it afforded them an increased share of the energy 
market or otherwise helped their profit objectives (Bjorn et al., 2002, p. 90). In particular, 
hydropower is vital for the country, accounting for 59.1% of electricity generation in 
Canada and lighting over 90% of homes in Québec, British Columbia, Manitoba, 
Newfoundland, and the Yukon (official NRCan statistics for 2010). However, Canada is 
an energy exporting country and, despite the size of the hydropower sector in Canada, it 
only accounts for 2% of energy exports. The oil and gas sector brings in $87.9 billion 
CAD (official NRCan statistics for 2010), trumping the $2.1 billion CAD for 
hydroelectricity. Nuclear was another key stakeholder in the climate change debate, 
especially in Ontario, with the Canadian Nuclear Association running ads: ‘Clean air is 
important to all of us, nuclear energy is helping to make it happen’ (Winsor, 2002). Other 
renewable industries such as wind and solar account for an even smaller fraction of the 
energy mix, although they are now growing in importance. All these energy industries 
followed the Kyoto negotiations with interest and supported implementation at home. 
They may also have played a part in Ottawa’s attempt to receive clean energy export 
                                                
57 Canada pursued credit for both sinks and exporting low carbon natural gas to the United States which 
would have reduced her Kyoto commitment by roughly a third (60 million tonnes of GHGs) (Macdonald, 
2001). Canada received some credit for her sinks but failed on clean energy exports.  
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credits.58 That said, they did not match the high carbon energy producers in the amount of 
time and energy dedicated to the climate change file, or indeed in their influence. 
Appreciating this diversity of views, industry’s overall response to Kyoto can be 
summarised into four broad categories. First, there were those who, rightly or wrongly, 
did not believe Kyoto implementation impacted their industry in any substantial way. It 
took a long time for companies, and indeed the public, to appreciate the risk climate 
change posed to the production and distribution of goods; while others did not view the 
cost of compliance as onerous and thus did not dedicate resources to fighting Kyoto 
(Giberson, 2010). Second, were those such as forestry and hydro, who were supportive of 
Kyoto and believed they would benefit from implementation. They either saw profit in 
the transition to a low carbon economy or, in the case of insurance, were worried about 
increased risk, slow onset changes, and extreme weather events brought about by climate 
change. Third, there were those who were cautiously supportive or comfortable with 
Kyoto but sought recognition for early action (Bramley Personal Interview). For example, 
prior to ratification, the aluminium sector had reduced emissions between 50-85% 
through technology innovation and increased efficiency in the smelting process. 
Regulation and a carbon pricing system was not, in and of itself, detrimental since GHG 
emissions can also lead to high energy costs and over-voltage which can destabilise 
production (Van Houtte Personal Interview). Therefore, many viewed Kyoto 
implementation in efficiency terms. However, these groups did worry they would be 
expected to keep innovating at the same speed and would not be recognised for early 
action (Van Houtte Personal Interview). In fact, to many, Kyoto’s baseline year was more 
alarming than the -6% target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This group wanted to 
work with, not against, the federal government. In fact, all three categories can be broadly 
                                                
58 Clean energy exports which give some sort of credit for displacing dirtier energy. This was a failed 
strategy on the part of the Canadian government. As a former UNFCCC negotiator from Foreign Affairs 
Canada recalled, we had ‘no support at all. You would be hard-pressed to find an issue where you do not 
have any support’ (Ballhorn Personal Interview). 
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summarised as in line or close to the federal government’s moderate policy ambition to 
ratify and implement Kyoto – motivating all to seek a course of adaptation rather than 
confrontation with the government (Macdonald, 2007). This is an important point 
because, despite their different views on the costs and benefits of Kyoto, their response 
was largely the same. It was the fourth and final group that received the most attention: 
those who feared that Kyoto and any subsequent carbon pricing policy would undermine 
their entire sector and profits, such as Imperial Oil and most of the trade associations 
closely related to oil and gas. In other polluting industries, for example mining, 
greenhouse gas emissions can be reduced by improvements in efficiency and typical 
pollution-control regulation. For the oil and gas sector, however, ‘climate policy intends 
to reduce consumption of what, for the fossil fuel sector, a product in and of itself – the 
good they sell in the market’ (Macdonald, 2001, p. 23). As such, oil and gas viewed the 
Kyoto Protocol as the ‘most severe environmental policy threat’ since the National 
Energy Program of the 1980s (Macdonald, 2001, p. 3). The development of Alberta’s oil 
sands was especially contentious and still receives global attention.  
The strongest opposition was concentrated in Alberta and Saskatchewan (as 
discussed in Chapter 4), where corporations and the large trade associations joined forces 
with the provincial government to fight Canada’s participation in the Kyoto Protocol. 
Although the oil and gas sector is not exclusively isolated to the Prairies (e.g. New 
Brunswick and Newfoundland in the east), their geographical concentration increased 
their collective voice and encouraged coordination between the Premier of Alberta and 
the oil and gas sector to fight aggressively against Kyoto. For example, the Canadian 
Chamber of Commerce coordinated its message with the provincial government of 
Alberta, arguing that a more detailed national plan needed to be formulated. Moreover, 
the charged atmosphere in Alberta dissuaded some companies like Shell International and 
BP International from making public statements in support of the Protocol even though 
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they had adopted voluntary GHG targets, for fear of alienating the very government who 
regulated their sector (Bramley Personal Interview). Those that strongly opposed Kyoto 
joined with Alberta’s Premier, Hon. Ralph Klein, and other key players, such as the 
Fraser Institute and Conrad Black (founder of The National Post), to provide a united, 
albeit superficial, opposition (Hengeveld Personal Interview; Bramley Personal 
Interview).  
 All of these organised interest groups had a number of potential channels in which 
to exercise influence over federal climate change policy. In the sections that follow, I 
consider four principal mechanisms for influence: campaign finance, agenda-setting, 
investment, and their close working relationships with key Ministries. 
 
5.3 Campaign Finance 
The first and most obvious way interest groups can influence democratic governments is 
through the electoral process, and in particular through the provision of financial support 
for favoured candidates or negative advertising against opponents. The power to buy 
influence arises from the fact that most political parties need to raise enormous sums of 
money for election or re-election, potentially making it a powerful channel of influence. 
The influence of campaign finance on environmental policy in the United States is a 
popular topic in the press (McKnight, 2014; The New York Times, 2014), especially 
following the US Supreme Court decisions in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission (2010) and McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission (2014), which 
deregulated campaign finance under the First Amendment, freedom of speech. In Canada, 
however, this channel of influence is limited by the country’s stricter rules on campaign 
finance, and the fact that campaign contributions have never been connected to free 
speech (Boatright, 2011).  
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In 1974, Canada passed the Election Expenses Act, which applied restrictions on 
private contributions to parties and MPs and also mandated free and equal broadcasting 
time to all parties. It attempted to cut the purse strings between powerful interest groups 
and political parties, ‘thereby ensuring that no one candidate dominates due to wealth’ 
(Marleau and Camille Montpetit, 2009). In addition, ‘only the candidate and the 
candidate’s official agent may pay the candidate’s personal expenses’ (Marleau and 
Camille Montpetit, 2009) and no interest groups can independently campaign on their 
behalf. Most importantly, Canadian law sets expenditure limits during federal elections 
for each political party based on the number of ridings they have a candidate in. ‘Unlike 
the United States, which limits the amounts individuals and groups can contribute to 
election campaigns, the historical Canadian approach was to limit the amounts that 
candidates and parties can spend’ (Heard, 2011). 
Campaign finance was reformed in 2003, under Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, 
with the Canada Elections Act (Bill C-24). The new Act disallowed direct donations from 
non-Canadians and all corporations, trade associations, and labour unions. This was 
amended in 2004, making corporations and trade associations able to donate a maximum 
of $1,000 CAD per year; however, in 2006 they were disallowed again under the Federal 
Accountability Act (Bill C-2). There is scope for interest groups to advertise on behalf of 
a party or candidate (after the Supreme Court Case, Harper v. Canada in 2004); however, 
this is capped at $150,000 CAD for each election period. Overall, Canadian political 
parties rely much more on public funds than in many other democracies, including the 
United States and United Kingdom.59 Most importantly, the expenditure limits are the 
same for each of the national parties. For example, in the 2004 federal election, the limit 
for all national political parties of Canada (NDP, Liberal, Conservative, and Green 
                                                
59 Although this is set to diminish since the Conservative Harper government is phasing out the per-vote 
subsidy which is one of the main public contributions to Canadian political parties. 
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Party60) was at $17,593,925.32 CAD; and in 2008 their limit was $19,999,230.62 CAD 
(Elections Canada). 
In addition, Canadian elections do not appear at set intervals – they are called at 
the discretion of the government up to a maximum of five years or when the government 
loses a vote of non-confidence (as seen in 2011). ‘The fact that [Canadian] elections have 
not occurred on a fixed calendar has […] important consequences for interest groups’ 
(Boatright, 2011, p. 36). Canadian interest groups cannot work towards set election cycles 
unlike in the United States, where large armies of consultants are hired to work towards 
policy goals with clear timelines. Canadian elections are also generally called during 
favourable times for the majority party (unless it is forced through a vote of non-
confidence), meaning that contentious issues may not feature at the moment an election is 
called (Boatright, 2011). Moreover, Canadian parties observe much greater party 
discipline than is the case in other countries such as the United States (as mentioned in 
Chapter 4). This further limits the scope to influence parties between elections by 
lobbying or discrediting specific MPs on key Parliamentary votes, with the exception of 
when a rare “free vote” is called.  
Overall, the scope for interest groups to buy votes or lobby individual MPs is 
limited. Indeed Canada’s laws governing campaign finance are largely praised for their 
egalitarian model. As a result interest groups steer ‘away from electoral politics’ and 
‘seek to work with the cabinet or the bureaucracy’, as we will see later in the chapter 
(Boatright, 2011, p. 37).  
 
                                                
60 The Green Party of Canada became entitled to federal funding when it received 4.32% of the 2004 
popular vote (above the required 1% for eligibility). 
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5.4 Agenda-Setting  
In the story of climate change, there is little doubt that it was first framed by green groups 
and the scientific community (Haas, 2000), to which prominent Canadians played an 
integral part. As one climate scientist and member of Canada’s delegation at the original 
1979 Conference in Austria observed, Canada’s early delegations were driven by 
Environment Canada and the country’s scientific community (anonymous Personal 
Interview).61 The first IPCC report also played an important role in galvanising national 
positions and building momentum for the early negotiations. The combative politics had 
not yet taken hold, nor had the counter-current of climate denialism which now features 
in many countries, including the United States. This section will discuss how organised 
interest groups vied to dominate the climate change agenda within Canada, focusing on 
those that played the most active role with public campaigns and direct lobbying. 
In the 1990s when the UNFCCC process was created and discussions turned to 
targets and emissions reductions, ENGOs and the scientific community campaigned for 
Canada’s early participation. They helped lay the foundations for climate change to be 
framed as an environmental issue as opposed to an issue of human rights, poverty, or 
security. The prospect of legally binding commitments immediately alarmed some 
corporations and industry associations who feared strict carbon pricing policies. 
Opposition within industry also attached itself to concerned provinces, especially Alberta. 
These groups funded reports or launched media campaigns which questioned the science 
of climate change: whether it was indeed taking place or caused by human activity 
(Smith, 2000; Toner, 2002). To illustrate, Guy Crittenden, former Editor-in-Chief of the 
Canadian trade publications Hazardous Materials Management and Solid Waste & 
                                                
61 Starting in 1991, ‘economic experts replaced senior atmospheric scientists and forestry experts on 
Canadian delegations’ (Russell and Toner, 1998, p. 6). Even within Environment Canada, the teams 
responsible for the UNFCCC negotiations evolved where climate scientists were replaced by economists 
and international affairs specialists (Bernstein, 2002, p. 220; Supported by anonymous Personal Interview 
with former member of Canadian UNFCCC delegation). 
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Recycling, wrote an editorial in The Globe and Mail’s Science Fiction section entitled 
‘The Day the Earth Warmed Up’ (Crittenden, 1997). It was a lengthy editorial piece 
which attempted to dismantle the Kyoto Protocol and climate change science, incorrectly 
stating ‘[o]ver the past decade, the Earth's average temperature has increased by zero. 
Nothing. Nada. In fact, there's evidence that it has actually cooled a bit’. Industry 
opposition also founded the Canadian Coalition of Responsible Environmental Solutions 
(CCRES) in 2002, which organised news conferences and media ads against Kyoto. 
Opinion pieces appeared in national and local newspapers, as did reports from the Fraser 
Institute and magazines such as Willie Soon and Climate Research magazine which were 
fabricated specifically to publish pro-industry positions. Key individuals also played a 
role (Bennett, 2002). As Steven Bernstein, an academic who has written extensively on 
Canadian climate change politics, observed, ‘there was an attempt under Conrad Black 
[and his national newspaper The National Post] to try to pull the Canadian public to the 
US position’ (Personal Interview). For example, headlines in The National Post stated: 
‘Antarctic ice sheet has stopped melting, study finds’ (quoted in Davidson, 2002) and 
‘The sky was supposed to fall’ (The National Post, 2000).  
However, this public campaign against the science of climate change never carried 
the same weight amongst Canada’s political elite or public as it did in other countries, 
with 70% of Canadians in 1997 believing climate change was real and a problem 
(Anderson Personal Interview). That number would rise to roughly 73-80% supportive of 
ratification (Anderson Personal Interview; Angus Reid National Poll, 8 November, 2002; 
Supported by Harrison, 2010); no doubt enhanced by awareness-raising campaigns by the 
federal government and ENGOs. In fact, almost as many people, 71%, said ‘even if there 
are some problems with the Kyoto Protocol, it should be implemented because it is a 
good first step’ (Angus Reid National Poll, 2002).  Each year the language against Kyoto 
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and attempts to debunk climate change became less frequent and inflammatory.62 As 
explained by Glen Toner (2002), 
‘Despite efforts by some industry groups and their allies in the business press 
and the right-wing Reform Party to cast doubt on the science, there is really no 
longer any serious dispute on that front. The real conflict has already moved to 
the debate over the policy instruments required to reduce emissions.’ 
Although Canada is home to climate sceptics, including journalists who likened climate 
change to an ‘environmental myth’ (The Globe and Mail quoted by Smith, 2000), climate 
scepticism never took root in the country as it did in others.  
There are several possible reasons why the climate sceptics and industry 
opposition failed to shift the agenda in Canada about the ‘reality’ of climate change as a 
problem. The first was because they lacked legitimacy and tailored their message in 
opposition to Canadian norms of environmentalism, thus lacked ideological influence 
over the public and Liberal government of the time. This is in contrast to the United 
States, where there is greater scepticism towards the scientific community and UN 
(Kathryn Harrison, 2002, p. 6). Although the Canadian public did not demonstrate an in-
depth knowledge of climate science, and in fact often confused it with other 
environmental issues, polls revealed they were willing to trust the UNFCCC process and 
climate scientists.  
Second, there are different types of media cultures between countries like Canada 
and the United States (Stoddart and Tindall, 2013; Boykoff, 2011, 2007; Anderson, 
2009). ‘Analyses of American media coverage have often focused on how journalistic 
norms of providing space for opposing positions has resulted in coverage for climate 
skeptics[sic] disproportionate to their prevalence’ (Stoddart and Tindall, 2013, p. 7). In 
fact, comparative research on media framing suggests that climate sceptics are given 
                                                
62 Although one can still find public statements questioning the science of climate change, most notably 
from Prime Minister Harper, who referred to ‘so-called greenhouse gases’ during the Christmas Speech in 
2006 (CanEnviroPol, 2006). Another example which appeared in mainstream media included The Globe 
and Mail article, “Why the IPCC climate change report is flawed” (Farnell, 2013). 
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more coverage in the United States than in other countries (See Stoddart and Tindall, 
2013). This is also supported by Anthony Downs’ analysis of the ‘issue-attention cycle’ 
in American media (1972). In Canada, there is less space for climate sceptics because 
news outlets do not attempt to ‘create an “aura of neutrality” by balancing voices 
representing the scientific consensus with skeptic[sic] voices’ (Young and Dugas, 2011, 
p. 10).63 
Thus, industry opposition changed strategies and redirected its focus away from 
questioning the science to raising questions about the Kyoto agreement itself. For 
example, the CAPP warned of ‘economic suicide’ if Canada signed Kyoto (White 
Personal Interview). This was echoed by full-page ads, such as the Coal Alliance’s ad in 
The Globe and Mail likening Kyoto to “seppuku”, Japanese ritual suicide (Smith, 2000). 
Kyoto was both demonised as euro-centric and favouring European economic interests or 
as a UN scheme to penalise OECD countries and bolster developing countries (White 
Personal Interview). ‘Those who were against Kyoto made it seem like there was an evil, 
international institution that was being pushed on Canada’ (Bernstein Personal Interview). 
As Michael Murphy, former Executive Vice-President of Policy at the Canadian Chamber 
of Commerce, explained, ‘[i]t was a very euro-favoured agreement. 1990 was no accident 
− it was picked. 1990 pre-dated the unification of Germany and it pre-dated taking coal 
out of the economy […] so for Europe, it was a perfect target year’ (Personal Interview). 
The CAPP and Canadian Coalition of Responsible Environmental Solutions (CCRES) did 
not refute the existence of climate change itself, but argued Kyoto was simply the wrong 
solution to the problem. Canada’s largest PR firm, National Public Relations, was hired  
at one stage with $225,000 CAD a week being spent on a public media campaign 
proposing a “Made in Canada” solution (Cormier, 2006). The federal government 
responded by rebranding their climate change plan as “Made in Canada”, which was 
                                                




cleverly adapted from the anti-Kyoto camp.  As Michael Murphy quipped ‘and now the 
government has come up with its “Made in Canada” plan and title, well that was our 
phrase in 2002’ (Personal Interview). Originally, some members of government were 
against adopting such a title because Kyoto is an international agreement and well-
received by the public, but it proved strategic in the end and, in some ways, combined the 
best of both worlds: an international agreement with a “Made in Canada” solution. 
However, the overall attack on Kyoto as a flawed agreement did not succeed in 
shifting public opinion or the government’s policy objective for ratification. Industry 
attacks on the Protocol were countered effectively by ENGOs who charged them ‘for 
sponsoring what they saw as a deceptive and self-serving media scare campaign’ 
(Schneider, 2009, p. 156). Although ENGOs were out-gunned financially, their strong 
reputation ‘allowed them to punch above their weight’ (Harrison, 2010, p. 172). Their 
messaging was echoed by the federal government, who also condemned the credibility of 
industry opposition. In a speech Prime Minister Chrétien compared such groups to the 
tobacco industry and their allies who for decades denied that smoking causes lung cancer 
(Speech November, 2002). ENGOs also sponsored awareness-raising campaigns on the 
science and impacts of climate change; drawing parallels with important issues like the 
decline of Atlantic cod which crippled eastern communities and whose lessons supported 
international action (Quirks and Quarks CBC Radio Program quoted in Smit Personal 
Interview). Both the Federation of Canadian Municipalities and ENGOs as well as the 
federal government (especially Minister of Environment, Hon. David Anderson, who 
specifically went on a speaking tour of Canadian cities in 2002) tailored their message 
along Canadian norms of environmentalism and multilateralism; whereas industry’s 
attacks relied on misinformation and the public’s lack of deep knowledge on climate 
change and regulation. They muddied the waters but were unsuccessful in changing the 
overall public mood against Kyoto. 
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It should also be mentioned that ENGOs were not always successful themselves in 
influencing Canada’s climate agenda. Between 1998 and 2006, when the finer points of 
the Kyoto Protocol were being negotiated, the federal government sought unpopular 
credit for nuclear power and natural gas and for protecting carbon sinks (forests). ENGOs 
attempted to shame the Canadian government when they appeared to put economic 
interests over the environment. One theatrical approach, which garnered much media 
attention during the UNFCCC negotiations, was the Fossil-of-the-Day awards sponsored 
by Friends of the Earth, Climate Action Network Canada, and other organisations.  
Figure 13 Canada Takes Third Place in Fossil-of-the-Day Awards, 2010 
(Source: Climate Action Network, 2010) 
 
They are awarded daily during the COPs for the three biggest laggards in the 
negotiations. They certainly created a fanfare at the meetings and Canada has received 
numerous Fossil-of-the-Day awards since the tradition first began. However, they did not 
always have the desired effect on the Canadian delegation. While the Prime Minister and 
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MPs are deeply concerned about public opinion and media scorn, delegates themselves 
such as a former negotiator at Foreign Affairs Canada viewed them as a ‘badge of 
honour’ (anonymous Personal Interview). As he said, ‘I think delegations care a bit about 
fossil-of-the-day […] but if the process of selecting is not very rigorous or balanced then 
[…] it is the badge of political correctness’ (Personal Interview). Cabinet dictates 
negotiation mandates from a broad perspective, then the diplomats and career negotiators 
fight to preserve manoeuvrability above all else, even if that means obstructing 
negotiations. Many from the green community or labour movement argue that Canada’s 
negotiation position revealed a disproportionate influence on the part of industry. 
However, as one of Canada’s former negotiators explained, it boiled down more to 
manoeuvrability, to ‘make sure the government could do as much as it wanted [and retain 
as many] tools to work on its own implementation plan’ (Ballhorn Personal Interview).  
Industry opposition to Kyoto was countered effectively by the federal government 
and other organised interest groups working in concert. In fact some suffered a fair degree 
of backlash for their strong anti-Kyoto attacks. It did not matter how many resources were 
dedicated, their message did not carry long-term. As Hon. David Anderson recalled 
during the public campaigns in Alberta leading up to ratification,  
‘Klein and the industry paid a lot of money advertising and they managed to 
drop the figures in Alberta from 73% support for ratification, down to about 
43%. Once they stopped spending the money it started going back up again. 
They drove it down but it was not permanently down’ (Personal Interview).  
By the time of Chrétien’s announcement of ratification in 2002, 95% of Albertan 
households said they would be willing to pay something to implement Kyoto (Angus 
Reid National Poll, June 6, 2002). The same tactic was used during the National Energy 
Program of the 1980s, where large sums were spent to dissuade the Albertan public. For 
Kyoto, they could not keep the polls down, assisted by the federal government’s message 
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which was simple and on point: climate change is a problem and Kyoto is the right thing 
to do. As explained by Hon. David Anderson,  
‘The provinces were faced with this impossible situation, because the public was 
against them. Premiers do not like being in a situation where they are in the 
minority and the federal government has the support of their provincial 
population. So the opposition would have been very, very different had there not 
been that public support. And as it turned out, it ultimately petered out’ 
(Personal Interview).  
By October, 2002, Hon. Ralph Klein gave up the national advertising campaign against 
Kyoto following focus group feedback who warned ‘that the campaign would be seen as 
self-serving propaganda’ (CBC News, 2002). Industry also followed suit, adapting their 
message to fear of capital strike (or capital flight) and job loss. 
 
5.5 Investment and Capital Strike 
Interest groups can also influence government by threatening job loss and 
investment/capital strike. If government policy brings about unemployment and a decline 
in prosperity, it is not business executives but government officials who are consequently 
retired from office (Lindblom, 1982). As a result, governments are ‘instinctively fearful 
of upsetting business interests’ and seek to maintain business confidence (Mitchell, 1997, 
p. 5). Although the degree to which this impacts on government officials also depends on 
their own economic assessment, officials are vulnerable to both implicit and explicit 
threats of capital strike. This section will explore the explicit threat of lost investment and 
jobs in the context of Kyoto ratification. At the time, the organised anti-Kyoto lobby 
dedicated significant time and capital to prevent ratification so it is an ideal example to 
assess this form of influence.  
In 2002, a coalition of business associations, including the Canadian Council of 
Chief Executives, the Canadian Federation of Independent Business, the Canadian 
160 
 
Manufacturers and Exporters, and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, sent a joint letter 
to the Prime Minister expressing concern about the potential economic impact of a ‘hasty 
decision’ to ratify for ‘Canada’s economy and standard of living’ (The National Post 
quoted in Harrison, 2007). The trade associations all quoted economic costs for 
compliance in the order of $40 − $50 billion CAD and warned of an exodus of jobs and 
capital. The Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters (CME) published, “Pain without 
Gain”, citing 450,000 lost jobs (2002). Alberta’s Premier, Hon. Ralph Klein, even quoted 
a trillion dollar loss at one stage (Anderson Personal Interview). As stated by one 
financial analyst, Diane Francis, ‘in order to meet the emissions cuts by 2010, one-third 
of our economy would have to be shut down or, alternatively, all our thermal power 
plants would have to be converted to nuclear plants at enormous cost’ (1999). Many 
interviewees including John Stone and Hon. David Anderson from Environment Canada 
argued that industry knew it was exaggerating the costs of compliance. Their goal was to 
prevent ratification, or at the very least, to garner more concessions from the government.  
The threat of job losses and disinvestment also fuelled the regional division of 
winners and losers in Canada. As is often described, ‘[r]egionalism is one of the accepted 
facts of Canadian political life’ (Henderson, 2004, p. 595). As seen in Chapter 4, 
Canada’s 13 provinces and territories have diverse social and economic profiles. The 
threat of capital strike created a challenge for the federal government to formulate 
common national policy as the provinces worried about protecting their economic 
interests.64 These disparities place fiscal equalisation (or sharing) high on Ottawa’s 
agenda (Simeon and Turgeon, 2006). For example, the Kyoto Protocol was viewed as an 
easy ride for the hydropower province of Québec. Alberta argued it was being unfairly 
penalised; and to a lesser extent Ontario with its manufacturing sector. Other interest 
groups such as ENGOs and FCM countered by emphasising the costs of inaction. The 
                                                
64 This same argument was used at the provincial level for threatening investment loss between the 
provinces as much as a competitive disadvantage between countries. 
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Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut are particularly vulnerable to climate change 
and the loss of livelihood. The municipalities also worried about the cost of inaction (as 
explained in Section 5.2.3) which filtered up to the provinces over time. 
Concerns about competitiveness and disinvestment gained greater currency when 
the United States formally withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in March, 2001 (Babiker et 
al., 2002, p. 195) and reached a climax in the lead up to ratification between June and 
December, 2002. The concerns over a comparative disadvantage with the United States 
alarmed many within Canada. As Michael Murphy, former Executive Vice-President of 
Policy at the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, explained, ‘the number one issue for us 
was competitiveness: Canada has taken on a target [and] the Americans, with whom we 
do 85% of our trade and other countries have no such targets’ (Personal Interview; 
Supported by Simpson, 2004). The trade associations stressed competitive disadvantage, 
which would ‘drive investment to other countries’ (CAPP et al., 2002; Hearn, 2002). 
However, this argument was tempered over time when some American states introduced 
their own targets to reduce GHG emissions, and a cross-border agreement was established 
in 2001 between the New England States and the eastern provinces (the NEG-ECP 
Climate Change Action Plan) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to the 1990 baseline by 
2010, and to -10% by 2020. This was followed by the 2003 agreement to establish a cap-
and-trade system between the US eastern states and New Brunswick, Ontario, and 
Québec. In 2007, the Midwest Governors' Accord, the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas 
Reduction Accord, and the Western Climate Initiative also provided promise that US 
states were pursuing a policy to reduce emissions. Although none of these initiatives were 
hugely successful, they did minimise the impression that Canada was acting alone. As 
John Stone of Environment Canada explained, ‘the only place in the US that [was] not 
moving along [was] the White House’ (Personal Interview); which mitigates the 
argument of competitive disadvantage. However, the US withdrawal from Kyoto also 
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allowed Chrétien to distinguish Canada from the United States (See Chapter 3). Although 
competitive disadvantage was a serious concern for many within government, it did not 
trump international reputation. 
 It was clear that the federal government under Chrétien was going to continue the 
policy course towards implementation, even if the country was 11% from her Kyoto 
target by 2002. Natural Resources Canada and other departments expressed concern about 
the economic costs of implementation; however, the Prime Minister did not appear to 
share their pessimism. The climate change file moved from NRCan to the Prime 
Minister’s office where they introduced a new plan that year to make up the country’s 
“Kyoto deficit”. Ottawa published her own economic assessments which showed minimal 
impact on the Canadian economy. For example, the government models cited a maximum 
impact of 0.5% of GDP related to future growth. ‘In other words, it is related to a 19.5% 
growth rate in the next eight or nine years as opposed to a 20% growth rate’ (Anderson 
Personal Interview). The letter to the CAPP described in the beginning of this chapter was 
also designed to relieve concerns over capital strike and job loss. The Prime Minister’s 
Office was given a mandate from the Prime Minister to ‘shut up the oil industry’ (Keith 
Stewart quoted in Macdonald, 2001). ‘Chrétien himself drew up a letter to the Canadian 
Association of Petroleum Producers’ outlining eight policy principles that would guide 
implementation and relieve some of industry’s concerns including: a) the promise that 
emission targets for new projects would be based on those for existing facilities that use 
similar technology; b) emission targets for new plants would be locked in for up to 10 
years to provide more economic certainty; c) research and development of carbon dioxide 
reduction technologies and favorable tax credits for reducing emissions; and most 
importantly, d) capping of the amount of carbon reductions to 15%, meaning industry’s 
target would only be 15% below business-as-usual by 2010 (Reuters, 2003).  
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In the years that followed, industry won major concessions with sector targets, a 
switch to intensity targets versus absolute targets, and a maximum price on carbon 
(Supported by Macdonald, 2008). They changed the metrics but failed in their overall 
objective against ratification or carbon pricing. The federal government demonstrated a 
strong desire to work with business (as seen in the NRTEE process and Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) negotiated between NRCan and industry sectors). However, they 
were also publicly willing to fight the inflammatory arguments by industry and ‘tough it 
out’ to wait for such economic arguments to dwindle with time (Anderson Personal 
Interview). As former leader of the Liberal Party, Hon. Stéphane Dion, and former Head 
of Environment Canada, Hon. David Anderson, explained, a consultative approach is 
important but it cannot simply become a race to the lowest common denominator 
(Personal Interviews). 
 Another reason the threat of disinvestment and job loss did not change the 
national policy direction was due to the labour unions successfully countering public 
claims from business of economic suicide. For example, the Canadian Auto Workers 
Union unanimously voted to support Kyoto just ahead of ratification in 2002 (Autos.ca, 
2002). Even the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada (CEP), 
who were the largest union representing workers in oil and gas, pulp and paper, and other 
heavy emission industries supported the Kyoto Protocol early on. As explained by Brian 
Kohler,  
‘Some of the industry in Canada tried to play the economic blackmail card and, 
of course, they always make reference to jobs when they do that because it 
sounds so much better than profits. Well, we made them look ridiculous [since] 
the largest union in the energy field says Canada should sign this. I think we 




In fact, the unions boycotted some consultation meetings when they felt corporate 
interests were too strong and aggressive. In the end, support from labour reinforced 
Ottawa’s position that Canada could afford Kyoto.  
The threat of capital strike did not prevent ratification; and in some ways, the 
strategy also backfired for industry (Ogilvie Personal Interview; Belfry, 2010). The trade 
associations who had predicted near bankruptcy if Canada ratified the Kyoto Protocol 
now faced concerns from their investors if such economic predictions proved to be true. 
While elected officials are mindful of economic voting (on the prominence of economic 
issues during elections and therefore business confidence, see Mitchell, 1997); so too are 
corporations attentive to the ideological preferences of shareholders and investor 
confidence. The Vancouver Sun reported that, ‘capital markets are abandoning companies 
in the industry because of confusion about the Kyoto Protocol’s implications for them’ 
(quoted in Simpson, 2004, p. 57). Kaija Belfry explained that institutional investors 
whose funding was required for the Alberta oil sands projects insisted industry negotiated 
with the government to create greater certainty on their returns (2010). ‘The multibillion-
dollar facilities required considerable external funding from [such] investors who were at 
the time refusing to provide capital without greater certainty over the future price of 
carbon’ (Confidential interview with government official in Belfry, 2010, p. 12). The $3.5 
billion CAD True North oil sands project in Forest Hill, Alberta was abandoned that year 
partly because of concern regarding the future price on carbon (CBC, 2003; Merolli, 
2003). ‘Other projects threatened to follow suit [and] the government of Alberta, was 
understandably livid’ (Confidential interview with government official in Belfry, 2010, p. 
12). Within months, the CAPP negotiated the $15 deal, announced straight after the 
House of Commons ratified the Kyoto Protocol. 
Although the federal government’s new 2002 climate change plan was a cautious 
approach to carbon pricing; it represented a departure from the voluntary initiatives which 
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had characterised federal policy up until that point. Industry had to reverse its position 
and accept both ratification and a price of carbon, albeit a low one, as well as 
downplaying the costs of implementation afterwards in a bid to relieve fears from both 
institutional investors and shareholders. As observed by Richard Ballhorn from Foreign 
Affairs Canada, ‘there is a whole history of business resisting environmental regulations 
for fear they could not make the changes − and then doing it for less’ afterwards 
(Personal Interview).65 As summarised by Murphy from the Canadian Association of 
Petroleum Producers, ‘it is no secret we fought pretty hard to forestall ratification. [It 
was] our main piece of work till 2002. But [Canada] went ahead and ratified it. Not sure 
how good a job we did’ (Personal Interview). 
 
5.6 Interests and Designing Canada’s Climate Change Policy 
Up until this point, the analysis has concentrated on how organised interest groups work 
to define the agenda and directly lobby government; but there is another more implicit 
form of influence: helping to design the very government policy they hope to influence. 
This is a challenging area to investigate and disentangle. It relies heavily on inside 
knowledge gathered through interviews, since official reports only show the final product, 
not the policy process itself. That said, it is a vital area of study since Canadian 
governments across all levels rely on the expertise of interest groups when formulating 
government policy, especially following periods of federal and provincial downsizing 
(See Chapter 4 Section 4.4.1). Organised interest groups are often invited to help design 
policy through formal consultations and consultancies or informal, professional working 
relationships. As Samson explained, Canada’s decentralised national policy system 
‘necessitates’ stakeholder participation on top of coordination from all levels of 
                                                
65 A similar reversal was seen after the Montreal Protocol, where industry cited huge economic costs and 
then transitioned with relatively low compliance cost. 
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government (2001, p. 199). It is also a focal point for disagreement between pluralist and 
business dominance theories since it hinges on the degree to which interest groups can 
shape the ideas of elected and unelected government officials (Mitchell, 1997). It is a 
channel of influence which is usually characterised by cooperative, rather than adversarial 
relationships between organised interest groups and government (Montpetit, 2009). Over 
time, as interest groups work closely with government departments, each relying on the 
other, interest groups can influence bureaucratic policy and culture. All the stakeholders 
outlined in this chapter lent the government their time and experience for the UNFCCC 
negotiations, NRTEE process, and in domestic policy formation, leading one to ask how 
and to what extent did this close relationship shape federal policy towards Kyoto’s 
implementation. This final section will examine how this channel of influence may have 
shaped the actions of the federal government, introducing ideas on epistemic 
communities, business dominance theory, and organisational behaviour. It discusses 
industry’s move from obstruction to adaptation, and especially their close relationship 
with Natural Resources Canada, and the consequences thereafter.  
The first time industry publicly accepted a price on carbon was with the 
agreement between CAPP, NRCan, and the Prime Minister’s deputy in the autumn of 
2002. Although they retreated slightly from this position soon afterwards (Belfry, 2010), 
from then on there was slow but steady acceptance from industry of carbon pricing 
policies as they moved into a lengthy period of consultation with the government in the 
next phase of Canadian climate change policy. Today, all Canadian trade associations 
publicly accept a carbon price, even though the Conservative government has appeared to 
abandon this position. The oil and gas sector showed a renewed eagerness to work with 
the federal and provincial governments that continues to the present day. In particular, the 
provinces quickened the pace of their climate change policy formulation once Kyoto’s 
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ratification was secured, which also led to greater collaboration with organised interest 
groups at the provincial level.  
 After ratification, the Prime Minister’s office stepped back, leaving Natural 
Resources Canada again in charge of the domestic policy formation. Both the federal 
Discussion Paper (May, 2002) and the Climate Change Plan for Canada (November, 
2002) showed a policy change whereby ‘companies would be allocated emission permits 
and required to hold a permit for each tonne of GHGs they emit’. Up until that point 
federal and provincial plans did not discuss how the total reduction effort and cost would 
be distributed amongst geographic regions and sectors or whether they would use 
coercive policy instruments such as tax or law (Macdonald, 2001). The new policy 
direction in 2002 laid the foundation for the Large Final Emitters (LFEs) Program in 
2005. The LFEs Program was, in essence, a cap-and-trade programme which started with 
the high carbon industries to be rolled out over many years. Between 2003 and 2004, 
NRCan undertook a lengthy process of negotiation with industry to establish the 
principles of the future trading system and a memorandum of understanding with the 
Forest Products Association, DuPont Chemicals, and the International Emissions Trading 
Association. However, ‘no policy ever made it past the proposal stage during this time’ 
(Belfry, 2001, p. 6). In 2005, the new Minister of Environment, Hon. Stéphane Dion, 
successfully pushed to have the domestic climate change file moved to Environment 
Canada. In fact, ‘the battle to get the plan was a hard fought one [but] Environment 
Canada won out’ (Ballhorn Personal Interview). Traditionally, climate change was split 
between EC and NRCan, with the former in charge of the international negotiations (in 
coordination with Foreign Affairs Canada) and the latter solely responsible for domestic 
implementation.66 When the file was moved over to EC, industry was left guessing. Those 
                                                
66 Confusion over the climate change file went back to 1997. Natural Resources Canada and Environment 
Canada fought ‘who did what to who’. This was part of the reason the Climate Change Secretariat was 
created to mediate this division (McBean Personal Interview). 
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that signed MoU agreements with NRCan wondered if they would still be honoured by 
Environment Canada (Personal Interviews with industry stakeholders). Under the helm of 
Environment Canada, carbon dioxide was added as a toxic substance to the Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act, paving the way for the future carbon pricing scheme. 
Environment Canada issued a notice for the LFE Program which included intensity 
targets, emissions trading, and a technology fund for partial compliance (Belfry, 2010). 
The programme was announced in 2005 and was scheduled to begin the following year. 
However, it was never actualised as the Liberal Party lost power in early 2006 and the 
newly elected Conservative Party dismissed the programme in the first year in office. 
The division of Canada’s national climate change policy between Natural 
Resources Canada and Environment Canada, along with the transfer between the two, 
created practical difficulties in policy formulation since Environment Canada had greater 
expertise in science and NRCan in energy and economics. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the federal government did not demonstrate strong capacity in policy formulation 
after a long period of government downsizing. However, the division of the climate file 
between NRCan and EC also created an unintended consequence unrelated strictly to the 
capacity of government, by pitting the two departments against one another. This is 
because each department represents different clientele (Ballhorn Personal Interview; 
Bennett Personal Interview; White Personal Interview; Bernstein, 2003, p. 92). 
Environment Canada had stronger ties with the scientific community and environmental 
groups, a point emphasised by notably “green” Ministers such as Hon. David Anderson 
and Hon. Stéphane Dion; whereas Natural Resources Canada had a closer relationship 
with industry and labour groups with Ministers such as Hon. Ralph Goodale and Hon. 
Herb Dhaliwal, who were critical of the Kyoto Protocol.67 In fact, the Natural Resources 
                                                
67 After COP3, Hon. Ralph Goodale spoke of resignation, although he would never act upon the threat 
(Simpson et al., 2007, p. 33). Hon. Herb Dhaliwal was recorded to be against Kyoto’s ratification in 2002 
(Bramley Personal Interview). 
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Minister was described as Chrétien’s ‘Alberta lieutenant and worked to protect the 
associated interests of that province and the oil industry’ (Macdonald, 2008, p. 225). This 
was compounded when other Ministries were called upon − each bringing their own 
expertise, bureaucratic culture, and interest base which were sometimes in opposition 
with Kyoto’s implementation. As explained by Allison and Zelikow, ‘[s]eparate 
responsibilities laid on the shoulders of distinct individuals [and departments] encourages 
differences in what each sees and judges to be important’ (1999, p. 256). 
These differences in bureaucratic clientele and departmental responsibilities were 
often at odds with one another. The fighting between NRCan and EC is well-documented 
in the press and in interviews. One unnamed scientist within EC spoke of how personnel 
do not readily change Ministries in their careers, and if they do, may not be able to 
integrate successfully. Government officials become ‘branded’ as either EC or NRCan 
(Personal Interviews). Members of both the Conservative and Liberal parties interviewed 
for this research described this conflict between the Ministries as a major obstacle for 
climate change policy. Former Minister of Environment, Hon. Stéphane Dion, went 
further to say that if he had won the election he would have done away with the old 
dichotomy and ‘games’ between the Ministries; especially between the Ministries of 
Finance, EC, and NRCan. They would have had ‘to work together for once’ (Dion 
Personal Interview). Another former Minister under the Conservative government 
unequivocally admitted that the greatest obstacle to climate change policy in Canada was 
the Ministries themselves (anonymous Personal Interview). This is confirmed by Glen 
Toner who explained ‘the federal government is often at war with itself 
interdepartmentally on major sustainable development issues’ (2002). The Commissioner 
of the Environment and Sustainable Development (CESD) also identified ‘the lack of 
horizontal coordination and integration across federal departments as one of the major 
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constraints hobbling the federal government's performance’ (CESD, 1997 in Toner, 2002, 
p. 72).  
This rift between the Ministries, and especially NRCan and EC, can be traced to 
their difficult bureaucratic cultures and competing interest bases. As mentioned, NRCan 
has stronger ties with industry groups and many industry programmes, such as the 
Canadian Industry Program for Energy Conservation (CIPEC), which are run out of the 
NRCan offices in Alberta (Murphy Personal Interview). As former UNFCCC negotiator, 
Richard Ballhorn, explained, ‘NRCan was defending their clientele which tends to be the 
energy sector’; and ‘they seem to really have lost interest in many ways on the details of 
the implementation strategy’ (Personal Interview). It was suggested by Rodney White, 
Director of the Institute of Environmental Studies, that one of the reasons NRCan was 
made the lead agency for implementing Kyoto was because of their stronger expertise in 
energy policy and close relationship with business. However, this led to policy inertia, as 
NRCan failed to champion the Kyoto agenda. The underlying objective of NRCan is to 
enhance the natural resources sector’s contribution to the country’s economy; and as 
such, the department cannot endorse policies that would knowingly hurt the economy. As 
John Bennett explained, ‘NRCan is in charge of reducing emissions but their mandate 
also holds them responsible for building energy [and] to exploit natural resources68: it is 
like telling it to stand on its head and work backwards’ (Personal Interview).69 NRCan 
staff did not work on the assumption that Kyoto’s ratification was inevitable especially 
after the US withdrawal (Hengeveld Personal Interview); and yet they were the 
department in charge of Kyoto’s implementation between 1998 and 2004. It was even 
suggested that policy advisors at NRCan colluded with the anti-Kyoto lobby to 
‘selectively leak’ unfavourable economic models of Kyoto implementation to prevent 
                                                
68 For example, NRCan has approved every oil sands project that has been submitted. 
69 It was also reported that the staff at NRCan responsible for climate change do not get as much time with 
the Minister, further indicating it is not a priority issue. 
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ratification (Bramley Personal Interview). Afterwards, the department favoured voluntary 
approaches such as the Voluntary Climate Change Registry Program over a legally 
binding emissions trading scheme. As summarised by Glen Toner, ‘the fossil-fuel sector, 
the government of Alberta, and NRCan formed a formidable juggernaut against 
regulating economic activities to achieve reductions in greenhouse gases. They have been 
successful in promoting a National Action Plan on Climate Change that consists primarily 
of a voluntary challenge and registry (VCR) initiative’ (2002, p. 100).  
On the other side, Environment Canada cultivated a strong relationship with the 
scientific community and ENGOs. Unsurprisingly, Environment Canada ‘share[s] a much 
greater sense of urgency and question[s] the effectiveness of voluntary initiatives to fully 
meet the targets’ (Toner, 2002, p. 101; Supported by Bennett Personal Interview; 
Anderson Personal Interview). Government officials at Environment Canada assumed 
ratification of Kyoto; and it was Hon. David Anderson (and later Hon. Stéphane Dion) 
who worked with the international community and Canadian ENGOs to push for 
ratification and more robust mitigation policies.  
This closeness between government departments and interest groups is mutually 
beneficial, and there is no reason to assume that this channel of influence is detrimental to 
policy formation in and of itself. Government gains knowledge and expertise whilst 
interest groups gain access and influence. However, the problem lies when government 
must rely on the expertise of the group it seeks to regulate, and moreover, when there are 
bureaucratic divisions within government that interest groups can exacerbate and exploit. 
When this happens, organised interest groups are able to constrain the actions of 
government through this level of access and influence. Interest groups can expose 
structural weaknesses in government, which for our purposes intersects between the 
structural and pluralist analysis of this chapter and Chapter 4. Unlike issues of health or 
education, federal environmental policy in Canada is divided between two departments, 
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namely Environment Canada and Natural Resources Canada. Both departments have 
evolved to represent different clientele and competing mandates. In essence, they have 
come to represent different epistemic communities, and this division proved just as 




The role of interest groups in climate change policy is well documented. However, the 
pressure they wield is specific to each country where influence is channelled or expressed 
depending on the political system and national context at the time. In the case of the 
Kyoto Protocol, the scientific community and ENGOs first championed and largely 
framed the climate change issue – tapping into the public’s strong sense of 
environmentalism and multilateralism which was echoed by the federal government. The 
vocal opposition within industry failed to steer the agenda or scare the public and 
government over the economic costs. This was surprising because Canadian greenhouse 
gas emissions rose steadily between the signing and ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, 
with growth in oil and gas bringing large investment into the country. However, the anti-
Kyoto camp was undermined by labour unions and failed to convince key government 
decision-makers that the Protocol would bankrupt the country. Where industry 
demonstrated the greatest influence for a time was dominating the NRTEE consultations, 
which published reports recommending intensity targets over absolute GHG emission 
targets and a regulatory framework in line with American states − all key policy points 
supported by industry’s recommendations (Supported by Coward and Weaver, 2004; 
Macdonald, 2008). The evidence also suggests that industry was able to steer NRCan 
away from ambitious mitigation policies. Anti-Kyoto industry groups were able to 
obstruct and slow federal policy formation and won important concessions in the process; 
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however, they failed in their overall policy objective to prevent ratification and carbon 
pricing. 
One possible reason for industry’s failure despite their formidable resources and 
close professional relationship with NRCan can be seen in the work of David Vogel 
(2005) and Neil Mitchell (1997). There is a ‘cyclical pattern in business policy influence’ 
(Mitchell, 1997, p. 20). David Vogel examined environmental health and safety, energy, 
and tax policy in the United States and found that industry’s influence was cyclical 
depending on the strength of the economy. Of course, the influence of business is 
expressed differently in Canada; however, it is possible that ‘good economic performance 
decreases business political power, as the public raises their expectations about what 
business can afford’ (Mitchell, 1997, p. 20). Conversely, poor economic performance 
harms public confidence in industry leaders, which in turn affects public perception and 
corporate agenda-setting. Economic downturns may also impact other organised interest 
groups such as labour unions and non-profit organisations, further complicating the 
picture.  
The other possible explanation for industry’s failed bid to block the Kyoto 
Protocol was because their message lay in sharp contrast to Prime Minister Chrétien and 
the Minister of Environment, who both sought to ratify the Protocol. Although many 
within the federal government opposed Kyoto’s ratification in 2002, Chrétien pushed it 
through undaunted by industry opposition or even the reservations of his Cabinet. After 
the Liberal Party lost in 2006, industry found a strong ally in Stephen Harper. Although 
public support has remained constant for the Kyoto Protocol, the Conservative 
government dismantled the LFEs Program in 2006 and formally withdrew from the 
Protocol in 2011. The 2008 global economic downturn and Harper’s political ideology 
have since strengthened the oil and gas lobby within Canada. Threats of capital strike 
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carry much more weight and green groups, in particular, have been side-lined and have 
been demonised as terrorists in some instances (McCarthy, 2012).   
The power of industry to buy votes or threaten the government with capital strike 
and job loss is a powerful channel of influence. However, under the Liberal Party, 
bureaucratic fighting between NRCan and EC did more to hamper Ottawa’s Kyoto 
ambitions than direct lobbying from the oil and gas sector. These two departments not 
only represented different clientele, but different sets of expertise in economic versus 
scientific analysis, and politically powerful epistemic communities. At a fundamental 
level, one can infer that the two departments also conceived the problem of climate 
change policy in very different ways. Literature on organisational culture and epistemic 
communities reveals how vested interest groups can change the pattern of learning which 
will frame ‘how states identify their interests and recognise the latitude for state action’ 
(Hass, 1992, p. 2). The rift between NRCan and EC may also go a long way to explain the 
schizophrenic nature of federal climate change policy, especially when viewed in 





Chapter 6  Conclusion 
In December 2011, Canada became the first and only country to withdraw from the Kyoto 
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It 
is unusual for a country to withdraw from a ratified international agreement, and shocking 
for one who was one of the original flag-bearers. As explained by Josh Roberts, an 
environmental lawyer, ‘[c]ountries can trigger these release clauses, but it happens very 
rarely. For example, Norway and Iceland left the International Whaling Commission's 
treaty, but such moves are rare’ (Quoted in Vaughan, 2011). Nonetheless, this is what 
Canada unceremoniously did. Canada’s Minister of Environment, Hon. Peter Kent, 
referred to the country’s formal withdrawal as an ‘early Christmas present to myself and 
to Canada’ (Speech, 2012). These remarks represent a different approach and regard for 
international agreements than witnessed under the previous government; and it is 
common to see the response of the Conservatives to Kyoto as marking a complete 
reversal in Canada’s climate change policy. Indeed, this is an image that suits both the left 
and right alike, but how real is it?  
When the Conservatives assumed power in 2006, the Party began dismantling the 
federal climate change programme and it currently has no explicit climate-energy policy 
to reduce GHG emissions (Supported by Macdonald, 2008). In 2013, a report ranked 
‘Canada 55th of 58 countries in terms of tackling greenhouse gas emissions, ahead of 
only Iran, Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia’ (The Canadian Press, online). Although the 
federal government has publicly agreed to a new target for GHG emissions reductions at 
17% below 2005 levels by 2020 (under the Copenhagen Accord), it has also declared 
itself ‘an emerging energy superpower’ (Prime Minister Harper quoted in Leslie, 2014) 
and has refused to introduce any climate change programmes that would distract from the 
burgeoning oil sands development in the Prairies, or wider economic ambitions.  
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It would be tempting to put the country’s tarred environmental image entirely on 
Conservative shoulders. However, putting aside the hostile rhetoric, they represent more 
of a continuation than a radical break in climate change policy. It is highly unlikely a 
meaningful climate change programme will be initiated under the current Prime Minister. 
Indeed, industry leaders back in 2008 did not believe Harper would act on a promised 
cap-and-trade system and there is no indication that they bet wrong. And yet, greenhouse 
gas emissions rose to more than 29% above the country’s Kyoto target under the Liberal 
government.70 Even if the 2015 election ushers in a new, more supportive Party, they will 
encounter the same problems as Jean Chrétien. A strong mandate from the top is only the 
first step in a country whose regional energy divisions have only grown since 2006. 
 This thesis sought to understand why and how the federal Canadian government 
shifted from being an international leader to a laggard in the Kyoto Protocol − a trend that 
began under the Liberals and has accelerated under the Conservative Party. In doing so, I 
tested some of the major assumptions surrounding both Canada’s involvement in the 
Kyoto Protocol and failed implementations; in the hope to understand climate change 
politics in Canada, the motivations and rationales behind the actions of the federal 
government, and the constraints upon their ambitions. This conclusion will summarise the 
findings and empirical contributions of this thesis organised by Chapter. I will then offer 
my academic, conceptual contributions on what this thesis might mean in terms of the 
state and the actions of government, balancing the lessons learned from and about the 
three broad theoretical perspectives. The chapter will then step back and address the 
wider implications in terms of climate change politics in Canada, before concluding with 
final thoughts.  
                                                
70 Rise in GHG emissions between 1990-2006. Since then emissions have reduced owing more to the global 
economic downturn in 2008 than any federal or provincial policy. 
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6.1 Summary of Findings and Empirical Contributions 
As outlined in the Introduction Chapter, this thesis was framed in a systematic way by 
three over-arching research questions, which encompassed different theoretical 
perspectives for explaining the puzzle of Canada’s transition from international leader on 
climate to laggard. Each question sought to test distinct theoretical approaches for 
understanding “the state” and explaining the actions of government: moving from a 
rational actor model where the Canadian government is framed as a personified actor 
under Chrétien; to a pluralist (or ‘government politics model’ in Allison and Zelikow, 
1971) definition where the federal government is neither assumed to be unified nor to be 
the most powerful actor in the political system. The analysis also moved progressively 
from the international to the domestic level analysis. This was important since the politics 
of climate change, and especially the UNFCCC negotiations, are most often studied at the 
international level. What this thesis has shown is that the domestic actors and internal 
bargaining processes were as important, if not more so, for understanding the actions and 
inactions of the federal Canadian government.   
During early, exploratory research, two main explanations were proposed time 
and time again by informants as to why the Government of Canada was eager to sign the 
Kyoto Protocol. The first was strategic interest in enhancing Canada’s international 
reputation, or more cynically to appear “greener” than the Americans. Then there were 
those that cited Canada’s innate support for environmental stewardship and 
multilateralism amongst the public and decision-makers. Both norms entrenched in 
Canada’s national psyche also make the country’s inaction on climate change so 
surprising and frustrating for pundits and academics alike. The next step was to test these 
different interpretations (Research Question 1): to ask how and why did international 
norms and strategic interests align and motivate the Government of Canada’s early 
support for the Kyoto Protocol? Chapter 3 used the theories of neorealism and social 
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constructivism to understand the motivations behind Canada’s foreign policy decisions. 
They represent two competing views of norms and foreign policy; and also epitomise 
different paradigms of the state and decision-making in foreign affairs, especially as 
constructed by them. It was particularly useful to note the language employed by 
Canadian delegates and Ministers, who tended to frame their answers in either 
geopolitical, strategic terms or by evoking moral language. Moreover, Canada’s original 
position at COP3 was mandated with relatively little analysis of the costs and 
implications of different policy actions. For this reason, it was a fascinating case study to 
explore the principal motivating factors for the government in the absence of significant 
analysis. The evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated how the targets under discussion 
were largely plucked from the sky, which made the Kyoto Protocol a case study more in 
political optics than has been witnessed in other international agreements such as trade.  
 Chapter 3 showed that a traditional neorealist, geopolitical understanding provides 
only a partial explanation for Canada’s foreign policy decision to sign and ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol. Social constructivism expands the neorealist approach to include the 
perceptions and beliefs of key decision-makers into the analysis; in this case, the view of 
Prime Minister Jean Chrétien as well as his Ministers. Rather than sitting in opposition to 
each other, as is sometimes seen in international agreements (e.g. NAFTA), Canada’s 
strategic interests and her norms of environmental stewardship and multilateralism were 
aligned in the case of the Kyoto negotiations, and both contributed to Chrétien’s eager 
support. Canada had a guiding hand in the creation of the UNFCCC, and at one time even 
proposed a more ambitious Law of the Atmosphere. The Kyoto Protocol adhered to 
Chrétien’s long-standing support for multilateralism and global governance, and the 
specific target was mandated to keep in step with Europe, Japan, and principally the 
United States: for Canada to do its part and be a good boy scout. 
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 When the United States withdrew from Kyoto, Chrétien was presented with an 
opportunity to differentiate the country from her southern neighbour. Canada also won 
concessions that recognised the country’s large carbon sinks and that reduced her target 
by roughly one-third. Thus, Canada was able to surpass the United States with effectively 
a lower commitment. The problem, however, was that throughout this time period the 
provinces repeatedly had been sidelined. In the next phase of Canada’s implementation, 
regionalism and political battles between Ottawa and the provinces stalled the federal 
government’s ambitions. The social constructivist approach within International Relations 
provides robust explanatory power to understand Canada’s motivation and rationale for 
joining the Kyoto Protocol and the country’s commitment target. However, it positions 
the federal Government of Canada at the top of the totem pole and still adheres to a 
rational actor model (albeit one constrained by the beliefs and perceptions of its decision-
makers).  
The international level analysis also provided a strong understanding of why 
Canada was an eager participant in the Kyoto Protocol; however, Canada’s attempts at 
implementation were shaped more by the structure of the state combined with regional 
divisions both of which undermined Chrétien’s aspirations to play a positive role in the 
international climate change regime. The second part of this thesis, Chapter 4, took its cue 
from Robert Putnam’s metaphor of “two-level” diplomacy to investigate (Research 
Question 2) the limits on unilateral federal action and how provincial demands and 
federal-provincial coordination processes shape climate change policies in Canada.  
In the case of Kyoto, Chrétien’s majority federal government held sole power to 
accede the Protocol, but limited powers to implement without the provinces. This is 
because the provinces hold greater powers over energy and environmental policy, and 
multiple veto points in the federalist system mean that a small number of provinces can 
hold up agreement on matters of national importance, if they so choose. Issues such as 
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universal health care, education, and the environment require careful harmonisation 
between both tiers of government. This kind of consultation and coordination is a 
hallmark of Canadian federalism, but when it breaks down, the federal government has 
few options to act unilaterally. The National Energy Program is a case in point; and 
offered a cautionary tale for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, especially the 
pursuit of a carbon tax. In fact, these regional divisions in Canada may be more potent 
than ever with redistribution of wealth and population moving away from the east and to 
the west in recent years. 
The provinces are naturally guarded against federal intrusion; however, it is the 
ability of energy policy to rekindle regional divisions that made the Kyoto Protocol 
political TNT.  Despite Chrétien’s assurances that Alberta and Saskatchewan would not 
be unfairly penalised, it was clear these provinces would pay a higher price for Canada’s 
compliance. The implementation of the Kyoto Protocol was further hampered by the 
diminished capacity of both the provinces and Ottawa to study and formulate policy. By 
the time of ratification, only two out of 10 provinces had produced climate change plans 
of their own, and the first provincial legislation was not introduced until 2003 (six years 
after Kyoto). As the provinces saw it, they had little reason to dedicate resources to 
implementation while the Protocol’s ratification remained undecided. Although this delay 
may have strengthened Canada’s position in the UNFCCC negotiations and given the 
country much needed time for policy formulation, it also had the unintended consequence 
of disincentivising action from the provinces until it was secured. The five-year delay also 
spurred the anti-Kyoto lobby in Canada who joined with the Premier of Alberta and 
Natural Resources Canada to form a ‘formidable juggernaut’ to block Kyoto at every turn 
(Toner, 2002, p. 100).  
In the end, Ottawa failed to garner the necessary support from the provinces, 
hampered by ineffective coordination processes and weak capacity. The rationale behind 
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the National Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy may have made it logical 
to consult and analyse the country’s various policy options (although at times it did 
appear to represent only the lowest common denominator). However, NRTEE could not 
take the place of formal negotiations between Ottawa and the provinces, especially over 
how reductions and the costs of meeting them might be shared amongst the different 
regions of Canada. The federal government attempted to rally support, but instead was 
left squabbling with the provinces with weak capacity and no power to impose agreement. 
Now domestic climate change policy has been turned on its head. There is a proliferation 
of provincial climate change plans with no leadership from Ottawa. These policies range 
in size, scope, and ambition, and sit like ornamental china figurines on a shelf with no 
clear arrangement or coordination amongst them. 
The last piece of the puzzle resides with interest groups in the Canadian climate 
change debate. Chapter 5 asked (Research Question 3): how, why, and with what wider 
effects did organised interest groups shape Canada’s response to the Kyoto Protocol? The 
previous chapters examined the regional economic divisions within Canada, but 
organised interest groups entered the analysis only as brief cameos. In Chapter 5, they 
take centre stage with the federal government demoted to one actor amongst many, 
consigned to battle with powerful interest groups as they vie to dominate the political 
agenda and shape climate change policy. This pluralist approach views the actions of 
federal government not through the lens of a unified, rational actor; but more as the 
reaction and consequence of political battles with external actors, and even battles within 
itself − what Allison and Zelikow refer to as the ‘governmental politics model’ (1999). 
 This final stage of the thesis tested the assumption that Canada’s inaction in Kyoto 
was largely due to powerful industry groups. Some business coalitions certainly drew 
attention to themselves with aggressive public campaigns against the Kyoto Protocol. Yet 
their outward campaign failed to block ratification. This thesis found that industry as a 
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subset are heterogeneous by nature, but as a group have hindered implementation and 
possibly encouraged withdrawal. The anti-Kyoto coalition was not as all-powerful as it 
wished itself to be, and many within the business community did not view climate policy 
as particularly onerous. In many ways, industry as a stakeholder group is a moving target 
for academic study. It is in constant state of flux with respect to diverse interests and 
objectives on climate change policy; yet many pursued a tactic of adaptation and 
cooperation with the federal government, rather than obstruction. Even some of the large 
oil corporations saw rent-seeking opportunities and reputational benefit with modest 
regulation. 
In Chapter 5, I employed a pluralist view of the state and interest groups. I ring-
fenced the principal stakeholders in the domestic Kyoto debate to examine how and with 
what influence they were able to shape the actions of the federal government under four 
categories of influence. In sharp contrast to the United States, campaign finance is not a 
potent form of influence within Canada owing to the country’s strict regulations for 
donation and sponsorship, strong party discipline, and erratic election cycles. However, in 
terms of setting and dominating the agenda, interest groups as a whole showed a high 
degree of influence, especially when different groups worked in concert to refute climate 
denialism along with anti-Kyoto campaigns spearheaded by the Alberta Premier and 
vocal members of the oil and gas sector. Here we also see interest groups switching 
allegiances, coordinating their messages with the federal government in some instances 
and fighting Ottawa in others. In the third channel of influence, the powerful trade 
associations attempted to scare the public and decision-makers with the prospect of 
capital flight from Canada and significant losses in jobs and the economy. This channel of 
influence received a significant amount of media attention, and can be viewed as a partial 
success for industry. They won important concessions from the government but failed in 
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their overall objective to block Kyoto’s ratification and a carbon price. They won the 
battle but lost the war.  
The final channel of influence was the most challenging area to study but one that 
is too often overlooked: the influence that comes with working closely with government 
departments in policy formation. Here we find that vested interest groups were able to 
exacerbate the bureaucratic rift between Natural Resources Canada and Environment 
Canada, and for a time, prevent stricter regulations when NRCan was in charge of 
domestic implementation. Although it was not the only factor hindering Canada’s 
implementation, it was an instructive case of the close relationship between business and 
regulator, with relevance not just for climate change policy but environmental regulation 
in general and issues such as finance. 
 
6.2 Conceptual Contribution 
It was Karl Popper who wrote, ‘[w]henever a theory appears to you as the only possible 
one, take this as a sign that you have neither understood the theory nor the problem which 
it was intended to solve’ (1979). It was not the aim of this thesis to prove or disprove one 
theory over another. All of the theoretical perspectives used in this analysis have their 
strengths and weaknesses owing to their distinct framing of the state and policymaking. 
However, collectively, they offer a more comprehensive analysis of climate change 
politics in Canada and greater explanatory power for the actions of government. Although 
these three broad perspectives cannot be merged, it is also important to note there is a 
high degree of cross-pollination between them as they are further refined through new 
academic analysis.  
 One important point of difference between these three broad approaches is how 
they define “the state”, in our case, the federal Government of Canada. Within IR, the 
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state is conventionally treated as a rational and purposeful actor who is value-maximising. 
This conceptualisation of the state is prevalent today and adheres to a geopolitical view of 
states and global politics found in the broadsheets and Conference rooms in equal 
measure. Thus, the federal government, under the helm of Jean Chrétien, is viewed as 
acting under a consistent foreign policy that supported both multilateral cooperation and 
environmental stewardship. Such international norms translated to Canada’s national 
identity at that time. Strategic interests were also important, especially the political optics 
of Canada’s foreign policy in comparison to the United States. The Kyoto targets were 
bartered between countries like playing cards, and held little correlation to scientific or 
economic analysis. This is significant since IR traditionally views the decisions of 
government as a cost-benefit analysis, where objectives are weighed against possible, 
future consequences. This thesis revealed how the Government of Canada changed its 
negotiation mandate from stabilisation to -3% and again to -6% based more on moral and 
reputational considerations with little understanding of what exactly they were signing up 
to. 
 In the second stage of the analysis, the rational actor model is expanded to 
examine the structure of the Canadian federalist system, how power is distributed 
between the two tiers of government, and the multiple veto points found within. The 
federal government is still treated as a rational actor who again is value-maximising, but 
unlike the chaos of the international system, domestic politics are dictated by the capacity 
of the government and division of powers laid out in the constitution. The federal 
government has limited powers to act unilaterally without the provinces; and few 
politically attractive options to implement Kyoto. 
 In contrast, pluralism views “the state” as one actor amongst many in society, 
whose heterogeneous nature makes the rational actor model largely meaningless. The 
Government of Canada is not a monolithic entity, and as such, the actions of government 
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are viewed more as responses or outputs of micro-political battles both within the federal 
government and between the government and external actors. Pluralism also explores the 
role of ideas and social learning (through epistemic communities), but unlike social 
constructivism, the analysis is not channelled through a personified state. Pluralism is 
ideal for exploring the schizophrenic behaviour of the Canadian government with respect 
to the Kyoto Protocol, by focusing on the informal constraints on government, in addition 
to the legal constraints dictated in the constitution.  
It is impossible to reconcile pluralism and the rational actor model. To draw a 
comparison with physics, they are as different as quantum mechanics and general 
relativity. Yet one without the other would yield an incomplete understanding of the 
actions of government. That said, there may be one helpful heuristic model for 
conceptualising these three broad perspectives, stemming from Simon’s notion of 
“bounded rationality” (1985). Despite their different treatments of the “the state”, as 
either a rational, purposeful actor or heterogeneous organisation; they all wrestle with a 
fundamental question: are the actions of government the result of intent or consequence? 
Policymaking stems from both the objectives of actors in the system and the constraints 
upon their ambitions. There may be a period where the actions of government appear to 
be dominated more by intent or consequence, but both dictate actions and the final result. 
 
6.3 Wider Implications 
There is one final unanswered question posed at the beginning of this thesis: what lessons 
can we learn about Canada’s participation in the Kyoto Protocol, for both the country and 
other federalist states? The first important lesson is that identity matters but context 
matters more. Countries within the EU, for example, did not achieve their Kyoto targets 
because they are necessarily greener than Canada. Canada’s national identity is the 
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environment and there was a time when she held as much ownership as Europe in the 
emerging international climate change regime. The Canadian case-study demonstrates the 
barriers to climate change policy for federalist countries, and also highlights factors 
unique to Canada. The most important of which is the structure of the Canadian federalist 
state. Ottawa has limited powers to introduce climate-energy policy – far fewer than 
unitary states such as the United Kingdom and France.  
Federalist countries require greater bargaining and coordination between different 
levels of government, with federal governments often consigned with limited 
constitutional powers. This tug-of-war between tiers of government can become frayed by 
historic, regional political divisions and/or powerful interest groups. In the United States, 
industry groups are formidable owing to limited restrictions on campaign finance and 
greater doubt over the science of climate change both amongst the public and policy-
makers alike. As one chief US negotiator remarked, anti-Kyoto groups do not need to 
disprove climate change, they just need to ‘muddy the waters’ (Personal Interview). This 
uncertainty combined with strong electoral disincentives means that the anti-Kyoto lobby 
was politically stronger in the United States than in Canada, especially since the US 
Congress holds less power than parliamentary democracies to exercise party discipline. 
As Kathryn Harrison observed, 
‘US climate legislation requires approval by three distinct actors: the 
House, the Senate, and the president, each acting independently […]. 
Indeed, filibuster rules and the threat of a presidential veto mean that 
supermajorities may be required in one or both houses of Congress. This 
means that advocates of policy change need to build a broader coalition 
than do interests who seek to block change.’ (in Harrison and Sundstrom, 
2010, p. 76). 
After the creation of the Kyoto Protocol, both Chrétien and Clinton had limited powers to 
implement Kyoto but for different reasons. In the US, Clinton’s hands were essentially 
tied with the Byrd-Hagel resolution preventing ratification; whereas Chrétien pushed 
through ratification but wielded few policy levers to implement without the provinces on 
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side. The result was that in both countries climate change policy has been more successful 
at the state/provincial level and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future.  
One can also reflect on similarities and differences with other federalist countries. 
For example, there are many common features between Germany and Canada. Germany 
has been able to achieve greater reductions in GHG emissions not least since 
reunification. However, both countries fractured their climate change file across different 
Ministries. In Germany, the file is principally shared between the Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature Protection and Nuclear Safety (BMU) and the Ministry of 
Economics and Technology (BMWi) (Michaelowa, 2008). The competing mandates and 
bureaucratic fighting between Canada’s EC and NRCan are echoed between BMU and 
BMWi. Germany has also struggled to introduce strict energy efficiency mandates and to 
implement a credit trading system. The BMWi tried to weaken the EU ETS similar to 
NRCan’s obstruction to carbon pricing and the LFE Programme. Fortunately the credit 
trading system in Germany improved through domestic pressure of German ENGOs and 
the Green Party, and international pressure through the European Union. Where Germany 
has shown greater leadership is through championing renewable energy to achieve a 
competitive advantage in new energy technologies (especially with the phasing out of 
nuclear energy by 2022), rent-seeking opportunities for industry, and a strong coalition 
between ENGOs, trade unions, and farmer associations who benefit from land deals and 
job creation (Michaelowa, 2005).  
The comparison between Canada and Australia is also interesting since both have 
been branded laggards throughout the Kyoto Protocol negotiations. Despite general 
public support, Australia resisted the Protocol with an economy highly dependent on coal 
exports. The government also aggressively fought for landuse concessions under the 
Kyoto Protocol (the so-called Australia clause), reducing her commitment by roughly 30 
percent similar to Canada. Scholars have cited an uncomfortably close relationship 
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between industry and government, which it has ‘criticized for blurring government-
industry boundaries in the drafting and managing of policy, the funding of research into 
the cost of abatement, and the inclusion of industry on international government 
delegations’ (Crowley, 2010, p. 208). The Australian federal government did manage to 
introduce a carbon tax for two years. Similar to the 2008 Canadian federal election, the 
carbon tax in Australia became a highly divisive issue. However, the most important 
difference between Australian and Canadian federalism is that the Australian constitution 
does not allocate specific powers to each federal and state government, and thus Canberra 
can impose policy on the states.  
Overall, the Canadian federalist system closely resembles the European Union. 
Similar to federalist countries, there are multiple veto points in the EU system and 
numerous lobbying channels for anti-Kyoto groups. Furthermore, the constitutional rules 
governing the EU system maintain core powers of its member states just as the British 
North America Act protects provincial authority in key areas. For example, the EU was 
never able to achieve a carbon tax since taxation and energy policy require unanimity in 
the Council of Ministers and not a majority vote as seen in other policy areas.71 Where the 
EU was able to demonstrate significant progress, most notably through the EU ETS, was 
through coalition building and ‘competitive leadership’ where countries holding the EU 
presidency sought to out-compete their predecessors, strengthened further by the push for 
greater EU integration overall (Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2010). Similar to the ‘the 
California effect’ in the United States where US states compete to keep up with 
innovation in California, European countries sought to match or surpass one another in 
climate change policy.  
                                                
71 Tax policy is one of three areas where unanimity is required in EU Council of Ministers, the others being 
land-use planning (with some exceptions) and choice over the strategic direction of energy systems.   
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Unlike the federal Canadian government, the EU recognised it did not have the 
authority to plough ahead of the individual national governments. The treaty-based 
negotiations to share the burden amongst the 15 EU countries were necessary to meet 
their Kyoto commitments, and these formal negotiations were a necessary ingredient 
missing in Canada during the federal-provincial consultations.  
Moving forward, there are several important lessons that can be drawn from this 
thesis for Canada alone. The Conservative Party came into power in 2006 and much has 
been written about the change in style and approach under Stephen Harper, especially 
Canada’s foreign policy (Smith, 2012; Ibbitson, 2014).  Harper cut his teeth as a founding 
member of the right-wing Reform Party based in Alberta, and his political ascent parallels 
the rise of the region. Where once Ontario and Québec dominated, the policy centre in the 
country has migrated west and action on climate change appears more remote than ever. 
Yet, as this thesis has demonstrated, the foreign policy ambitions of the Prime Minister 
form only the first line in the story. Chrétien’s enthusiasm for Kyoto, however vital to get 
ink to paper, did not render effective domestic climate change policy in the long run or 
reductions in the country’s growing GHG emissions. In fact, the only substantial 
decreases in emissions are a byproduct of the 2008 economic downturn. The most 
significant factors for Canada’s inaction on Kyoto, and any future international 
commitment, lies with the domestic context, not foreign policy ambitions. A change in 
leadership does not equal a change in result. 
 Since Canada ratified the Kyoto Protocol, the provinces have formulated their 
own climate change plans with varying degrees of success (See Holmes, 2012; NRTEE, 
2012). At this point in time, both a national carbon tax and cap-and-trade system would 
be viewed by voters as a duplication of effort (Dion Personal Interview); and a legal 
challenge from the provinces would stand a greater chance of success for the same 
reason. What was missing under the Liberal Party, and what continues to be lacking, are 
190 
 
formal coordination mechanisms between all the provinces and Ottawa: for the federal 
government to act as an honest broker between the provinces, just as she seeks to do in 
the global system. The tug-of-war between the federal and provincial governments, and 
regional undercurrents which flow beneath most national debates, are a fact of Canadian 
political life. As much as Chrétien sought to go it alone on Kyoto, his policy options were 
severely limited.  
Thus, since Canada’s domestic implementation of the Kyoto Protocol resembles a 
two-level game similar to the European Union, it has been proposed that the federal 
government embrace that model with formal, codified negotiations seeking specific 
emission targets for each province and territory (See Macdonald, 2008). Chrétien 
abandoned such federal-provincial negotiations largely due to Alberta’s obstructionist 
tactics. But the provinces have since accepted emissions reductions; at least in principle, 
and with growing pressure from the territories, municipalities, trade unions, and ENGOs, 
there is scope to bring everyone around the table once again. 
 Perhaps the most promising ballast to Canada’s entrenched regional economic and 
political divisions is the growing public awareness of the regional impacts of climate 
change (Supported by Harrison, 2010). The costs incurred by more extreme droughts in 
the Prairies, the zebra mussel invasion of the Great Lakes and the pine beetle decimation 
of the soft timber industry of British Columbia, are but a few examples.  
In fact, ‘[o]ne former government official involved in the negotiations over 
softwood lumber tariffs [between the US and Canada] mentioned the possibility 
that the agreement reached in 2006, which was certainly not in tune with the 
Canadian government’s initial demands, was provoked at least partly by the pine 
beetle – or, rather, the urgent need to clear forests before infestation and, as a 
result, the need to resume large-scale exports’ (Stoett, 2009, p. 342).  
The public debate and the role of interest groups will evolve as the risks of climate 
change become more apparent and urgent for the provinces and federal government alike. 
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Most likely, the Courts will also be used by state and non-state actors, as predicted by the 
Federation of Canadian Municipalities.  
 
6.4 Final Thoughts 
This thesis has contributed to literature on Canada’s participation in the international 
climate change regime; most importantly, the political geography of climate change 
policymaking in a highly decentralised and regionally asymmetrical country. The debate 
over climate change has most often been studied between the United States and the 
European Union. As with most environmental issues, this concentration of study leads to 
oversimplified and exaggerated conclusions (Schreurs, Selin, and VanDeveer, 2011), 
although there are promising new areas of research in recent years. Context matters and 
with each new country, our analysis and understanding becomes more sophisticated. 
Rather than focusing on the international level and assuming some administrations to be 
more “green” than others, we must seek to understand the rationale behind foreign policy, 
the domestic context, and the capacity within each political system to act. Nothing can be 
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Appendix A. Annex I Emissions between 1997-2012 
Kyoto Target % | Achieved % 
Rounded to the nearest decimal                                      
No goal listed for countries who never ratified or 
withdrew 
 
Countries whose emissions have increased 
Countries whose emissions have decreased 
Source: Adapted from Schwarzer, UNEP GEO Data Portal 
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Appendix B. Kyoto Targets for Annex I Countries 
Kyoto Protocol Annex B: Quantified Emission Limitation and Reduction 
Commitments for the 2008/2012 Commitment Period 
Country Target of 1990 
Baseline 
 EU-15*, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Monaco, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland 
-8% 
 US+ -7% 
 Canada, Hungary, Japan, Poland -6% 
 Croatia -5% 
 New Zealand, Russian Federation, Ukraine 0 
 Norway +1% 
 Australia +8% 
 Iceland +10% 
The list includes countries listed in the UNFCCC’s Annex I except for Belarus and 
Turkey who were not included in the Protocol’s Annex B as they were not Parties to the 
UNFCCC when the Protocol was adopted. However, both are listed under Annex I with 
no mandatory emission targets. 
*  The EU’s 15 member States committed to a collective -8% target but redistributed for 
each country taking advantage of a scheme under the Protocol known as a ‘bubble’. Some 
countries were allowed to grow their emissions while others took greater reductions than -
8%. See Appendix A for examples. 
+ United States never ratified 











Appendix C. Timeline of Federal Climate Change Policies 
1997 Canada announces its intention to sign the Kyoto Protocol (formalised in 
1998) 
1998 First report published, The Kyoto Conference on Climate Change: Let's Get 
The Ball Rolling 
1999 Six greenhouse gases were to be added to the list of toxic substances in 
Schedule 1 to the Act. Tabled in 2005 but later withdrawn 
2000 The Government of Canada Action Plan 2000 committed to reducing GHG 
emissions by 65 million tonnes per year from 2008 to 2012. 
2001 Canada Foundation for Sustainable Development Technology Act: Not-for-
profit foundation established to fund green technology 
2002 Canada formally ratified the Kyoto Protocol. The federal government 
released Climate Change—Achieving Our Commitments Together, 
committed to cut 240 million tonnes of GHG emissions from Canada’s 
projected 2010 level 
2003 Additional $1 billion CAD pledged for climate change programme 
2004 One Tonne Challenge announced 
2005 The Kyoto Protocol entered into force. The federal government released 
Project Green—Moving Forward on Climate Change: A Plan for Honouring 
Our Kyoto Commitment, which committed to reducing GHG emissions by 
270 million tonnes per year from 2008 to 2012. 
 Notice of Intent to Regulate Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Large Final 
Emitters 
 Greenhouse Gas Technology Fund Act 
 Canada Emission Reduction Incentives Agency Act 
 
2006 Clean Air Act. Under the newly elected Conservative government the Large 
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Final Emitters programme was abandoned. Their new Clean Air act (and 
budget) made no mention of Kyoto Protocol; only introduced a tax credit for 
the purchase of monthly transit passes  
2007 Environment Canada released the first climate change plan, as required by 
the Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act, which indicated that Canada’s target 
was to reduce GHG emissions to an average of 6% below its 1990 emission 
level over the 2008–2012 period. The plan reiterated the government’s 
commitment as indicated in “Turning the Corner” and added a commitment 
to reduce Canada’s total GHG emissions by 60 − 70% by 2050. These targets 
were repeated in the 2008 and 2009 climate change plans. 
The Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act is assented to in June, 2007. 
The plan, Turning the Corner was announced. The government announced 
Canada was not on track to meet Kyoto and announced a new target to 
reduce GHG emissions by 20% below Canada’s 2006 level by 2020. 
2010 Canada committed to reducing GHG emissions by 17% below its 2005 level 
by 2020 under the new Federal Sustainable Development Strategy. 
2010 Canada pledged $400 million in new and additional climate change financing 
for 2010-2011 
2011 Canada announced its intention to formally withdraw from the Kyoto 
Protocol. Canada committed to 17% cuts from 2005 levels by 2020 − lower 






Appendix D. Political Parties in Parliament 1997-2012 
 
Governing Party Opposition Parties 
1997 Majority Liberal Party 155 seats Reform Party 60 seats BQ 44 seats NDP 21 seats PC 20 seats 
 
          
 
          
2000 Majority Liberal Party 172 seats Alliance Party 66 seats BQ 38 seats NDP 13 seats PC 12 seats 
 
          
 
          
 
          
2004 Minority Liberal Party 135 seats Conservative Party 99 seats BQ 54 seats NDP 19 seats 
 
 
        
 2006 Minority Conservative Party 124 seats Liberal Party 103 seats BQ 51 seats NDP 29 seats 
 
 
        
 2008 Minority Conservative Party 143 seats Liberal Party 77 seats BQ 49 seats NDP 30 seats 
 
 
        
 
 
        
 2011 Majority Conservative Party 166 seats NDP 103 seats Liberal 34 seats BQ 4 seats Green 1 seat 
 
          
 
